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This book contains selected papers written by students who followed the course “EU Law 
Foundations – The Institutional Functioning of the European Union”, which is part of the 
Bachelor Programme European Law School offered by the Faculty of Law of the Maastricht 
University, in 2012-2013.  
In 2010 the Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA) awarded 
financial support to this course in the form of a Jean Monnet European Module (Lifelong 
Learning Programme). The Jean Monnet grant enabled us first of all to invite a series of 
distinguished guest-speakers, who shared their knowledge, experiences and views on the 
institutional functioning of the European Union with the students. The guest-speakers 
included Onno Hoes (Mayor, City Maastricht), Bruno de Witte (Professor Maastricht 
University and Robert Schumann Centre, European University Institute Florence), Robert 
Madelin (Director General of DG Connect European Commission) and Jean Paul Jacqué 
(Honorary Director General, Council of the European Union and Emeritus Professor, 
University of Strasbourg). We thank the guest-speakers for their inspiring presentations, 
which have enriched both the students and the teaching staff. Special thanks go to Mayor 
Onno Hoes, who permitted us to include his lecture in this volume.  
In addition, the Jean Monnet grant enabled us inter alia to organize each year a Student 
Conference. In December 2010 and December 2011 respectively we organized the first two 
conferences. The best papers presented by students during these conferences were published 
in EU Law Foundations – The Institutional Functioning of the European Union – 2010-2011 
Volume I and EU Law Foundations – The Institutional Functioning of the European Union – 
2011-2012 Volume II respectively. These volumes are available in hardcopy as well in its soft 
copy version on the website of the Maastricht Centre for European Law (MCEL).1  
The third conference was held on 7 December 2012. Each of the 180 students participating in 
the course was given the opportunity to either present a paper or act as a discussant of other 
students’ papers in workshops composed of 40-45 participants. The quality of the 
presentations and discussions, in which also staff members of our Faculty participated, was 
high and led to often lively and heated debates on issues involving the institutional 
functioning of the European Union. The 12 best papers are collected in this special volume. 
The Conference was closed by a keynote address delivered by Sacha Prechal, Judge at the 
Court of Justice of the European Union and Professor of European Law, University of 
Utrecht, entitled “Being a Judge in Europe – What Makes the Difference?”. We are grateful 
for her thought-provoking presentation and sharing her experiences with us.    
In addition to Judge Prechal and the other guest-speakers, we are indebted to Monica Claes, 
Florin Coman-Kund, Tanja Ehnert, Giulia Giardi, Suzanne Jongste, Sead Kadic, Raymond 
Luja, Elise Muir, Andrea Ott, L. Tilindyte, Maartje de Visser and Sabrina Wirtz for their 
various contributions. Last but not least, we would like to express our sincere gratitude to 
EACEA for the financial support received without which it would have been impossible to 
make the course as interesting and successful as it was.  
 
Anne Pieter van der Mei and Ellen Vos 
  
                                                 
1 http://www.maastrichtuniversity.nl/web/Institutes/MaastrichtCentreForEuropeanLaw.htm.   
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SPECIAL CONTRIBUTION 
REFLECTIONS ON THE IMPACT OF THE TREATY OF MAASTRICHT ON 
MAASTRICHT  
 
Onno Hoes 
 
 
Dear Students and Staff of the Maastricht Centre for European Law, Ladies and Gentlemen, 
 
It is with great pleasure that I have accepted the kind invitation of Professor Ellen Vos to tell 
something of my experiences with Europe in your course in EU Law Foundations. I am 
pleased to do so not only because Europe and its recent history are very important for 
Maastricht, but also because it gives me the opportunity to address you as members of our 
municipal society.   
As Mayor of this city, I am convinced that Maastricht would not be what it is today, if you, 
students, weren’t here and would not have brought your dynamics into our community. 
Maastricht needs its students, and hopefully you need Maastricht, and all the things you can 
learn and experience here, too. You are the future, you should have the new ideas and 
initiatives, be it politically, be it economically, be it cultural.  
If you ask me if there was any impact of the Treaty of Maastricht on Maastricht itself, my first 
answer would be: it gave us an enormous amount of worldwide free publicity. The name 
‘Maastricht’ has been mentioned during the last 20 years in countless articles, news reports 
and so on. And until today journalists from all over the world visit the town if they want to 
make a report from somewhere in Europe, for example on the economic crisis and its impact 
on people on the street. This year alone, the city was visited among others by the BBC, the 
Wall Street Journal, the Economist, the national television of Japan, Sweden, Poland and 
Belarus, MTV Moscow and writing journalists from all over Europe. 
I would like to emphasize that it made us not only aware of the fact that Maastricht, the 
birthplace of the European Union and the Euro, lies in the middle of the new Europe. It also 
made us aware of the fact Europe lies in Maastricht, more than anywhere else, as you 
yourselves demonstrate by having different nationalities and having chosen a study that 
concerns itself with the legal foundations of our international, European society. International 
contacts and exchange of knowledge are becoming more and more normal and essential. 
Indeed it would be impossible to live without those contacts. 
 
Ladies and gentlemen, exactly 20 years ago the European Union and its currency, the euro, 
were established by the Maastricht Treaty, adopted here on February 7th, 1992. In February 
2012 we celebrated the 20th anniversary of the 1992 Treaty in a time of crisis and doubts. 
Public discussions arose on the question of whether it was perhaps a mistake to have accepted 
the monetary union, the political union and whetehr there should perhaps have been stronger 
conditions for accession.  However, during the conference in February 2012, that was 
organized by the University in cooperation with the city, people who were directly involved in 
the negotiations that lead to the Treaty concluded that it was a logical outcome of the spirit of 
that time in a Europe that aimed at a permanent unification. Not only to create a stable 
political climate, with respect though for national singularities and differences, but also to 
prevent future military conflicts within Europe.  
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I also would like to remind you that in the late eighties and early nineties Western Europe was 
confronted with the end of communism and the cold war. The new political map of Eastern 
Europe asked for an answer of the existing European Community. Despite the current crisis, 
the outcome of the February 2012 conference reflected optimism about the future of Europe 
and the role of Europe in the future world. Let us not forget that, being the largest economic 
conglomerate in the world, the European Union can take a much stronger position in the 
world, both economic and political, then any separate nation can do. 
 
Another aspect of the Treaty is less known by the general public, but had an impact on our 
society in general, and maybe on the Maastricht University and its Faculty of Law in 
particular. European democracy and parliamentarism, and therefore European Union law, got 
a stronger position. The Maastricht Treaty created the co-decision procedure, a reform that 
boosted the role of the European Parliament in the European Union.  
When signing the Treaty of Maastricht, European leaders adopted declarations stressing how 
important it is to involve parliaments in European decision-making, both the European 
Parliament and the national parliaments. Since then the role of parliaments in European 
decision-making has grown considerably. I believe we should be proud of this development 
because strong parliaments promote responsible European governance and enhance 
democracy in Europe.    
So one of the impacts of the Treaty on Maastricht is that the city is host to strong university 
research centres which focus on European law, democratic accountability and parliamentary 
control: your own Maastricht Centre on European Law and the Montesquieu Institute 
Maastricht. And of course I should mention the departments of History and of Political 
Science of the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (FASOS), which specialise in the history 
of European integration and in European institutional politics. 
 
If you permit me to take a look at the future, I believe that Maastricht agrees for an important 
part with the view developed by our key-note speaker in February 2012, dr. Parag Khanna, 
who argued that a mixture of the public and private sector will be needed to save the world. 
Not only nations and governmental organisations, but also large cities, multinational 
companies, non-governmental organisations and even extremely rich entrepreneurs will play 
their role in providing the world with what it needs. He also emphasized that, from a political 
point of view, strong regional partnerships are essential and he believed that the European 
Union is such a strong regional player in the world and has the resilience to cope with the 
problems of today.  
Europe in the next twenty years, ladies and gentlemen, is something that will have to be 
invented, organised and supported also and maybe just by you, being born around the time the 
Treaty was prepared and signed. The next 20 years it is you, who will be the real ambassadors 
of the Maastricht and the European soul. A soul that is nourished by the fact that you have to 
be the instigators of the future, that you may have the new ideas Europe needs. And hopefully, 
those ideas will benefit from the thoughts that you will receive during your studies here. 
 
Looking back, again I must add that, apart from the indirect benefits of the free publicity, this 
world-famous treaty has really proven to be a huge advantage for our city. Since then, we 
have been referred to as the Fourth City of Europe, after Brussels, Strasbourg and 
Luxembourg. Not in terms of size, of course, but rather in reference to our European profile. 
Moreover, the Treaty nourishes the international character of Maastricht, which you encounter 
here in the Maastricht University every day, and also enhanced by a lot of institutes in 
Maastricht, attracting young people from all over Europe and the rest of the world to come 
live and study here. The Maastricht University, the Zuyd University of Applied Sciences, the 
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European Institute for Public Administration, the European Journalism Centre, the Maastricht 
School of Management, the United Nations University and the European Centre for 
Development Policy Management are some of the exponents of those international orientated 
educational institutes. 
Ladies and gentlemen, it is also good to realise that it is not only the Maastricht Treaty that we 
have to thank for our international position. Our European status is largely due to our 
geographical location. After all, the Maastricht region shares 220 kilometres of border with 
Belgium and Germany, and only eight kilometres with the rest of the Netherlands. You will 
understand and already have experienced yourselves, that people, goods and services are 
constantly crossing the borders here. Indeed, in this region we are more or less forced to think 
and act as genuine Europeans. That is why the municipal government’s policy and all the 
organisations and businesses operating in our city are European in outlook. 
Nevertheless, I would like to emphasize the importance of a United Europe, as we in 
Maastricht see it. Having been a trading city – and after the industrialisation – a fabricating 
city for most of our history, Maastricht recognises the necessity of sharing responsibilities for 
economic interests, legal and moral values, and the democratic justification of it all. I strongly 
believe that a united Europe is essential for our prosperity, and that the internal market adds to 
existing opportunities of economic growth. The Netherlands and Maastricht were for 
centuries internationally orientated, we created and still create a lot of that prosperity in 
foreign countries and especially in Europe. 
 
Back to the Treaty, ladies and gentlemen. Today we face a new challenge. The Maastricht 
Treaty of 1992 was the first European treaty with a cultural paragraph. In many ways borders 
still are a huge obstacle for cooperation, for business, for knowledge institutes and for cultural 
productions and products. In 2018 the Netherlands, together with Malta, is entitled to deliver 
the European Capital of Culture. As you may have noticed, Maastricht candidates for this 
title, not in the least because in 2018 the Treaty will be 25 years in effect. Especially in this 
part of Europe we share with our neighbors of the Euregion Maas-Rhein a rich history and 
cultural heritage, which should make it possible to live, to learn, to work and to enjoy with 
each other. It is the whole region which supports Maastricht in its nomination: the cities of 
Aachen, Liège, Hasselt, Tongeren, Genk, Sint-Truiden, Heerlen, Geleen-Sittard, the Dutch 
province of Limburg, the Belgian provinces of Limburg and Liège, the Deutschsprachige 
Gemeinschaft Belgiens, and the region Aachen. 
Maastricht lies on one of the ethnic fault lines of Europe. Today those fault lines do not 
compare to the intensity of the fault lines of religion and race of which our society nowadays 
is so aware of. But for the people who lived in this region in the past, their divisions were very 
real. Some of the divisions were linguistic ones. Limburg’s is the local dialect and Dutch is 
the official language but it is also on the dividing line between Dutch, German and French. 
Maastricht is now part of a multilingual Euro-region. It has prospered and I am certain it will 
continue to do so for years to come. Inspired by the Treaty, Maastricht has accepted 
difference and embraced it. 
 
The Treaty of 1992 made the name Maastricht almost synonymous for the European Union. 
As European Capital of Culture our Euregion could be a new example for the rest of Europe 
and other Euregions. An example, ladies and gentlemen, of a new Europe, the Europe of the 
civilians, built bottom-up on the foundation of culture. Our bid, called Europa Herontdekt or 
in English Europe Revisited, was officially presented only ten days ago. It describes four 
major program lines: Speaking in tongues, Remembering the future, Mirroring Europe and 
Living Europe.  
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civilians, built bottom-up on the foundation of culture. Our bid, called Europa Herontdekt or 
in English Europe Revisited, was officially presented only ten days ago. It describes four 
major program lines: Speaking in tongues, Remembering the future, Mirroring Europe and 
Living Europe.  
 
8 
 
You all have a keen interest in Europe and its legal and cultural foundations, and you will be 
asked to bring in your own ideas, opinions and perspectives into the content of a new treaty. 
As I said before: you are the young generation which could and should playa  key role in the 
future course of Europe. Together with everyone else who was born around the time of the 
original Treaty you are the generation Maastricht.  
 
Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to thank you for choosing this university as a worthy place 
to study and I wish you the best of luck during your future years, here in our common 
European city of Maastricht. Thank you for your attention.  
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THE HERITAGE OF THE LUXEMBOURG ACCORDS POST-LISBON  
 
Felix Bahmann 
 
 
 1. Introduction 
 
In my paper I will address the Luxembourg Compromise of 1966 and research its 
repercussions throughout the process of European Integration until today. The arrangement 
agreed upon in January 1966 has sparked an on-going discussion – not only about its causes 
and effects, but also on its actual legal nature. I would therefore like to follow the 
development of Qualified Majority Voting in the Council and evaluate, in how far the 
Luxembourg Compromise still influences the current institutional framework. 
To that end, I will start with a short exposition of the main historic events and developments, 
namely the Empty Chair Crisis of 1965 and the Compromise in the following year but also the 
further developments in the Single European Act in 1986, the Treaty of Maastricht of 1992 
and the subsequent Ioannina Compromise in 1994. 
After that, I will address these questions from a theoretical perspective and try to explain them 
in line with the supranational and neofunctionalist views on European integration. In how far 
was the Luxembourg Compromise a throwback to the supranational agenda? Could it together 
with the Ioannina Compromise support the intergovernmentalist’s view on the European 
Union? 
Eventually I will try to combine these two parts, the historical facts and the theoretical 
background to analyze whether and to which degree the Luxembourg Compromise is still 
active today. Based on this I will present my conclusion: The Luxembourg Compromise and 
its successors are very alive today and define the institutional framework of the European 
Union at its core. 
 
 
2.  The Empty Chair Crisis and the Luxembourg Compromise 
 
The European Integration has been in its beginning a multi-layered process. The Council of 
Europe of 1949 was supplemented by the European Atomic Energy Community and first and 
foremost the European Economic Community, established in the Treaty of Rome in 1957.1 
In retrospective, the first years of the EEC seem like a honeymoon, characterized by the 
settling into the new premises in Brussels, the delegation of tasks and a general atmosphere of 
harmonious cooperation.2 The six founding Member States – France, Italy, Western Germany, 
the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg – worked together and set time frames for further 
integration. Special emphasis was put on the setting up of the Customs Union.3 
Even though different opinions on the future character of the EEC existed from the start, these 
did not become apparent for a longer time. Whereas de Gaulle, the charismatic President of 
France saw the EEC mainly as platform for cooperation while fully retaining national 
sovereignty based on the principle of direct diplomacy between the Member States4, the 
Benelux countries were open for a more supranational approach. Also the newly instituted 
                                                 
1 De Witte 2009, p. 9. 
2 Dinan 2010, p. 34. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Eggermont 2012, p. 7. 
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Commission of the European Economic Community under its first president Walter Hallstein 
was in favor of central competences.5 
Of special importance for France was the Common Agricultural Policy, with which it wanted 
to externalize the cost of subsiding its “large and unproductive agricultural sector”6 to the 
European level. The Commission wanted to seize this opportunity and pushed for the 
establishment of a system of own financial resources, which would by brought up by the 
Member States, but exclusively administered by the EEC and that would replace the current 
temporary funding arrangement, which kept the decision power with the Member States. 
Furthermore, it asserted Art. 47 TEEC, which would make decisions on this matter subject to 
Qualified Majority Voting in the Council from 1966 on.7 
Contrary to the original agreement in 1957 this change met the fierce resistance of de Gaulle, 
who after the French constitutional reform and the birth of the Fifth Republic adhered again to 
the ideal of a strong and independent France. Losing its blocking veto under Qualified 
Majority Voting system and the risk of being overruled, could not be reconciled with his 
aims.8 
The French position was known and yet the Commission continued its plan, thereby 
“violating the golden rule of not taking any action likely to encounter an outright veto”, as 
Robert Marjolin put it.9 The conflict between France and the Commission escalated in June 
1965 when de Gaulle declared that France would openly oppose Art. 47 TEEC and the 
Qualified Majority Voting system and recalled his ministers and permanent representatives 
from the Brussels institutions, leaving their chairs empty. However, since all other Member 
States stood together in this matter and de Gaulle won the elections in December 1965 only 
with a small margin, he gave up his hard line soon and was willing to negotiate an 
agreement.10 It was finally reached at a meeting in Luxembourg in January 1966, which still 
was largely an ‘Agreement to disagree’11: 
 
I. Where, in the case of decisions which may be taken by majority vote on a proposal of 
the Commission, very important interests of one or more partners are at stake, the 
Members of the Council will endeavour, within a reasonable time, to reach solutions 
which can be adopted by all the Members of the Council while respecting their mutual 
interests and those of the Community, in accordance with Article 2 of the Treaty. 
II. With regard to the preceding paragraph, the French delegation considers that where 
very important interests are at stake the discussion must be continued until unanimous 
agreement is reached. 
III. The six delegations note that there is a divergence of views on what should be done 
in the event of a failure to reach complete agreement. 
IV. The six delegations nevertheless consider that this divergence does not prevent the 
Community’s work being resumed in accordance with the normal procedure. 
 
 
Considering the Community law was still at an early stage at that time, the legal nature of the 
Luxembourg Compromise has always been uncertain and subject to intensive debate.12 In 
                                                 
5 Dinan 2010, p. 37. 
6 Dinan 2010, p. 36. 
7 Dinan 2010, p. 37. 
8 Eggermont 2012, p. 11. 
9 Dinan 2010, p. 37. 
10 Dinan 2010, p. 38. 
11 de Witte 2009, p. 39. 
12 Palavret 2006, p. 305. 
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short it made clear that, even though Art. 47 TEEC and the Qualified Majority Voting in some 
fields was left in place, each Member State could invoke its “very important interests” to veto 
any decisions which were to be taken by the council. As the second paragraph of the 
compromise points out, France deemed this as a definite and binding possibility, whereas the 
other Member States only agreed to “reach solutions which can be adopted by all the 
Members of the Council within a reasonable time.”  
Notwithstanding these different views it soon became evident that the de facto rejection of 
Qualified Majority Voting paralyzed the Council and slowed down the processes within the 
EU, since the Member States could only bring forward proposals which were very likely to be 
adopted by all states.13 
The Luxembourg Compromise did not take the form of an officially binding decision, so that 
the actual legal effect of it is disputable. Nevertheless, unanimity could henceforth always be 
reached. Some believe therefore that the Compromise reaffirmed Marjolin’s ‘golden rule’.14 
According to the ‘orthodox’ interpretation, the Luxembourg Compromise came to an end with 
the Single European Act in 1986, which intended to break up the time of eurosclerosis and 
accelerate the integration process, eventually introducing Qualified Majority Voting in the 
Council.15 Others think, it was even till a later stage theoretically part of the Union acquis, yet 
not binding or enforceable, but generally observed.16 
 
The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 further improved the application of Qualified Majority Voting 
in the European institutions. According to Art. 203, the Council of the European Union will 
use Qualified Majority Voting in certain fields.17 It furthermore introduced a system of 
weighted votes, roughly resembling the Member State’s population: The United Kingdom, 
Italy, France and Germany were assigned ten votes; Spain had eight; Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Greece and Portugal five; Sweden and Austria four; Ireland, Denmark and 
Ireland three and Luxembourg two votes. Before the first accession round, a Qualified 
Majority consisted of 54 out of 76 votes in total.18 
After the accession of Finland, Austria and Sweden the total votes grew to 87, changing the 
Qualified Majority to 61. However, this also meant that the blocking minority was raised to 
26 votes which met resistance from the United Kingdom and Spain, with especially the 
United Kingdom being driven by its Euroscepticism of that time. The British interests in the 
Council of the European Union are comparable to the French behavior in the European 
Council in 1965. Even though, these two are two different legal entities (and the latter is de 
jure not an organ of the European Union), both closely related, not only in terms of their 
composition, but also in their function and procedure.19 
During a extraordinary meeting in Ioannina, the foreign ministers of the Member States 
therefore agreed on a special arrangement: The official blocking minority remained 26 votes, 
but 23 votes are sufficient to force the Council to reach a compromise within reasonable 
time.20 
This arrangement was sometimes seen as a comeback of the Luxembourg Compromise and an 
adaption to the new realities of the EU of twelve member states and later inspired the 
                                                 
13 Golub 2007, p. 179. 
14 Eggermont 2012, p.8. 
15 Dinan 2010, p. 262. 
16 Westlake/Galloway 2004, p. 235. 
17 Kent 2001, p. 23. 
18 Dinan 2010, p. 166. 
19 Dinan 2010, p. 237. 
20 Dinan 2010, p. 167. 
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respective provisions in the Treaties of Nice and Lisbon.21 It also brought to light, how 
institutional politics could be more complicated with a growing number of Member States.22 
 
Facing the forthcoming accession round in 2004, the Treaty of Nice again dealt with 
amending and updating the voting system in the Council.23 For that purpose two main points 
were decided. Article 3 of the treaty set out a new definition of the Qualified Majority and 
Declarations 20 and 21 in the annex of the treaty explained the Member State’s positions on 
the weighting of votes in the EU of 24.24 
Probably the most striking innovation was the combination of votes in the council with the 
population it represents. This so-called demographic clause, added to Art. 205 of the EC 
Treaty, ensured that for a decision to be adopted not only the qualified majority had to be 
reached, but the Member States voting in favor of a proposal also had to comprise 62% of the 
EU’s overall population. This was further specified in the Accession Treaty of 2003, 
confirming Declaration 21 of the Treaty of Nice: France, the United Kingdom, Germany and 
Italy were given 29 votes, Spain and Poland 27. The other Member States had fewer votes, 
vaguely corresponding to their population.25 This was also due to Poland’s energetic struggle 
for a high number of votes, despite their population of only 38 million. Also, France vetoed 
Germany’s strive for more votes and insisted on the symbolic parity between these two 
states.26 
Effectively, a council decision is adopted by a Qualified Majority, which needs to receive at 
least 232 out of the 321 total votes, which is 72.3 %, and fulfills the ‘demography clause’ of 
representing at least 62% of the EU’s population.27 
 
 
3.  Neofunctionalism and Intergovernmentalism 
 
The theory of Neofunctionalism is closely connected to the work of Ernst Haas. In 1958 he 
published his book The Uniting of Europe which tried to explain the supranational 
cooperation in Western Europe after the Treaty of Rome. Although his theory is nowadays 
seen as centered on the European Integration process, it originally intended to formulate a 
‘grand theory’, to make out patterns for future regional cooperation in all places of the 
world.28 
In short, the theory is based on the assumption that political integration follows from 
economic integration and tried to explain the transformation of the EU’s organs and its power 
gains since the 1960ies.29 Of special importance is the Spillover concept which lies at the core 
of Neofunctionalism. Haas believed that cooperating in a certain policy field would 
necessarily lead to the need of cooperation in other fields as well, leading to an automatic 
process of step-by-step integration. He mainly focused on researching the reasons of patterns 
of integration rather than formulation aims and end goals of this process.30 He furthermore 
stated that even though national governments would not be the driving factors in this process, 
                                                 
21 Westlake/Galloway 2004, p. 245. 
22 Dinan 2010, p. 167. 
23 Westlake/Galloway 2004, p. 243. 
24 The Treaty of Nice: A Comprehensive Guide. 
25 The Treaty of Nice: A Comprehensive Guide. 
26 Cini 2007, p. 163. 
27 Treaty of Nice: A Comprehensive Guide. 
28 Cini 2007, p. 86. 
29 Sandholz/Sweet 2012, p. 2. 
30 Cini 2007, p. 87. 
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regional groups and private actors would support integration, as they would see their benefits 
in it.31 
The theory was very popular among academic circles in the 1960ies, as it seemed to offer a 
theoretical foundation for the ongoing process of that time. Indeed, many of its core thoughts 
including the spillover effect were proven right at that time, keeping in mind the movement 
forward from the European Coal and Steel Community to the Rome Treaty and further and 
deeper integration.32 
The first big crisis of the European integration process also marked the decay of this theory. 
The slowing down in the European Community and the Empty Chair crisis showed that the 
assumption of a steady and ongoing process of integration driven by supranationalist elites 
was not taking place. Also, the French behaviour made clear that traditional power politics 
and the preservation of national interests were still decisive factors in Europe.33 
 
 
In the wake of the Luxembourg compromise and the perceived stop of the self-fuelling 
integration in Europe, Intergovernmentalism emerged as the other main theory in explaining 
regional cooperation. Based on the writings of Stanley Hoffmann it succeeded in convincing 
academic scholars in the 1970ies and 1980ies, also a time of ‘Eurosclerosis’ and a slow and 
difficult integration process. Unlike Haas who looked at private interest groups and 
supranational elites as decisive actors, Hoffmann’s conceptual approach is cantered on the 
national states and is rooted in the classical, realist theories of International Relations.34 
The Luxembourg Compromise was largely seen as disproving Neofunctionalism and proving 
the intergovernmentalist thesis.35 According to the proponents of this school, nation states act 
rationally, thus using regional integration only as means to serve their own interests. This is 
usually characterized by a 'bargaining process', in which each state tries to reach the most for 
itself, which often becomes apparent in tense situations.36 
As France was in 1966 certainly the most powerful Member State, with a  policy of aiming 
for national greatness and independent, it could easily use its position to force the other 
Member States in accepting its demands. However, some believe that the others were glad to 
give in as they secretly agreed with this confirmation of the intergovernmental element of the 
community.37 
Intergovernmentalism seems therefore to be indeed a valuable tool to explain patterns in the 
European Union's history and clearly matches the situation leading to the Luxembourg 
Council.  
 
 
4.  The Luxembourg Compromise and its Aftermath 
 
As I have laid out previously, the Empty Chair Crisis and the subsequent Luxembourg 
Compromise was perhaps the first crisis of the young European Community. The 
Luxembourg Compromise had three immediate and lasting consequences on a material level: 
It reduced the legislative in- and output, since the requirement on unanimity made Member 
States reluctant to bring forward proposals. Furthermore, ambitious proposals were not 
                                                 
31 Ibid. 
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33 Ibid. 
34 Cini 2007, p. 100. 
35 Chryssochoou, p. 66. 
36 Ibid. 
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itself, which often becomes apparent in tense situations.36 
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4.  The Luxembourg Compromise and its Aftermath 
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Compromise was perhaps the first crisis of the young European Community. The 
Luxembourg Compromise had three immediate and lasting consequences on a material level: 
It reduced the legislative in- and output, since the requirement on unanimity made Member 
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33 Ibid. 
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36 Ibid. 
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submitted either, as the Member States' veto made them unlikely to succeed. And thirdly it 
slowed down decision-making in general, as the negotiations took longer time and were more 
important.38 
Apart from these concrete effects, it also changed the spirit of the European project. The 
honeymoon of the first years was gone, the dogmatic predictions of an steady and self-fuelling 
integration process made by the (Neo)functionalists were proven wrong. Instead it was 
suddenly clear, that single Member States (in this case France) would put their national 
interests over the well-being of the community, if they find this necessary. In hindsight, this 
seems not to be a spectacular outcome and many realists could have predicted this, but 
nevertheless it stalled the process of European integration for a long time, arguably even until 
the Single European Act was passed in 1986.39 
Moreover, the French refusal to accept Qualified Majority Voting in the Council, as 
previously agreed on in the Treaty of Rome, also had long-term repercussions in the EC's - 
and the later the EU's – institutional framework. The supranational character of the 
organization was to some degree weakened and the Council become the single most powerful 
organ. Also, the unianimity requirement and the Veto power if “vital national interests” are at 
stake, made clear that the Member States could block decisions as a solution of last resort.40  
Whether and when the veto possibility of the Luxembourg Compromise was used, is hard to 
ascertain. It lies in the nature of the compromise that only the threat to block a decision or 
even the open display of discontent could trigger renewed negotiations to reach unanimity. 
Furthermore, even this was often unnecessary as all actors were well aware of this possibility, 
thus only bringing forward proposals which all Member States are likely to agree on.41 
According to some scholars the Luxembourg Compromise's veto has been lastly invoked by 
Germany in 1985 and is “dead” today.42 Nevertheless, keeping in mind the nature of the 
Compromise as described above, this can easily be falsified. On the contrary, the concept 
seems very much alive, however, “usually in a deep sleep, but subject to very occasional 
awakening”.43 
Nevertheless, it is obvious that in a EU of 27 Member States works differently with the 
Western European alliance of the 1950ies consisting of six states. 
After the accession of Finland, Austria and Sweden the total votes grew to 87, changing the 
Qualified Majority to 61 and the blocking minority to 26 votes. At a special conference in 
Ioannina the Member States therefore agreed on a special arrangement: The official blocking 
minority remained 26 votes, but 23 votes are sufficient to force the Council to reach a 
compromise within reasonable time.44 Indeed, this arrangement can be seen as a comeback of 
the Luxembourg Compromise and an adaption to the new realities of the EU of twelve 
member states. 
This topic was also at the core at the negotiations on the Treaty of Nice and came up again 
very recently in 2007. The current legal framework is in some way even more confusing and 
complicated than the original veto power of 1958. Unlike previously interended, the voting 
method of double majorities will only be applied from 2014 on and will fully enter into force 
from 2017. Furthermore, the Ioannina compromise was again confirmed in a perhapseven 
stronger way: The Council will from 2017 be forced to reach unianimity even in matters that 
                                                 
38 Golub 2007, p. 282. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Dinan 2010, p. 167. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Nedergaard 2007, p. 168. 
43 Nugent 1999, p. 121. 
44 Dinan 2010, p. 167. 
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actually on ly require a Qualified Majority if at least 24,75% of the Member States, 
representing at least 19,25% of the population demand so.45 
The process which has begun in Luxembourg in 1966 has therefore evolved to a pattern which 
repeated itself over the history of the European Union. The Ioannina Compromise, the 
Treaties of Nice and Lisbon all confirmed and adapted the Compromise to the current 
situation. The intergovernmental element in the Council and the Veto power of single member 
states (or an alliance of a few) is therefore very much alive: The shadow of the Luxembourg 
Compromise still reaches to the present. 
 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
Based on this analysis of the development and outcome of the Empty Chair Crisis and the 
subsequent Luxembourg Compromise I did not only try to explain it by utilizing the 
conceptual approaches of Neofunctionalism and Intergovernmentalism, but also to follow the 
content of the Luxembourg Compromise through the time.  
During the development of the European integration process, this agreement has changed its 
forms and precise details many times, but could retain its content – making the Council an 
essential intergovernmental organ of the European Union and safeguarding the Member 
States' veto right. 
Even though, the enlargement of the Union made an adaption of this compromise necessary 
and one single state can nowadays not officially block a decision, already a small minority is 
sufficient to change a decision based on a Qualified Majority to a vote requiring unanimity. 
The Luxembourg Compromise therefore proved to change the course of European integration 
fundamentally and still exercises great influence on the Council's voting method, making 
unanimity the ideal situation which is always aimed for. With regards to the many opinions 
stating that the Luxembourg Compromise 'died' in the 1980ies, I can conclude: There is life in 
the old dog yet! 
 
 
 
                                                 
45 The Treaty of Nice: A Comprehensive Guide. 
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DECISION-MAKING BY CONSENSUS: BY DEFINITION A BAD THING? 
 
Johanna Hagenauer 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The Council of Ministers (‘the Council’) is arguably the most powerful organ of the European 
Union (EU). It has traditionally been considered as the main decision-maker of the European 
Union, even though the European Parliament has increasingly been accounted decision-
making power up to equal status under the co-decision procedure in the Maastricht Treaty. In 
fulfilling this task the Council officially decides on matters using the formal voting method of 
either qualified-majority voting (QMV)1 or unanimity. However, traditionally the Council of 
Ministers is eager to reach consensus, without the use of any vote, and hence approximately 
65% of the decisions are based thereon. The avoidance of formal and transparent forms of 
decision-making adds to the various vital claims of democratic deficit, often associated with 
the Council.2 The conventional secrecy of the Council’s deliberations only furthers the claim 
of a lack of transparency.3 In the light of the call for a transition to formal decision-making by 
QMV, one may equally ask why consensus is aimed at by the Council?  
This article aims to examine the underlying rationale of the institution of consensus, its 
possible disadvantages and benefits, and the question whether formal voting methods should 
be preferred to consensus. First, an overview about the historic development of decision-
making in the Council will be provided, taking into account events like the infamous 
Luxembourg Accords of 1966 that provide the starting point of the development of the 
informal method of consensus. This is important to understand the nature of consensus and 
the reasons why it initially evolved. Second, the practise of decision-making by consensus and 
its main characteristics will be outlined. Third, an evaluation of possible concerns about this 
informal norm will be presented. Fourth, possible reasons underlying the preference for 
consensus will be assessed. Finally, a conclusion will be drawn on the findings of the article, 
in which it will be argued that a transition to QMV in the Council is neither feasible nor 
desirable.  
 
 
2. Evolution of Decision-Making in the Council 
 
To understand the informal method of consensus, it is necessary to discuss certain historical 
events that have shaped decision-making as it exists today in the Council. Originally, at the 
time of the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC) under the Treaty of 
Rome in 1957, the main form of voting was unanimity.4 This meant that in order to come to a 
                                                 
1 Art. 16 TEU read in conjunction with Art. 3 of Protocol (No 36) on Transitional Provision holds currently 
for a system of weighed votes whereby an act shall be adopted by a number of votes representing at least a 
majority of Council members, if the proposal originated in the Commission, and representing two thirds of 
Council members in other cases. Furthermore a member of the Council may request, where an act was 
adopted by qualified majority, to check whether the Member States comprising the qualified majority also 
represent 62% of the total population of the Union. If this is not the case the act shall not be adopted. 
2 See: D. Heisenberg, ’The institution of ’consensus’ in the European Union: Formal versus informal 
decision-making in the Council’, European Journal of Political Research (2005); and  S. Novak, L’opacité 
du consensus – La Prise de Décision au Conseil de L’Union européenne, available at 
<www.laviedesidees.fr> (last visited 31.05.2013). 
3 D. Heisenberg, European Journal of Political Research (2005), p.82. 
4 N. Foster, EU Law Directions (2nd edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008), p. 19. 
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decision all of the six core Member States had to agree. This form of decision-making hence 
provided the Member States with the opportunity to effectively veto a decision they did not 
favour. However, it was already realised at the time the Treaty of Rome was signed that there 
was a need for a more efficient form of decision-making. This need, in time, called for the 
introduction of QMV in the Council.5  
 
2.1  Luxembourg Accords 
  
There were however opponents to a transition to QMV. Amongst them was French President 
of that time Charles de Gaulle, who strongly opposed a proposal in 1965 providing for, 
amongst other measures, the introduction of QMV.6 The French President feared the loss of 
national sovereignty to an unacceptable extent by approving a proposal of such ‘federalist 
logic’.7 As a consequence of the failure to come to a compromise in the Council, De Gaulle 
refused to attend any Council meetings until this matter was resolved. This essentially 
blocked all Council activity, creating a deadlock since all other Member States were unable to 
make decisions because unanimity was required. The period of French non-attendance in the 
Council, which lasted seven months, became known as the ‘empty chair crisis’, which was 
resolved in the Luxembourg Accords in January 1966.8  
The infamous Luxembourg Accords were essentially ‘an agreement to disagree’ with regard 
to voting methods in the Council.9 It provided for something akin to a veto for Members 
States in cases where an agreement appears to be impossible and where national interests of 
any Member States were at stake.10 Since there was no clear definition of the term ‘vital 
interests’, the Member States themselves were left with the task to interpret what it meant. 
Deliberations would therefore continue, sometimes extensively, until consensus was reached 
and therefore QMV became rather an exception than the norm.11 This development was 
considered to be a ‘return to intergovernmentalism’12 and had its impact on the dynamic and 
efficiency of Council decision-making and the therewith the pace at which Community goals 
were achieved. This historical event, resulting in a period of stagnation, can also be regarded 
as setting the stage for the development of a ‘culture of consensus’, as it exists today, based 
on over 40 years of conventional practice.  
 
2.2 The Single European Act  
 
After approximately twenty years of political malaise in the Community an attempt for 
institutional revitalization was made in the 1985 Single European Act (SEA) providing the 
extension of QMV in the Council for a range of areas previously voted on by unanimity. The 
aim was to improve the efficiency of the Council by eliminating the possibility of a veto for 
the Member States.13 The measures introduced by the SEA were regarded as the effective 
statutory introduction of QMV in the Council.14 
                                                 
5 Ibid. 
6 P. Craig et al, EU law – Text, Cases and Materials (5th edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008), p. 
7. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 N. Foster, EU Law Directions, p. 19. 
10 I. Bache et al, Politics in the European Union (3rd edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2011), p. 129. 
11 P. Craig et al, EU law – Text, Cases and Materials, p. 8. 
12 Ibid. 
13 I. Bache et al, Politics in the European Union (3rd edition), p. 154. 
14 J. Tallberg, ’Explaining the institutional foundations of European Union negotiations’, Journal of 
European Public Policy, 17:5 (2010), p. 640. 
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2.3 Decision-Making in the Council Today 
 
Under the current Treaties, the Council votes either by unanimity or QMV, whereby 
according to Art. 16(3) TEU QMV is the default method of decision-making. However, 
decision-making by consensus remains to be the preferred method and in fact in the period 
between July 2009 and June 2012 65% of the decisions for which QMV would have been 
sufficient were made by consensus.15  But why would the Council put itself under the higher 
burden of deliberations needed to reach consensus in cases where an easier method of 
decision-making is available? The official statement provided by the Council is that its aim is 
to ‘shape the policy in such a way that every participant can agree with the final output’.16 The 
evaluation of this argument is unfortunately hindered by the difficulty to conduct research 
about the Council’s deliberations due to residual opacity and a lack of data, despite various 
‘transparency promoting’ measures. 17 This will be explained in the subsequent section where 
the nature and characteristics of consensus will be examined.  
 
 
3. What is Consensus? 
 
‘Consensus’ is often confused with unanimity, as in both decision-making methods no 
opposition is apparent. However ‘consensus’, unlike unanimity, does not constitute a formal 
method of voting but rather holds for deliberations until all opponents are appeased by way of 
bargaining, concessions, package deals and vote exchange. The result is the same: it seems 
like all parties agree. However, in the case of ‘consensus’, this might be an illusion. To assess 
this argument and other concerns being raised about the informal norm of consensus of the 
Council, one has to take a closer look at the actual the decision-making practices. 
As already mentioned, the possibility of assessing the Council’s voting methods is 
significantly impaired since most decisions are still made behind closed doors, while 
transparency measures like public sessions have a theoretical effect only.18 Despite these 
obstacles, a few authors have still tackled the task to shed light using the empirical methods 
interviewing Member State representatives. Being aware of the possible subjective nature of 
the ministers’ statements, one has to be cautious when drawing conclusions. However, 
keeping in mind the lack of other means to assess the Council’s decision-making conduct, it is 
still achievable to identify certain characteristics.  
The official standpoint of the interviewed ministers is that QMV is still systematically used 
when the treaty article provides for it.19 This rests on the assumption that the Presidency of the 
Council is aiming at the highest level of efficiency passing as many laws as possible, which is 
easier under QMV because opposing Member States presenting a minority are simply 
outvoted. However, there are certain informal rules grounded in political realism that apply in 
exceptional cases: large Member States shall not be marginalised in their will and passing a 
law may be delayed when vital interests of a Member State are endangered.20 The latter shows 
significant resemblance to the agreement of the Luxembourg Accords and symbolises to what 
                                                 
15 Vote Watch Europe, The Voting Records of EU Member States in the Council since 2009- Annual Report 
July 2012. (2012), p. 8. 
16 Ibid. 
17 A. Wartjen, ’Decision-making in the Council of the European Union’, Journal of European Public Policy, 
17:5 (2010), p. 671.  
18 S. Novak (2009), p.12. 
19 Ibid, p.  4. 
20 Ibid, p. 5. 
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easier under QMV because opposing Member States presenting a minority are simply 
outvoted. However, there are certain informal rules grounded in political realism that apply in 
exceptional cases: large Member States shall not be marginalised in their will and passing a 
law may be delayed when vital interests of a Member State are endangered.20 The latter shows 
significant resemblance to the agreement of the Luxembourg Accords and symbolises to what 
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a great extent the present form of decision-making by consensus is based thereon. 21 Former 
Finnish minister for Foreign Affairs Erkii Tuamioja stated: ‘At the end of the day, you can 
block. Moving forward at the European Council depends on consensus. In general there is still 
this kind of understanding, although no one talks about the Luxembourg Compromise any 
longer […] If a country’s vital national interests are at stake, this is respected.’22  
 
3.1  Before the Plenary Session 
 
Formal voting is, however, rarely used in the plenary sessions. In practise the Presidency 
makes a proposition and if no objections are raised it is declared as passed. It has been 
observed that there is rarely any opposition,23 but does this mean that all Member State 
representatives fully agree? The assumption is that there are negotiations between the 
ministers even before the stage of plenary session is reached, in which bargaining and vote 
trading is taking place.24 Member State X may for example promise his vote on a particular 
matter, although not being completely satisfied with it, to another Member State Y in 
exchange for Y’s vote in another area of particular importance for X. Furthermore, there is 
bilateral communication between the Member State representatives and the Presidency in 
which the ministers hint at their view to the Presidency and possible concessions are 
discussed.25 
 
3.2 In the Plenary Session 
 
Despite extensive communication, both between the Member State representatives amongst 
themselves and between them and the Presidency, the plenary session itself is characterised 
by the participants being unclear about their position.26 All participants of the plenary session 
make mental calculations in order to assess if there is a blocking minority. Member State 
representatives, aware of belonging to a minority opposing a measure, realise the risk of being 
outvoted by the majority and are unlikely to raise their opposition.  
There are several reasons for this conduct: Firstly, the ministers do not want to be perceived 
as dissenting by their peers and possibly offend them, which might in turn lead to their 
unwillingness in future deliberations.27 Secondly, they deem it to be useless to vote against the 
measure knowing that their vote will not change the outcome.28 Thirdly, they want to avoid 
possible embarrassment and humiliation of being defeated.29 Most importantly, however, they 
run the risk of missing out on possible concessions made by the Presidency, as the latter could 
simply initiate a formal qualified majority vote in which case the minority would simply be 
outvoted without any further discussion.30 
This conduct, as mentioned before, results in opposition being rarely made when the 
Presidency introduces a proposal. Formal decision-making by vote therefore will not take 
place since it appears unnecessary. This effect is only furthered by the fact that the Presidency 
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is unlikely to use his or her right to force the Member State representatives to formally vote, 
in order to avoid revengeful consequences once the Presidency has ended.31 All these 
conventional practices can be explained by power plays, which evolved over almost half a 
century with the Luxembourg Accords as their starting point.32  
These informal practises have been highly criticised in literature on various grounds, amongst 
them being a lack of transparency and democratic deficit. The next section will focus on the 
evaluation of some of these concerns. 
 
 
4.  Evaluation of Possible Concerns about ‘Decision-Making by Consensus’ 
 
4.1  Democratic Deficit 
 
One of the main arguments against decision-making by consensus within the Council, 
advanced by critics is the claim that it results in a democratic deficit.33 The absence of a 
formal voting mechanism, in which every Member State representative gives his vote and 
therewith makes clear what his position is, deprives the Council of an important democratic 
element: transparency. The resulting opacity makes the law-making on EU level even more 
inaccessible as it only adds to the complexity of EU law which it seems is hard to grasp for 
the ordinary EU citizen.34 Allowing democratically elected Member State representatives, 
who are formally obliged to vote on measures that will be binding upon their states’ citizens, 
to make deals in secrecy by way of bargaining might induce some confusion and frustration 
among citizens and may create problems of the legitimacy of the EU.35 Given the Council’s 
main rationale for using consensus is solidifying of legitimacy of the EU in the eyes of the 
citizens, by way of appearing to be ‘speaking in one voice’ (see below), there seems to be a 
paradox. 
 
4.2  Accountability 
 
The severe lack of information about the positions of the Member States representative also 
raises the issue of accountability on the national level.36 Member States can choose to make 
their positions, and therewith their ‘loser status’ in case of abstention or vote against, within 
the Council public, however there is no obligation to do so common to all Member States.37 
Publishing information about deliberations and their position therein provides state 
representatives a chance to show their opinion concerning certain matters and can be regarded 
as necessary in light of their accountability to the citizens they represent. However, most 
governments strongly advise their ministers to remain silent about their defeats.38  
 
This behaviour can be explained by various considerations: Firstly, ministers want to save 
themselves the embarrassment of admitting defeat. Secondly, state representatives might be 
concerned about their position in national politics, as citizens may recognise their defeat as a 
result of poor negotiation skills and therefore doubt their political abilities. Thirdly, there is 
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the issue of passing a law in the national government, which the particular minister has 
originally opposed on a supernational level.39 Not revealing their defeat to national journalists, 
non-governmental organizations, political opponents and last but not least voters raises doubts 
about their legitimacy in the light of democratic accountability.40 
 
4.3 Disadvantaged Member States 
 
Another criticism frequently advanced is that some Member States might be disadvantaged 
under the informal method of consensus. Two groups of Member States may be subject to this 
claim both of which will be considered below: firstly, new Member States that have 
accessioned to the EU, and secondly, small Member States. 
It has been mentioned above that the institution of consensual decision-making is essentially 
based on conventional practices that have developed since the Luxembourg Accords. 
Practicing negotiations and deliberations repeatedly with the same participants over a long 
period of time provides these participants certain knowledge about each other’s preferences 
and characteristics which may transform decision-making into a transaction rather than 
bargaining.41 It only logically follows from this assumption that newly accessioned Member 
States will have a great disadvantage when entering this playing field, which is vastly 
unknown to them. In fact, it was assumed that the enlargement of the EU in 2004, 
accessioning ten new Member States, would drastically change the decision-making dynamics 
within the Council.42 The assumption was that QMV would be applied more often since 
decision-making by consensus will be nearly impossible considering the increased number of 
state interests that had to be taken into account.43 However, while it was evident that the 
Council meetings lasted considerably longer it was also observed that Member State 
representatives recorded their oppositions to proposals less frequently after the enlargement 
than in the period beforehand.44 This suggests the ‘culture of consensus’ was upheld. This 
claim is supported by the observation of Sweden’s voting behaviour shortly after its 
accession: it initially voted very often against proposals, despite the fact that explicit ‘no 
votes’ were rare in the Council. Later, it changed to a less obstructionist position within the 
Council which was interpreted as Sweden’s adaption to the ‘culture of consensus’ by way of 
learning.45  
The second group of Member States, which might also be put at detriment under the informal 
norm of consensus, are small Member States. One of the informal rules of the Council is not 
to marginalise large Member States in their will.46 This practise provides for significant power 
for larger Member States potentially pressuring smaller Member States into taking decisions, 
which are not necessarily optimal for them.47 This assumption is reinforced by the reluctance 
of Member State representatives to voice their opposition once realizing they are in a 
minority. Furthermore, there is a high level of sensitivity not to offend fellow ministers with a 
view on one’s own bargaining position in future deliberations.48 This may especially hold for 
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smaller Member States since their bargaining power might not be as strong from the 
beginning. 
Despite concerns about the lack of political legitimacy and accountability due to the absence 
of a voting process of the Council, the ‘culture of consensus’ persists as the preferred method. 
In order to objectively assess the informal method of consensus it is important to also evaluate 
factors that might support its use. The following section will review arguments in favour of 
informal consensus over formal voting. 
 
 
5. Evaluation of Possible Reasons Underlying a Preference for Consensus 
 
5.1 Fairness through Bargaining 
 
The primary argument advanced by the Council is that decision-making by consensus rather 
then QMV is used in order to reconcile all different positions, taking also the minority view 
into account, to satisfy all participants.49 In fact, it could be argued that while in the case of 
QMV individual preferences of the minority are simply ignored, decision-making by 
consensus provides for better protection of their concerns.50 It is assumed that informal 
deliberations and negotiations facilitate bargaining, in which the minority is given a chance to 
demand compensation in other areas. This would lead to the conclusion that the informal 
working of the Council, including vote-exchange, package deals and concessions, would 
create an overall higher achievement of individual interests of the Member State 
representatives, while at the same time not compromising the acceptance of the proposal.  
One has to bear in mind, however, that there are, as mentioned above, considerable power 
plays within the Council, which might work to detriment of smaller or new Member State’s 
interests. 
 
5.2  Solidifying Legitimacy 
 
Another argument closely connected to the preceding one is that decision-making by 
consensus creates greater legitimacy of the EU on a national level.51 The effects of consensus 
are, as previously mentioned, from an outside perspective the same as the effects of a formal 
voting of unanimity, namely the outer appearance of all Member States agreeing. The fact that 
the extensive bargaining and informal deliberations that lie at the heart of the ‘culture of 
consensus’ happen mostly in secrecy, however, only creates an illusion of ‘complete 
agreement’. This is furthered by the trend of Member State representatives not to publish their 
opposing positions on a national level. As a consequence, the Council seems to speak with 
one voice, which might have the positive effect of supporting the EU’s legitimacy in the eyes 
of citizens, even if it is based on an illusion created by secrecy and opacity.52 The desired 
effect is the implementation of EU measures, which could have possibly been compromised 
in Member States that initially opposed them, had their representatives’ original opposition 
been made public.53 
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5.3 Efficiency and Time  
 
It would seem that the strongest argument in favour of consensus is the aspect that it can 
provide for improved efficiency that results from over 40 years of conventional practices. It 
might be argued that the Council participants are familiar with each other’s preferences and 
characteristics from the work experience they share, creating a certain common 
understanding, which makes the decision-making process easier to a certain extent.  
There is another aspect closely connected to this argument, which relates to the element of 
time, holding that this common understanding of the Council members also speeds up the 
process of decision-making. Paradoxically the main claim made by advocates of QMV, is that 
QMV would expedite the process, as a vote would replace hours of deliberations, which 
would be continued until all participants are satisfied with the outcome. This argument can, 
however, be somewhat invalidated when considering the fact that all informal negotiations in 
reality actually happen before the plenary session, so that they do not contribute to the length 
of the Council sessions and that the simple approval of the proposal as it happens under 
consensus might even be quicker than conducting a formal vote. Furthermore, data provides 
little evidence that consensus slows down the process of decision-making.54 
 
 
6.  Is a Transition to Formal Voting Methods Feasible and Desirable? 
 
As the decision-making of the Council, as it exists today is the result of decades of 
conventional practices, there is significant reluctance towards change. The fact that newly 
accessioned Member States only initially diverge from the norm of consensus but later adapt55 
only underlines the idea that the Council Members do not see any need for change, which 
makes a transition seem very unrealistic.  
Even if the decision-making by formal voting would be made obligatory, it is unlikely that the 
informal negotiations before the official Council sessions, including the bargaining and vote 
exchange, would cease to exist. Member State representatives would still try to make the best 
possible ‘deal’. In practice the results would be same: deliberations happened beforehand and 
are only confirmed in the plenary session. Just that now this happens by a vote and not by 
mere silence when the Presidency asks for opposition. Consequently, one might raise the 
claim that by replacing the ‘silent agreement’ with a possibly lengthy procedure of formal 
voting, the efficiency and promptness with which decisions are made within the Council will 
be hindered. This invalidates the often-purported argument QMV would speed up the process 
of decision-making and raises doubts about the desirability of a transition to a formal method 
of voting.  
It is difficult to refute the claims of opacity and lack of democratic characteristics, since the 
lack of formal open voting is inherent in concept of consensual decision-making. However, 
the lack of information about the individual positions on a national level can be regarded as a 
consequence of the reluctance of Member State representatives to make them public. It should 
therefore be the task of national law to counteract this conduct and it would thus be unfair to 
blame the Council’s working for the opacity this behaviour creates. Furthermore, one may 
regard this lack of information and democratic characteristics, as being a necessary burden 
that one has to be willing to accept as a by-product of efficient decision-making on EU level.56  
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The most important question seems to be, however, to what extent the informal and opaque 
character of the Council’s deliberations and bargaining practices actually differs from the 
conduct common to national politics. It almost counts as common knowledge that informal 
meetings outside the usual settings in which formal decisions are being taken are part of day-
to-day politics. This does, of course, not mean that these informal practices have to be 
regarded as being appropriate behaviour, however we ought to recognise that we cannot deny 
their existence and we might even be too hasty in condemning them.  
 
7. Conclusion 
 
In the end, democratically elected Member State representatives are sent to the Council in 
order to achieve the best possible outcome for the citizens of their states (and arguably for the 
EU) and this is what they are attempting to do. One might not be entirely comfortable with the 
way they approach this task, raising concerns about a lack of democratic legitimacy, 
transparency and accountability. However, should it not be the outcome that matters? And, if 
so, keeping in mind the fact that decision-making by consensus facilitates bargaining, which 
in turn might provide for a better protection of each Member States’ interests, one should 
appreciate the advantages of consensus rather than focussing on its weaknesses. After all, the 
‘culture of consensus’ is exactly that: a culture that has evolved over decades and has proved 
its efficiency and also benefits.  
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54 J. Golub et al, ‚’How Time Affects EU Decision- Making’, European Union Politics Vol. 8(4) (2007), p. 
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55 J. Tallberg, Journal of European Public Policy, 17:5 (2010), p. 643. 
56S. Novak (2009), p. 11. 
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The most important question seems to be, however, to what extent the informal and opaque 
character of the Council’s deliberations and bargaining practices actually differs from the 
conduct common to national politics. It almost counts as common knowledge that informal 
meetings outside the usual settings in which formal decisions are being taken are part of day-
to-day politics. This does, of course, not mean that these informal practices have to be 
regarded as being appropriate behaviour, however we ought to recognise that we cannot deny 
their existence and we might even be too hasty in condemning them.  
 
7. Conclusion 
 
In the end, democratically elected Member State representatives are sent to the Council in 
order to achieve the best possible outcome for the citizens of their states (and arguably for the 
EU) and this is what they are attempting to do. One might not be entirely comfortable with the 
way they approach this task, raising concerns about a lack of democratic legitimacy, 
transparency and accountability. However, should it not be the outcome that matters? And, if 
so, keeping in mind the fact that decision-making by consensus facilitates bargaining, which 
in turn might provide for a better protection of each Member States’ interests, one should 
appreciate the advantages of consensus rather than focussing on its weaknesses. After all, the 
‘culture of consensus’ is exactly that: a culture that has evolved over decades and has proved 
its efficiency and also benefits.  
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CONSENSUS DECISION: AN EU ASSET? 
 
Berit Gleixner  
 
 
1.  Introduction  
 
Many analysts had predicted that the enlargement of the EU through the admission of many 
new Member States was to bring decision-making in the Council of Ministers to a halt. 
However, as has been observed by many authors, this has not materialised; the EU and 
especially the Council of Ministers has been able to continue to legislate and to further deepen 
integration.1 However, until today it is hard to grasp and fully understand how the decision 
making in the Council takes place. This is due to the fact that decision-making in the Council 
usually takes place ‘behind closed doors’, by the informal way of consensus. 
Since 1993, after the Danish population rejected the Maastricht Treaty in a referendum, the 
results of voting had to be made available to the public.2  
It is also provided in Art. 15 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union that 
decision-making in the Union institutions should me made as transparent as possible. 
However, the lack of transparency is maintained: through informal decision-making in the 
Council the real opinions of individual ministers remain in the shadow of the consensus vote. 
This essay first aims to identify the main types of decision-making procedures used in the 
Council. After identifying these procedures, they will be analysed from a historic perspective. 
This will be followed by a discussion of different trends that have been identified through 
studying voting data of the Council. Finally, the advantages and disadvantages of decision-
making by consensus will be weighed before reaching a conclusion and answering the 
question of whether decision-making by consensus in the Council of Ministers really is an EU 
asset. 
 
 
2. Decision-Making in the Council 
 
The three main institutions that take part in the legislative process of the European Union are 
the Commission, the Council of Ministers, and the European Parliament.3 The Council is 
composed of ministers representing the National Member States.4  
The role of the Commission is to ‘promote the general interest of the Union and take 
appropriate initiatives to that end’5 It acts as the most significant initiator for legislation in the 
Union.6 Both the Council and the European Parliament, upon proposal by the Commission, 
have the power to approve or reject the Commission’s proposals.7 Depending on the proposal 
                                                 
1 Heisenberg, 'The Institution of 'Consensus' in the European Union: Formal versus Informal Decision-
Making in the Council', 44 European Journal of Political Research (2005), p. 67. 
2 Novak, ‘The Opacity of Consensus, Decision-making at the Council of the European Union’, p. 9, available 
at <http://www.booksandideas.net/IMG/pdf/20111124_opacity-consensus.pdf> (last visited 05.12.2012). 
3 Golub, ‘In the Shadow of the Vote? Decision Making in the European Community’, 53 International 
Organization (1999), p. 734. 
4 Art. 16(2) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter TFEU). 
5 Art. 17 (1)&(2) Treaty on the European Union (hereinafter TEU). Art. 17 (2) TEU provides that: ‘Union 
legislative acts may only be adopted on the basis of a Commission proposal, except where the Treaties 
provide otherwise’. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Art. 16(1) TEU: ‘The Council shall, jointly with the European Parliament, exercise legislative and 
budgetary functions’. 
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at hand, the Council will act either by qualified majority voting (QMV) or by unanimity, as 
provided for in the legal basis on which the proposal is based.8 Although the European 
Parliament’s importance in the legislative process has been gradually increased (from a 
consultation procedure, to cooperation under the Single European Act, and later to a co-
decision introduced by the Maastricht Treaty), the Council of Ministers remains the most 
important and most influential body in the legislative process.9 
Furthermore, mention must be made to an important working body in the Council of 
Ministers, the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper). Coreper is composed of 
permanent national officials and is made up of two bodies Coreper I and Coreper II. Coreper 
I, concerns itself with topics such as the internal market and the environment whereas Coreper 
II deals with the more controversial matters such as external relations, economic and financial 
affairs; and it is therefore more significant of the two. The reason why Coreper II is so 
important is because it plays an active role in EU decision-making. The proposals coming 
from the Commission will be considered by Coreper, prior to being tabled in the Council. The 
proposals will either belong to part A of the agenda, or to part B. The ones belonging to part 
A are those proposals which do not need further discussion and only need approval, whereas 
the ones belonging to part B still need to be discussed. The interesting point here is that 
decision-making in Coreper is made by consensus, and not by QMV. This means in essence 
that before proposals even reach the Council, they have already been so thoroughly discussed 
that most likely compromises between the permanent representatives have been made as to 
prepare a proposal that will more or less satisfy all the ministers in the Council.10 
 
 
3. Qualified Majority Voting, Unanimity and Consensus 
 
As stated above, the decision-making in the Council will be made by either of two formal 
ways: either by qualified majority or unanimity. However, there is a third informal way of 
decision making that is put to use in the Council of Ministers, which is known as the 
procedure of consensus.  
The official rule is that the Council will take decisions by QMV, unless the Treaty provides 
otherwise. Under the current rules of QMV, each country’s vote is weighed, meaning for 
example that big countries such as Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy and France’s votes 
will be weighed as counting for twenty-nine votes. In contrast the smallest countries such as 
Malta, Luxembourg and others votes will only be weighed as three or four votes. If the 
proposal came from the Commission, the act will be adopted if there is a minimum of 255 
votes in favour, which represents 62 percent of the total Union population.11 Through the 
Lisbon Treaty, new votes of QMV have been put in place, which will start to be enforced on 
the 1st of November 2014. Under these new rules, a qualified majority consists of: ‘55 percent 
of Council Members, including at least fifteen of them and representing Member States which 
have at least 65 percent of the population of the Union’.12  Furthermore, an additional hurdle 
has been added. Under the new rules, a blocking minority must be composed of at least four 
Council members.13 However, between 1 November 2014 and 31 March 2017, when a 
                                                 
8 Art. 16(3) TEU. 
9 Heisenberg, 'The Institution of 'Consensus' in the European Union: Formal versus Informal Decision-
Making in the Council', 44 European Journal of Political Research (2005), p. 67. 
10 P. Craig, C. de Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials, (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008), p.7. 
11 Art. 3, Protocol No. 36 on Transnational Provisions. 
12 Art. 16(4) TFEU. 
13 Ibid. 
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legislative act is supposed to be adopted by QMV, a minister in the Council may demand that 
the rules applicable before November 2014 are used.14 
Unanimity demands that all members in the Council are in agreement about the legislative act. 
Essentially, this means that each member in the Council retains a veto, and if only one 
member opposes the proposal, it will not be passed. Hence unanimity is the most 
circumstantial way to pass a proposal. 
Even though it is provided for in the Treaty, the Council rarely acts by using qualified 
majority, but rather makes decisions informally by consensus.15 It must be understood that 
decision-making by consensus, although the final decision means unanimity, is not equivalent 
to unanimity. For unanimity, there will be 100 percent agreement, therefore all present will 
completely agree with everything. However, with consensus this is different, consensus is 
more of a bargain where different interests will be weighed, and a solution will be found that 
more or less satisfies everyone. Consensus is, in a way, a compromise between different 
views and preferences of the Member States. Therefore, even though publicly it is stated that 
all Member States were in favour this is not the reality. This issue will be analysed in further 
depth in the following sections. 
Why the Council chooses to make decisions by consensus, instead of using QMV, is a 
question that arises. A good way to understand and make sense of this is to go back in history 
and analysing some key events.16 
 
 
4. The Luxembourg Accords 
 
The most important event in this respect is without doubt the Luxembourg Compromise, 
where a settlement was reached after the occurrence of the Empty Chair Crisis. Several 
important events took place between the treaty setting up the European Economic Community 
and the Single European Act. One of them was the enlargement of the European Community 
and, more specifically, in 1961 the application of the UK to join. This was met by great 
resistance from Charles de Gaulle, who showed much discontent with regards to important 
institutional reforms that had been proposed by the Commission and, more importantly, 
regarding the choice to alter decision-making in the Council of Ministers from unanimity to 
QMV (this had been decided previously under the Treaty of Rome). As a result of the 
difficulties of the Council to reach a compromise on these matters, de Gaulle decided not to 
attend the Council meetings any longer. This went on for a period of 7 months in 196517 and is 
known as the Empty Chair Crisis. 
Following this, a meeting took place in which a compromise was reached, which was called 
the Luxembourg Accords. In short, this was an ‘agreement to disagree’ about voting 
procedures in the Council.18 The French insisted that even where the Treaty provided to vote 
by QMV, the dialogue must continue until unanimity has been reached.19 Here, we can clearly 
see that what the French in essence aimed and created, was decision-making by consensus in 
the Council of Ministers. They officially stepped away from the formal decision-making 
rules. In effect, at the time this meant that France was in some way able to retain its veto, 
which it would not have been able to do if a proposal was voted on by QMV. The Single 
                                                 
14 Art. 3(2) Protocol No. 36 on Transnational Provisions. 
15 Heisenberg, 44 European Journal of Political Research (2005), p. 68. 
16 Heisenberg, 44 European Journal of Political Research (2005), p. 68. 
17 , EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials, p. 7. 
18 Ibid p. 8. 
19 Ibid. 
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European Act further extended the use of QMV to many other areas, but most decisions still 
continue to be made by consensus.20 
As argued by Heisenberg (2005), the EU’s ‘culture of consensus’, is the outcome of 40 years 
of negotiation in the history of the EU.21 The EU is what it is today through decades of 
negotiation, starting from the negotiation to create the European Coal and Steel Community in 
1951 and ending with the negotiation to adopt the Lisbon Treaty in 2007. This way of 
decision-making can thus be said to be inherent in the system.22  
To assess the advantages and disadvantages of decision making by consensus further, it is 
interesting to analyse which potential factors might influence Council behaviour and also why 
governments vote against the majority in the Council. The factors taken into account are 
based on hypotheses that have been formulated by countless authors and have been 
thoroughly analysed by using voting date from the Council. The most important and most 
discussed factors include: Ideological factors such as the left-right wing dimension, the 
amount that Member States contribute to the EU budget, their size and further the importance 
of the Presidency of the Council.  
When looking at the results and trends that were found by analysing voting behaviour, it must 
however be kept in mind that the data that is made available only concerns legislative acts that 
have actually been passed. Therefore, no information is made available about legislative acts 
that have been wholly rejected. This is an important limitation about the data.23 
 
 
5. The Left-Right Dimension 
 
National politics in the EU Member States have often been determined by the ‘left-right 
dimension’. The integration process of the countries has brought to the effect that national and 
EU politics have been increasingly intertwined; therefore political positions and views will 
influence the voting patterns of these countries in the Council. This is directly linked to 
whether they are pro-integration or whether the country has shown some ‘eurosceptical’ 
tendencies. It seems logical to postulate that the more pro-integration the countries are the 
more likely it is that they will support the vote of the majority in the Council.24 Through 
analysis of negative votes and abstention in the Council by Governments of three different 
political backgrounds: left-wing, right-wing, and centrist, Matilla (2004) notes that support for 
integration does not influence the voting behaviour of left-wing and centrist governments in a 
significant way. The results for the right-wing governments show that those who support 
integration, will similarly not vote against the majority. This is in contrast to ‘eurosceptical’ 
right-winged governments, which will be the ones that oppose the majority and make their 
discontent clear.25 There could be two reasons: either these governments are the only ones that 
dare to show their lack of support, or they simply are not willing to compromise with the 
other participants.26 When analysing the data, one must however keep in mind that these are 
merely hypothetical based on assumptions.  
 
 
 
                                                 
20 Heisenberg, 44 European Journal of Political Research (2005), p. 68. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Novak, ‘The Opacity of Consensus, Decision-making at the Council of the European Union’, p. 9. 
24 Mattila, 'Contested Decisions: Empirical Analysis of Voting in the European Union Council of Ministers', 
43 European Journal of Political Research (2004), p. 32. 
25 Ibid, p. 45. 
26 Ibid. 
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6. Net-Contributors vs. Net-Beneficiaries 
 
There seems to be a further divide in the voting behaviour of net-contributors to the EU 
budget and net-receivers. The hypothesis that the ‘more a country benefits financially from 
the EU budget the less likely it is to vote against the majority’, has been a topic frequently 
discussed.27 An analysis with two variables shows that a country’s contribution to the budget 
has an impact on its voting patterns, namely that contributors to the budget are 50 percent 
more likely to cast a negative vote or to abstain.28 It can therefore be concluded that countries 
that benefit the most from the EU will also support it the most and have a positive attitude 
towards majority votes.29 
 
 
7. Small Member States vs. Big Member States 
 
A number of studies have shown a possible division between small and large Member States 
in decision-making. In many studies, the effect of size showed that larger Member States 
often vote against the majority or abstain and medium-sized and small Member States rarely 
do so.30 This is rather surprising, as it would be expected that Member State’s negative votes 
or abstentions be distributed evenly. However, as has been noted by Heisenberg (2005), small 
Member States rarely cast negative votes or abstain, in fact: ‘the five largest Member States 
account for 46 per cent of the votes against, and 54 per cent of the abstentions’.31 Another 
approach on this is taken by Mattila (2004), whose initial argument is that the bigger Member 
States will rarely oppose the majority.32 As we have seen through QMV, the way the votes are 
distributed is directly linked to the size of the country. Therefore big countries such as 
Germany’s are weighed as 29 votes, whereas in contrast Malta only has three. The hypothesis 
was linked to the fact that because the large countries have more votes, they will logically 
have a higher chance of being on the side that wins. It must also be kept in mind that because 
the large Member States have so many votes, the proposals will already be made in such way 
that assures support of the larger Member States, for the proposal to be successful.33  
However, as can logically be expected, the data shows that large countries vote against the 
majority more often than smaller countries. Several reasons are given to explain this, one of 
them being that smaller Member States might feel that their position in the EU is not as 
important, since their number of votes will often not have a significant impact.34 Therefore, 
smaller countries may apprehend that their resources are rather limited, therefore 
concentrating their efforts to proposals that are more considerable to them.35 Furthermore, 
large countries may hang on to their national opinions stronger because of national pride or 
because of their ‘political culture’.36 One can imagine that a country like Germany is much 
less likely to give up their political views than for instance Malta or Luxembourg.  
 
 
                                                 
27 Ibid, p. 35. 
28 Ibid, p. 38. 
29 Ibid, p. 43. 
30 Hosli, ‘Explaining Voting Behavior in the Council of the European Union’, p.12. Retrieved from 
samba.fsv.cuni.cz/~gregl1as/workshop/Papers/Hosli.doc, last visited 5 December 2012. 
31 Heisenberg, 44 European Journal of Political Research (2005), p. 77. 
32 Mattila, 43 European Journal of Political Research (2004), p. 33. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Heisenberg, 44 European Journal of Political Research (2005), p. 77. 
35 Mattila, 43 European Journal of Political Research (2004), p. 33. 
36 Mattila, 43 European Journal of Political Research (2004), p. 46. 
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5. The Left-Right Dimension 
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6. Net-Contributors vs. Net-Beneficiaries 
 
There seems to be a further divide in the voting behaviour of net-contributors to the EU 
budget and net-receivers. The hypothesis that the ‘more a country benefits financially from 
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towards majority votes.29 
 
 
7. Small Member States vs. Big Member States 
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them being that smaller Member States might feel that their position in the EU is not as 
important, since their number of votes will often not have a significant impact.34 Therefore, 
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8. Presidency of the Council 
 
A minister representing a Member State holds the Presidency of the Council; this position is 
rotated regularly.37 Every six months, the position of Council changes and a new Council 
member takes up the task. During his time in office the President of the Council sets the 
Agenda for the Council meetings. The position of President has become more and more 
important over the past years, especially because of the use of informal decision-making.38  
On one hand, it has frequently been argued that the President is in a position to exercise 
tremendous influence on decision-making.39 He will ultimately be the one who decides when 
consensus has been reached; since instead of requesting the ministers to vote the Presidency 
makes a proposal and if no one objects to it, announces it as being passed. 40 
On the other hand, it has also often been noted that it might also force the Member State 
holding Presidency to make huge sacrifices.41 As regards the voting behaviour of the 
Representative holding presidency, it makes sense that he or she votes less often against the 
majority.  
On the whole, holding the Presidency may also be very beneficial towards influencing future 
behaviour of that minister, since being in the position enables the representative to 
comprehend other opinions and take into account views of other representatives.42 
 
 
9. Advantages and Disadvantages of Decision-Making by Consensus  
 
In order to define whether decision-making by consensus really is an asset for the EU, the 
advantages and disadvantages of consensus, must be weighed. 
Firstly, a clear advantage of decision-making by consensus is that it facilitates bargains and 
that it is an efficient way of passing legislative acts. The way that the Council works is that 
there is no secrecy about the positions that a country has, because the open dialogue that 
precedes consensus will make it necessary to communicate with the other representatives. 
Therefore, each participant knows what the other countries standpoint will be, and each 
minister will know what the other will demand.43  
Further, even though ministers might not agree on several points in the proposal they will vote 
positively anyways. Decision-making by consensus makes it possible that a decision is 
reached without threatening the authority of EU law by not making ‘losers’ apparent.44  It is 
very much so that it is not in the ministers’ interest to show that they have been defeated45. 
This may be for several reasons. The most important seems to be, that if the ministers make 
apparent that they did not support the law that has been passed, it becomes increasingly 
difficult to implement it at national level.46  
However, in spite of these apparent advantages, one can immediately identify a pitfall: there 
is a lack of ‘democratic legitimacy’, caused by an evident deficiency of information about the 
legislative process. Citizens remain in the dark about what is really happening behind closed 
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doors.47 It leaves the intergovernmental and national views of the Member states out of the 
public’s eye, letting the citizens believe that decision-making at the EU level is running 
smoothly, that there is no reluctance and that there are no problems to reach a decision.48  
Furthermore, as stated above, another advantage of decision-making by consensus is that 
representatives will often vote ‘Yes’ even if they are not completely in favour of what is being 
voted upon. A remarkable data analysis was conducted, showing that some of the 
representatives should have voted negatively more often than others, but still vote positively. 
For example it was revealed that Austria, Germany, Finland, Denmark, Sweden and Austria 
act upon their preference much fewer times than Greece, Spain or Portugal.49 The most 
stringent case is Ireland, which according to the data opposed about ¼ of the directives but 
never made note of a formal documentation at the concluding voting stage. This shows that, 
even where countries might oppose a directive they will still in the end often vote ‘Yes’.50 
This is facilitated by the work that COREPERS do, because they prepare the work so 
extensively beforehand, that much of the negotiating will be done before the proposal reaches 
the ministers. Since each of the bodies of the COREPER is also made up of representatives of 
the Member States, they will be able to start negotiations for their ministers previous to 
tabling the proposal. Another confirmatory indicator is that 70-80 percent of the proposals 
prepared by COREPER will fall under the A category, meaning that no more discussion is 
required.51 
In general, all governments are therefore likely to vote ‘Yes’.52 However, there remain areas 
where consensus can simply not be reached. These areas are those that have created the most 
controversy in the European Union over the years, they have been identified as being for 
example the internal market, agriculture, and fisheries.53 As stated in Heisenberg’s (2005) 
Article: ‘to overcome reservations in some quarters there is only one solution: put the matter 
to the vote’ (Prodi 2004).54 Therefore decision-making by consensus does not always work 
and recourse will be made to QMV. 
On the other hand consensus impedes many aspects of democratic decision-making, mainly 
because of the element of secrecy and because of a lack of transparency. This element of 
secrecy could be surpassed by the fact that abstentions and negative votes can be made public: 
in some of the Member States the ministers are obliged to make their disagreement public.55 
However, this is not required under EU law and often it is also not done.56 Since negotiations 
go on until consensus has been reached, this signifies that voting outcomes show only a little 
proportion of the complete decision, leaving a big part of the information unknown. 
When looking at the factors which might influence a Council Member to abstain or to cast a 
negative vote, as analysed above, we see that there is a very clear indication that decision-
making by consensus is much more beneficial to the large Member States. This is shown by 
the fact that small Member States tend to vote less against the majority than big Member 
States and that those countries which contribute less to the budget (most likely smaller 
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Member States) will also be less likely to oppose the majority. Consequently, smaller Member 
States lack the incentive to not follow the larger Member States. 
  
 
10. Conclusion 
 
Decision-making by consensus has over decades been a highly effective method for the 
Council to adopt legislative acts. Being part of a hidden opposing minority seems to be a price 
that many Member States are willing to pay. The reason for this behaviour is the decision-
making process efficiency and that it is not revealed that they are one of the defeated 
countries. This shows that decision-making by consensus can be used as a political tool. 
Even though one cannot say that decision making of the Council is not public, the public 
element lacks transparency. This is because the data that are revealed only show an apparent 
unanimity but does not tell us which countries opposed or abstained from voting. Some 
Member States tried to overcome this lack of transparency by introducing a rule in their 
national law, which prescribes that if their representative opposes or abstains from the 
measure, this should be made public. However, as noted above, this is not required under EU 
law and therefore many countries do not have this rule in place. It would be intriguing to see 
whether decision-making by consensus would persevere if the EU would rule this disclosure 
mandatory. It would seem intuitive that if this were to be done, the Council of Ministers could 
very well switch back to simply voting by QMV. This indicates that not being defeated 
publicly is one of the main reasons why most decisions are made by consensus. 
Furthermore, even under the new rules for QMV that will enter into force on the 1st of 
November 2014, latest in 2017, it is very unlikely that decision-making by consensus will be 
given up. This is because under the new rules, bigger Member States will have more difficulty 
to reach a qualified majority as compared to the old rules. As we have seen in discussing 
trends in the voting data, consensus is in the end much more beneficial for big Member States 
than for small ones, so why should they switch back to formal decision-making which would 
make it more strenuous for them to reach a majority. 
It can be concluded that the biggest advantage of consensus is that it is extremely efficient. 
However, because of the lack of transparency and the element of secrecy, it cannot be argued 
that it is entirely flawless. It remains to be seen whether in the future efficiency can be 
combined with more transparency. 
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THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE EUROPEAN 
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: ALLIES OR ENEMIES? 
 
Charlotte Mol  
 
 
1.  Introduction  
 
Within Europe today there are two supranational courts which consider fundamental rights. 
The European Court of Human Rights,1 set up in 1959, located in Strasbourg. As the name 
indicates this has always been the foremost human rights court based on the 1950 European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.2 In Luxembourg, 
the European Court of Justice, today known as the Court of Justice of the European Union,3 
was founded in order to interpret and ensure the correct application of European 
Community/Union law. The institutions regulating the courts have always considered if and 
how a relationship between the two could and should exist. In reality the two courts have 
themselves slowly built a relationship through the cases adjudicated by them. The question 
remains how the courts have done so and whether the legislative changes imposed by the 
Lisbon Treaty have had an impact. Looking back and looking forward, can we say that the 
two courts have been allies or that their relationship is instead characterised by animosity?   
In order to successfully determine the relationship between the court in Luxembourg and the 
court in Strasbourg, their past relationship, pre-Lisbon, must first be considered, followed by 
an analysis of the post-Lisbon situation. Seeing how the case law of the two courts has slowly 
brought them together combined with an understanding of the Lisbon Treaty consequences in 
this area, will illustrate the type of relationship that exists today.    
 
 
2.  Pre-Lisbon Situation  
 
In order to successfully consider the relationship between the two courts their history is of 
crucial importance. Although the Court now deems fundamental rights of extreme 
importance, for the first 17 years it never even considered them.  
Why was it that the ECJ from 1959 in the Stork case4 until 1969 in the Stauder case5 refused 
to consider fundamental rights? The main consideration of the Court was that they did not 
have the competence to consider fundamental rights, as was stated in the Sgarlata case.6 In 
the Geitling case7 together with the Stork case the Court refused to consider fundamental 
rights since these were not protected by Community law. The Court and the European 
Communities at that time focused solely on market based aspects since the Rome Treaties of 
1957 were silent regarding human rights; de Búrca argues that this occurred because the 
drafters were afraid of another failure similar to the European Defence Community and the 
European Political Community8 treaties, hence all political issues were left out.9 This was an 
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interesting development, because during the drafting of the EPC in 1952 human rights 
protection played a key role. The Comité d’études pour la Constitution Européene, a group of 
lawyers and pro-integration elitists, created the first draft articles wherein fundamental 
freedoms were to be one of the aims of the Community. Making the Community a principal in 
the protection of human rights and interestingly naming the ECHR as the source for these 
rights.10 The Ad Hoc Assembly continued with the drafting and was a very different group 
than the Comité as it consisted of politicians. However they also focused on human rights, 
even considering a possible accession to the Convention and providing an individual right of 
action to challenge Community constitutions for violations of the Convention.11 The 
protection the Assembly included in the Draft goes beyond what is currently protected 
through the Lisbon Treaty. One could say that it if the EPC Treaty had succeeded the current 
discussion would not have occurred since it is evident that the drafters aimed for a very close 
and warm relationship between the Convention and the EEC.  
The Stauder case was the first time the ECJ declared fundamental rights to be a general 
principle of Union law,12 but the Court did not identify these rights until  Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft where the rights appeared to be those which were common to the 
constitutional traditions of the member states.13 The ECJ first mentioned the Convention in 
1974 in the Nold case, where the Court specifically included that international treaties to 
which the member states are signatories, such as the Convention, should also be considered as 
a basis for fundamental rights.14 The Nold case is of immense importance as it is the starting 
point of the use of the Convention as a human rights standard within the European 
Communities, a positive development towards the inclusion of the ECtHR.15 A year later in 
the Rutili case the Court actually invoked various Convention articles, using it as a 
guideline.16 Since then it has employed the Convention in its cases, increasing the scope in the 
case of Wachauf where it held that member states must, when implementing Community law, 
observe fundamental rights.17  
An important aspect of the Convention is that it is considered to be a `living instrument´18 
because the ECtHR continues to further interpret, and at times reinterpret, the articles. The 
Baustahlgewebe case was therefore a significant advance towards collaboration between the 
                                                                                                                                                    
9 Búrca, 'The Road not Taken: the European Union as a Global Human Rights Actor', 105 The American 
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courts, as the Court directly relied on the case law of the ECtHR ‘by analogy,’19 after having 
first referenced to the case law two years earlier in P v S.20 It strengthened this position in the 
Roquette case where the Court stated that ‘the European Convention on Human Rights has 
special significance’ and that the case law must be regarded.21 This judgment diverged from 
the judgments in the cases of Hoechst and Orkem which were criticized because the ECJ gave 
rulings that were later found to be contrary to the interpretations of the ECtHR.22 The last case 
of importance prior to the Lisbon Treaty is the Pupino case, from 2006, which gives a clear 
example of how the Court adopted and applied the case law of the ECtHR directly to its 
member states.23  
Considering the discussed historical evolution of the Court’s use of the Convention and the 
case law connected to this, it can be seen that after the lack of inclusion of human rights in the 
Rome Treaties the Court was initially extremely hesitant to consider any form of fundamental 
rights in their case law. It was not until the 1970’s that the Court warmed up to the idea of 
fundamental rights. Since then it has taken the lead to incorporate the Convention rights and 
jurisprudence into the European Communities. It was followed by the European Parliament, 
Council and Commission in 1977 with the Joint Declaration on the Convention, making clear 
their attachment to the rights contained within.24 Since 1979,25 the Commission has even 
proposed accession. The driving force, however, still lay with the Court since the Maastricht 
Treaty of 1992 and the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 only added to the Treaty what was already 
in effect within the Court’s case law.26 It was the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union,27 which was ratified in 2000, that created a  the secure text  within European 
Union law, even though it was only given full legal effect by the Lisbon Treaty. Up until the 
Lisbon Treaty, it clearly had been the Court who had taken the lead as regard fundamental 
rights, by attaching itself slowly but surely to the protections afforded in the Convention and 
through considering the case law of the ECtHR. Doing so, it showed that it thinks highly of 
the Convention and the ECtHR’s interpretation of it.  
On the other hand, the ECtHR has also had a case history with the court in Luxembourg, 
albeit a less extensive one. In the 1978 case of Confédération Française Démocratique du 
Travail the Commission28 declared applications against the Communities to be inadmissible.29 
The Commission in the case of Etienne Tête v France showed that in principle applicants can 
bring a case against a State concerning national measures which give effect to Community 
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law,30 and the Court continued this line of thought in Cantoni v France, so long as the State 
has a wide margin of appreciation in the application of Community law.31 In Matthews v the 
United Kingdom the Court additionally made States responsible if there is a violation in a 
European treaty when the State in question was involved in its adoption.32 These judgments 
are all reasonable; the question that remained was whether national measures which give 
effect to Community law with a narrow or no margin of appreciation as well as fundamental 
rights provided by the Community could be tested by the ECtHR. The first question was 
answered by the Commission in M & Co. v Germany; it found those applications to be 
inadmissible as the Community system was found to give equivalent protection to human 
rights.33 This position was reaffirmed in the recent Bosphorus case, with the ‘presumption of 
equivalence.’ This means that since the Community law is found to be equivalent, a state, 
when following the requirements of its membership to the European Community, cannot be 
found to act against the fundamental rights protected in the Convention, but it did find that the 
case is admissible.34 The ‘presumption of equivalence’ shows that the ECtHR also has high 
regard for the Union institutions and feels that the two courts are at an equal wavelength.  
 
 
3. Post-Lisbon Situation  
  
The Lisbon Treaty has three main consequences for the area of fundamental rights which play 
a large role in defining the relationship post-Lisbon between the two courts.  
To start with, art. 6(1) of the TEU now stipulates that the Charter is legally binding by having 
the same value as the Treaties.35 The effect being that it will have direct effect and primacy 
regarding domestic law in all Member States within its scope.36 The scope of the binding 
force is stated in art. 51(1) of the Charter, including its effect on the EU institutions and on 
Member States when implementing Union law. As one Judge from the Court of Justice 
expressed, the Charter ‘has become hard law, but within its own parameters.’37 There remains 
a question of interpretation of art. 51(1) regarding these parameters, since the CJEU in its case 
law prior to Lisbon held that the Member States had to respect fundamental rights also when 
trying to diverge from Union law or when maintaining that the question falls outside Union 
law. Would the Charter limit this?38 The question hasn’t been answered by the Court, but the 
Official Explanations state that it applies when Member States act ‘in the scope of Union 
law.’39 It will be up to the CJEU to clarify this aspect, all one can say is that the Court has 
referred to the legal status of the Charter for the first time in the Kücükdeveci case40 and on a 
regular basis ever since.41 The effect on the relationship between the courts being that the 
CJEU now commences by considering the Charter, instead of starting with the Convention, 
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only subsequently considering the Convention.42 This doesn’t mean that the relationship has 
worsened; it simply gives the Union its own text to hold on to.  
The second consequence is that art. 6(2) of the TEU now obliges the Union to accede to the 
ECHR.43 In order to do so, the Union requires a unanimous Council decision, consent of the 
European Parliament and ratification by the Member States.44 The advantages are clear, as 
Commissioner Reding states ‘the accession of the EU to the Convention will complete the EU 
system of protecting fundamental rights’45 and ‘will ensure that the case-law of both courts – 
the Court in Strasbourg and our Court in Luxembourg – evolves in step.’46 The latter quote 
shows how accession will minimize the danger of having conflicting interpretations from the 
two courts,47 a step forward to an even closer cooperation.   
While the advantages might be straightforward, the conditions to accession are not. The main 
problem is regarding Union law autonomy that must be preserved. It is this area that creates a 
small clash between the two courts, mainly on the side of the CJEU. There are two facets 
involved. Firstly, the CJEU does not wish for any other court to be able to assess the 
distribution of competences between the Union and the Member States.48 The proposed 
solution was the ‘co-respondent’ mechanism, allowing the Union or a Member State to join 
the proceedings as a ‘co-respondent’; any violation found would then be binding on both the 
applicant and the ‘co-respondent’ allowing the Union to decide who has to repair the damage 
of the victim.49 However this solution was initially rejected since it would not give the ECtHR 
enough control over the proceedings.50 Nonetheless in the final draft Accession Agreement 
text a modified version is included, allowing the ‘co-respondent’ mechanism to be used in 
certain cases.51 The second aspect involved regarding the Union Autonomy concerns the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the CJEU in regard to the interpretation and application of Union law 
derived from art. 19(1) TEU. The problem here is that the ECJ held that the Union did not 
have the competence to join international agreements which would allow another court to 
make a binding decision on how Union law should be interpreted or applied.52 However, the 
Convention has the rule of the exhaustion of domestic remedies,53 which means that the 
parties are required to exercise their right of appeal within the Union jurisdiction before 
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heading to the ECtHR.54 As has been established in ECtHR case law the Strasbourg court 
does not want to take the place of national authorities by interpreting and applying the 
domestic law, also as concerns international treaties.55 This makes it more likely that the 
ECtHR will consider the CJEU’s interpretation when adjudicating. The CJEU has exemplified 
this aspect, saying that the possibility of the ECtHR to consider an act without a prior CJEU 
ruling should be avoided.56 An additional solution has been proposed by Jacqué who argues 
that in the cases with a divergence between a Union act and the Convention, a strengthened 
preliminary reference procedure should exist. Additionally the national courts should be 
compelled to conduct a preliminary procedure in such cases.57 This would ensure that the 
autonomy of the CJEU in its interpretation of Union law is not lost when accession occurs. It 
is still to be seen how the two courts will solve these questions in the final Accession 
agreement.  
The last consequence of the Lisbon Treaty is that the Convention is now no longer simply a 
guideline, but the minimum standard for the corresponding rights in the Charter, thereby 
substantially incorporating the Convention rights into the Charter.58 Article 52(3) of the 
Charter provides for this; making the Union indirectly bound by the Convention through the 
legal status of the Charter.59 The aim of the inclusion of this minimum standard is to ensure 
consistency between the two courts.60 However, should the case law then not also be included 
in the minimum standard to ensure uniformity? When looking at the wording of the art. 52(3) 
there is no reference to ECtHR case law,61 although Weiß argues that the teleology of the 
article justifies the binding force of the case law on the Convention rights.62 It is the Official 
Explanation which offers an insight as it unambiguously states that case law should be 
considered to determine the meaning and the scope of the Convention rights.63 The latter was 
also held by the CJEU in the case of J. McB. v L.E..64 By having the Court consider the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR there is a strong incentive for the two courts to maintain 
contact,65 providing for a harmonious relationship. From the aforementioned it is evident that 
the Convention will have increased influence within the Member States, not only through 
accession but due to the Charter.66   
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4. Conclusion  
 
In view of the pre-Lisbon situation it can be said that the two Courts had a rough start, with 
the ECJ declining to consider fundamental rights. Yet once it did, it held the ECtHR in high 
regard, slowly but surely incorporating the Convention rights and the ECtHR case law within 
the Community system. While the ECtHR also refrained from admitting Community cases 
until recently in the Bosphorus case, it has deliberated on Union related cases and has since 
1990 accepted that the court in Luxembourg affords an equal protection of fundamental 
rights. In the pre-Lisbon situation it cannot be said that the courts had any animosities, there 
was clearly a relationship of respect between the two.  
The Lisbon Treaty has had several consequences within the area of fundamental rights, 
including the legal effect of the Charter, the requirement of accession to the Convention and 
elevating the Convention to the minimum standard, including the ECtHR’s case law. Making 
the Charter legally binding didn’t have a direct effect on the relationship, but indirectly 
allowed for the Convention rights that were transposed to be of higher value within the Union, 
while at the same time making the CJEU judges now stray their primary focus from the 
Convention to the Charter. Accession will definitely have an impact on the relationship, the 
declaration attached to the Lisbon Treaty shows the aim of closer cooperation; ‘the 
Conference notes the existence of a regular dialogue between the Court of Justice of the 
European Union and the European Court of Human Rights; such dialogue could be reinforced 
when the Union accedes to that Convention.’67  Then again it is yet to be seen how certain 
problems regarding the autonomy of the CJEU will be solved. Here is where a small 
animosity can be said to exist, as the Court is concerned about losing its monopoly over the 
interpretation and application of Union law as well as the distribution of competences with the 
Member States. However, academics seem to be less concerned as they propose various 
solutions which could be employed within the Accession agreement to ensure both the courts 
of their powers. At the same time it appears that, from considering its cautious case law, the 
ECtHR is not aiming to reduce the power of the CJEU, but solely to protect the fundamental 
rights in the Convention. Hence, one can say that accession will strengthen the cooperation 
between the courts, provided that solutions to preserve autonomy are included. Lastly, the 
new minimum standard of the Convention and the attached case law allows for further 
dialogue between the courts and a uniform application of fundamental rights; a positive 
recognition of the close and friendly relationship that the two courts have.   
All things considered, one can say that the two courts have never been enemies, they have 
simply been cautious at the start and slowly developed towards the cooperative relationship 
they have today. Although the Lisbon Treaty will strengthen their relationship, especially 
upon the Union’s accession to the Convention, it cannot be forgotten that the driving force of 
the two courts has allowed for this to occur. Especially the Luxembourg court has embraced 
the Convention and its court. Without its judicial activism regarding fundamental rights we 
would not be where we are today.   
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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION AND THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: COMPLICATIONS 
OF THE ACCESSION OF THE EU TO THE ECHR  
 
Rebecca Wörner  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Shortly after the Second World War the Council of Europe was created, which drafted the 
European Convention of Human Rights to secure a minimum standard of basic rights.1 
Parallel to the establishment of the Council of Europe, the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC), the corner stone of what we know as today’s European Union, was 
brought into being.2 Both institutions created their own Courts, the European Court of Human 
Rights (hereinafter referred to as the “ECtHR”) in Strasbourg and the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) in Luxembourg respectively.3 Even though both courts are on top of 
the hierarchy within their respective legal orders, there have barely been signs of rivalry. On 
the contrary- as history shows, there has been comity between the two Courts as will be 
discussed in further detail. The question at the moment is whether the fact that the EU will 
accede to the ECHR will change the relationship between the two courts. After all, by virtue 
of the accession, the CJEU will be subordinated to the ECtHR. In this research paper, the 
factors, which have shaped the co-existence of the Strasbourg and Luxembourg Courts, will 
be considered. Subsequently, complications of the accession will be discussed in further 
detail. 
 
 
2.  One Hand Washes the Other and Both Wash the Face 
 
What may have contributed to this friendly relationship, are the main objectives of the 
founding fathers of the two Courts. The CJEU is primarily concerned with its role as an 
integrative agent, focussing on (the economic aspect of) European integration.4 5The role of 
the ECtHR, on the other hand, is more about maintaining a minimum standard of human 
rights by reviewing legal acts on the conformity with the Convention.6 
Moreover, the CJEU has shown that it is willing to adhere to the case law of the ECtHR7. 
Before the CJEU made reference to the case law of the ECtHR, it “imported” the European 
Convention for the protection of Human Rights (ECHR) into the sphere of European Union 
Law due to the fact that it lacked reference to own legal sources concerning human rights.8 In 
the 1960’s, when the CJEU increasingly was being confronted with questions in regard to 
                                                 
1 M. Cuthbert, European Union Law in a Nutshell (Sweet&Maxwell, 2006), p. 115. 
2 M. Cuthbert, European Union Law, p. 114. 
3 L. Arévalo, ‘Adjudication of International Disputes in Europe: The Role of the European Court of Justice 
and the European Court of Human Rights’ 
The European Union Center at the University of Illinois working papers volume 6, no 1(2006), p. 4. 
4 G. De Búrca & J. Weiler, The European Court of Justice, (Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 56. 
5 Jeffrey Cohen: “the Court has done more to advance the cause of European unity – the cause of 
federalization of Europe – than any other Community institution”. 
6 M. Cuthbert, European Union Law, p. 114. 
7 T. Lock, ‘Walking on a tightrope: the draft accession agreement and the autonomy of the EU legal order’, 
Law and Governance in Europe Working Paper Series (2011), pp. 15-20. 
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human rights, it began to protect these rights. One decennium later, with the added pressure 
by several Constitutional Courts of the Member States (which claimed that rights were not 
sufficiently protected and therefore did not want to acknowledge the primacy of European law 
over their national legislation)9 10 it started to depend on the ECHR and later citing specific 
articles thereof 11. It then became an important means to enforce the primacy of Union 
Law.12The first reference to the ECHR was made in the Nold case. Later, the CJEU directly 
referred to the case law of the ECtHR, which illustrates its respect of their judgments.13 14 
The ECHR gradually turned into the minimum standard for safeguarding human rights within 
in the European Union. Clear evidence for this can be found in the Schmidberger case of 2003 
in which the CJEU considered the right of freedom of expression, as protected under the 
ECHR, more important than the freedom of movement of goods, which in turn can be 
considered as one of the core interests protected in the European Union treaties.15 This 
exemplifies the desire of the CJEU to foster their cooperation with the ECtHR in relation to 
human rights.  
However, this does not necessarily mean that the CJEU considers itself bound by the case law 
of the ECtHR. In Kadi, the court pointed out that it considered the Convention and the derived 
case law thereof merely as a source of inspiration. 
There have been cases in which the opinions of the two Courts were diverging. Notably 
Article 6 and 8 of the ECHR were in the centre of attention in this regard.  
In Hoechst, the CJEU held that business premises did not fall under the scope of protection as 
provided by Article 8 ECHR and claimed that there was no ECtHR case law stating 
otherwise, whereas the ECtHR had ruled six months previous to that in the Chappell case that 
Article 8 also was applicable in cases involving business premises.16 Later in the case 
Roquette Freres, when the CJEU was asked to reverse its ruling in Hoechst, it indeed 
extended the scope of Article 8 ECHR to include business premises.17 
Therefore, it can be concluded that even though the CJEU expressly stated that it merely sees 
the Convention as a source of inspiration, the Court is rather wary not to contradict the 
Convention or the decisions of the ECtHR. This may be due to the fact that it wants to avert 
conflicting judgments where Member States of the EU would have to “choose” between 
abiding EU law and the ECHR.18 
Moreover it can be argued that the Court of Justice has found a rather effective tool to enforce 
the primacy principle of EU law when relying on the Convention. By making reference to the 
ECHR, the ECJ builds a shield against possible attacks by Member States. 19 
                                                 
9 Ibid. 
10 Also see case law of Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1974] Case 11–70 ("Solange I") and Re 
Wuensche Handelsgesellschaft, BVerfG  [1987] ("Solange II"). 
11 Case 36-75. Roland Rutili v Ministre de l'intérieur. [1975]. 
12 J. Christoffersen et al., The European Court of Human Rights between Law and Politics (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2011), p. 164-167. 
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Court of Human Rights: A functional Analysis', Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social 
Research (ICPSR) at the University of Michigan (2012), p. 21. 
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Important rulings regarding the attitude of the ECtHR towards the Union can be found in the 
case law of Matthews v. U.K. and Bosphorus. In Matthews, the Court made a decisive move 
towards extending its own power to (indirectly) review EU law. 20  
In Bosphorus, the ECtHR again asserted this power, but in doing so, it ruled: “the protection 
of human rights in EU law is equivalent to the one under the ECHR”21. In line with this 
reasoning, the Court stated that where Member States did not enjoy discretion in the 
implementation of secondary legislation of the EU, their actions are assumed to be in 
accordance with the Convention. The test derived from this case was not whether a Member 
State of the EU actually breached the ECHR but if the protection of the Convention rights was 
manifestly deficient. 22 This major decision, the ECtHR put the CJEU in a higher position 
than national courts, as, in other words, the Strasbourg court would go so far as to refrain 
from claiming jurisdiction in cases where a Member State did not enjoy discretion when 
implementing certain Union Law. 23 
It seems that the Courts have taken their relations to such a level that they do not get into each 
other’s way, where the CJEU follows the ECtHR’s case law in a rather submissive manner 
and the latter will only intervene in cases when absolutely necessary. It may, however, be the 
case that once the EU’s accession is completed, their relationship will change. This will be 
considered in the section below. 
 
 
3. The Impact of the Accession on the Courts’ Relationship 
 
The idea that the EU should become a party to the ECHR is not new. It was proposed in 1979 
and in 1990.24 However, when officially proposed to the CJEU, the Court held in its Opinion 
2/94 that such accession was not possible, due to the fact that the law did not include any legal 
basis for such action. 25 This matter was finally settled by the Lisbon Treaty. Article 6(2) TEU 
was amended and now states that the EU ‘shall accede’ to the ECHR, which turned the idea of 
accession into a legal obligation.26 In 2010, Article 59(2) of the ECHR came into force by the 
amendment of Protocol No. 14 to the ECHR, which enabled the EU to accede.27 
In spite of the fact that the EU already provides for a solid system of human rights protection 
(after all, the Charter already guarantees a safety net), the formal accession of the EU to the 
ECHR will effectuate two major advantages:  
Firstly, it closes a legal gap where the ECtHR previously lacked jurisdiction in certain cases 
by virtue of ratione personae as well as ratione materiae in cases where EU Member States 
have transferred their answerability under the Convention to the Union.28 
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human rights, it began to protect these rights. One decennium later, with the added pressure 
by several Constitutional Courts of the Member States (which claimed that rights were not 
sufficiently protected and therefore did not want to acknowledge the primacy of European law 
over their national legislation)9 10 it started to depend on the ECHR and later citing specific 
articles thereof 11. It then became an important means to enforce the primacy of Union 
Law.12The first reference to the ECHR was made in the Nold case. Later, the CJEU directly 
referred to the case law of the ECtHR, which illustrates its respect of their judgments.13 14 
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in which the CJEU considered the right of freedom of expression, as protected under the 
ECHR, more important than the freedom of movement of goods, which in turn can be 
considered as one of the core interests protected in the European Union treaties.15 This 
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Important rulings regarding the attitude of the ECtHR towards the Union can be found in the 
case law of Matthews v. U.K. and Bosphorus. In Matthews, the Court made a decisive move 
towards extending its own power to (indirectly) review EU law. 20  
In Bosphorus, the ECtHR again asserted this power, but in doing so, it ruled: “the protection 
of human rights in EU law is equivalent to the one under the ECHR”21. In line with this 
reasoning, the Court stated that where Member States did not enjoy discretion in the 
implementation of secondary legislation of the EU, their actions are assumed to be in 
accordance with the Convention. The test derived from this case was not whether a Member 
State of the EU actually breached the ECHR but if the protection of the Convention rights was 
manifestly deficient. 22 This major decision, the ECtHR put the CJEU in a higher position 
than national courts, as, in other words, the Strasbourg court would go so far as to refrain 
from claiming jurisdiction in cases where a Member State did not enjoy discretion when 
implementing certain Union Law. 23 
It seems that the Courts have taken their relations to such a level that they do not get into each 
other’s way, where the CJEU follows the ECtHR’s case law in a rather submissive manner 
and the latter will only intervene in cases when absolutely necessary. It may, however, be the 
case that once the EU’s accession is completed, their relationship will change. This will be 
considered in the section below. 
 
 
3. The Impact of the Accession on the Courts’ Relationship 
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was amended and now states that the EU ‘shall accede’ to the ECHR, which turned the idea of 
accession into a legal obligation.26 In 2010, Article 59(2) of the ECHR came into force by the 
amendment of Protocol No. 14 to the ECHR, which enabled the EU to accede.27 
In spite of the fact that the EU already provides for a solid system of human rights protection 
(after all, the Charter already guarantees a safety net), the formal accession of the EU to the 
ECHR will effectuate two major advantages:  
Firstly, it closes a legal gap where the ECtHR previously lacked jurisdiction in certain cases 
by virtue of ratione personae as well as ratione materiae in cases where EU Member States 
have transferred their answerability under the Convention to the Union.28 
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Secondly, the EU would be subjected to legal review by an external body, which would mean 
a boost of credibility and legitimacy on the international stage.29 
Even though the EU could have acceded unilaterally, a more complicated way of accession 
was chosen in form of an Accession Agreement.30 The Commission, which was represented 
by a negotiating mandate, initiated negotiations over the accession with the Council of Europe 
in 2010.31 To that purpose, the Steering Committee for Human Rights established the informal 
working group CDDH-UE. In June 2011, the CDDH-UE presented the draft text of the 
Accession Agreement. Before the Agreement can enter into force, the Agreement needs to be 
approved by the institutions of the Council of Europe and by the Union. Also, it is subjected 
to the ratification by all of the Contracting Parties to the Convention. 32 Until then, the 
negotiations proceed, as several unresolved aspects will have to be discussed and taken into 
consideration in the negotiation process. For the EU, the most significant hurdle is the 
concern about the preservation of the autonomous character of its legal order. This is a major 
point of discussion in the negotiations at the moment. 33 Other specific issues are the claims to 
jurisdiction of both courts, the exhaustion rule set forth in the ECHR and the future of the 
Bosphorus presumption. Certain mechanisms are proposed to overcome these obstacles and 
the way they are going to be implemented may significantly define the relationship between 
the courts, as will be discussed below. 
 
4. The Exclusive Jurisdiction of the CJEU versus the Jurisdiction of the ECtHR 
 
As established above, the relationship between the two courts at the moment is rather friendly, 
yet unresolved. A possible ground for future annoyance may be that the Courts’ claims to 
jurisdiction are prone to clash under certain circumstances.  
In the CJEU’s Opinion 1/91 it was stated that its exclusive jurisdiction did not only flow from 
the Treaties (at that point of time the concerning provisions were to be found in Article 292 of 
the EC Treaty) but is at the core of the Union’s legal system.34 The CJEU’s claim of exclusive 
jurisdiction concerns a rather wide range of legal disputes as was shown in the Mox Plant 
case. 35 
According to earlier case law of the CJEU36, provisions included in agreements made by the 
Union automatically fall under the scope of Union law. Once the accession is completed, the 
ECHR will therefore be integral part of Union law. Consequently, the CJEU will have 
jurisdiction to interpret the ECHR. 37 This claim to jurisdiction, however, is rather unlikely to 
harm the harmony between the courts. What arguably may give cause to concern is the fact 
that the ECtHR enjoys exclusive jurisdiction in inter-state disputes according to Article 55 
ECHR as well as jurisdiction over disputes between parties to the Convention under Article 
33. After the accession, disputes between the EU and Member States could therefore be in 
principle be settled by the ECtHR. This goes directly against the CJEU’s claim to exclusive 
jurisdiction over matters that fall under EU law (see Art. 344 of the TFEU).38 39 However, the 
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ECtHR will merely be concerned with the question whether the EU has acted in conformity 
with the obligations set forth under the ECHR. Reviewing for incompatibilities with the 
Convention does not imply that the Strasbourg Court will be given the competence to 
interpret Union law in a binding fashion. Neither is it the case that the ECtHR has the power 
to invalidate EU provisions. The Strasbourg Court will base its decisions on the rulings of the 
CJEU. Moreover, Article 5 of the Draft Agreement stipulates that proceedings before the 
CJEU shall not be understood as procedures or settlement within the meaning of Articles 35 
or 55 ECHR. To that end, a possible conflict of the two Courts claiming jurisdiction on basis 
of Article 55 ECHR and Article 344 TFEU respectively is being avoided. Their relationship in 
this matter will stay intact and any possible disputes on this issue have consequently been 
prevented. This matter does therefore not constitute a complication as such. 
 
 
5. Preserving the Autonomous Character of the EU’s Legal Order 
 
Accession to the ECHR means that EU acts and omissions will be reviewable by the 
ECtHR.40 At the same time, the EU clearly aims to keep its legal order intact. 
For example, the explanatory memorandum to Article 52(3) of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, stresses on the fact that whilst complying with the standards set forth in 
the ECHR, the autonomy of Union law should not be affected. 41 The EU’s effort to preserve 
its autonomy is also reflected in the Draft Agreement where it is stated that the EU’s 
accession requires certain adaptations to the Convention system, among those “adaptations of 
the procedure before the European Court of Human Rights (…) to take into account the 
characteristics of the legal order of the EU, in particular the specific relationship between an 
EU member State’s legal order and that of the EU itself”42.  
In situations where a Member State is claimed to have infringed the ECHR while 
implementing EU law, the question of which entity should be blamed for the infringement- 
the EU or the Member State itself will arise.43  
Arguably, the discretionary power of the State in question will be the decisive factor in such 
situations. In case the responsibility lies with the State, it will have to bear the consequences 
itself. Otherwise, the EU is to be blamed. 44 The discretionary power of the Member States 
(and the division of competences between the EU and its Member States) is an internal matter 
of EU law. 
In its Opinion 1/91, the CJEU held that only itself has the exclusive competence to rule on the 
question of division of powers between the EU and its member states, otherwise the 
autonomous character of the EU legal order would be put into danger.45 
A solution to this issue may be provided by a co-respondent mechanism. The Draft 
Agreement provides for such a mechanism under Article 3, including specific provisions 
about tests for triggering the mechanism and reasons for providing the mechanism.46 This 
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CJEU shall not be understood as procedures or settlement within the meaning of Articles 35 
or 55 ECHR. To that end, a possible conflict of the two Courts claiming jurisdiction on basis 
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would entail that the EU will be given the opportunity to join as a co-respondent in cases 
before the ECtHR in such situations. 47  
As pointed out earlier in the Bosphorus ruling, it became clear that the ECtHR recognized that 
it was very well possible that the entity enacting a EU act does not have to be the same entity 
implementing it. A co-respondent mechanism prevents situations where one of the parties 
(here the drafter of the implemented act) would be declared inadmissible on grounds of 
ratione personae. Via this way, the party would be enabled to join the proceedings.48 
In cases where the EU joins a Member State as a co-respondent, the judgment by the ECtHR 
will bind the EU as well as the State. This is necessary in cases where the legislation at issue 
is of EU nature and only the Union itself would be able to amend it and therefore extinguish 
the violation. It then would be up to the ECtHR to decide on whether the EU has a valid 
interest to join as a co-respondent or not. 49  
Introducing a co-respondent mechanism brings about many advantages for future individual 
applicants as well as to both Courts. Individual applicants will not be put in a situation where 
they would wrongly hold a Member State responsible where this Member State had no leeway 
in implementing a certain legal act under Union Law. In such cases, both, the Member State 
as well as the EU could be held responsible jointly as co-respondents.50 For the CJEU the co-
respondent mechanism would mean that it could preserve its legal autonomy in this respect as 
by virtue, the ECtHR would not have to rule on the distribution on competences (i.e. an 
internal matter within the EU). The introduction of such mechanism is important for the 
relationship between the courts, as it is an important means to prevent disputes where the EU 
would claim that its autonomy was violated. This issue is indeed disputed in the negotiation 
process and forms a complication to the accession. 51 
 
 
6. The Exhaustion Rule 
 
Art. 35(1) ECHR sets forth that the ECtHR may only deal with cases “after all domestic 
remedies have already been exhausted”. The question was raised whether this pre-requisite 
was also fulfilled in cases, which were not previously submitted to the CJEU. 52 
In negotiations in June 2010 with the Council of Europe, it was discussed whether the ECJ 
should be given the possibility by a special mechanism to intervene before these types of 
cases are referred to the ECtHR (i.e. prior involvement of the CJEU). 53  
At the moment of writing, a definite way has yet to be found to precisely organize a prior 
involvement procedure. 
A less drastic implementation of the mechanism would be to provide the ECJ with the ability 
to comment on issues raised in cases before the ECtHR involving the interpretation or 
application of EU law.54 This is in line with Article 3(6) of the Draft Agreement, in which it is 
proposed that under certain circumstances the CJEU shall be given the possibility to assess 
the compatibility of Union Law with the Convention. The CJEU itself is of the opinion that it 
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is not acceptable to permit the ECtHR to rule on the compatibility of an EU act without being 
given the possibility to decide itself whether the act is valid or not. 55  
This opinion illustrates that the CJEU itself is a proponent of the prior involvement 
mechanism. However, providing for such a mechanism is rather complex.   
Firstly, this would lead to a privileged position of the EU in comparison to the other parties to 
the ECHR, as normal national (constitutional) courts are not always given the chance to 
review their national acts in regard to the applicant’s complaint of a violation. 56  
Secondly, an individual cannot lodge a preliminary reference procedure to the CJEU so 
therefore such remedy is therefore not directly available to him. Only a court or tribunal of a 
member state, according to Article 267 TFEU, can request a preliminary reference 
procedure.57 In case an application would be inadmissible where an individual took its case to 
the highest court but the court did not do a preliminary reference to the CJEU, this would 
mean that the application would be inadmissible according to the exhaustion rule of the 
ECHR58. It would be very unjust to hold an individual responsible for not exhausting a 
remedy, which was not directly available.59 
Thirdly, a prior involvement procedure will make the co-respondent mechanism even more 
complex.  
How such procedure would be implemented in practice and to which extent it would be 
available may have a profound impact on the relationship between the two courts. If the CJEU 
were to be granted with a mechanism as such to review acts previous in time to the ECtHR, it 
would most probably be able to prevent embarrassing situations by sparing the EU of being 
convicted for a violation. It is however rather doubtful that this mechanism will be 
implemented frequently due to the obstacles set out above. The EU will first have to convince 
the non-EU parties to the Convention that the prior involvement procedure will not provide 
the EU with unjust benefits but merely is a tool to adapt the accession to the specific nature of 
the EU legal system.60 
The exhaustion rule is a complex matter and can also be seen as a complication of the 
accession process indeed. 
 
 
7. The Future of the Bosphorus Presumption 
 
When considering future complications, the Bosphorus presumption must be taken into 
account. As described earlier, the ECtHR was rather lenient towards the Court of Justice in 
this ruling. It may be argued that the Court thereby sought to avoid possible conflicts with the 
CJEU and tried to show respect towards it.61 Currently, by virtue of this decision, the ECtHR 
does not review the actions of EU member states in cases where they were implementing EU 
measures as such and where they did not granted any leeway. However, once the EU has 
acceded to the ECHR, its current special position established by this ruling cannot be justified 
anymore towards the other parties to the Convention. Firstly, it would privilege the EU and 
secondly, as this would constitute unequal treatment of the parties to the Convention, the 
                                                 
55 CJEU: Discussion document of the on certain aspects of the accession of the European Union to the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, May 2010. 
56 X. Groussot et al, 218 Fondation Robert Schuman European Issues (2011), p. 16. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Art. 35(1) ECHR. 
59 J. Králová, 08 Czech yearbook of public and private international law (2011), p.133. 
60 Ibid. 
61 K. Kuhnert ‘Bosphorus: Double standards in European human rights protection?’ 2 Utrecht Law Review, 2 
(2006), p. 180. 
48 
 
would entail that the EU will be given the opportunity to join as a co-respondent in cases 
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6. The Exhaustion Rule 
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was also fulfilled in cases, which were not previously submitted to the CJEU. 52 
In negotiations in June 2010 with the Council of Europe, it was discussed whether the ECJ 
should be given the possibility by a special mechanism to intervene before these types of 
cases are referred to the ECtHR (i.e. prior involvement of the CJEU). 53  
At the moment of writing, a definite way has yet to be found to precisely organize a prior 
involvement procedure. 
A less drastic implementation of the mechanism would be to provide the ECJ with the ability 
to comment on issues raised in cases before the ECtHR involving the interpretation or 
application of EU law.54 This is in line with Article 3(6) of the Draft Agreement, in which it is 
proposed that under certain circumstances the CJEU shall be given the possibility to assess 
the compatibility of Union Law with the Convention. The CJEU itself is of the opinion that it 
                                                 
47 Biondi et al.,(Oxford University Press 2012), p. 191. 
48 J. Králová, 08 Czech yearbook of public and private international law (2011), p. 132. 
49 X. Groussot et al, 218 Fondation Robert Schuman European Issues (2011), Page 11. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Biondi et al., (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2012), Page 191. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Draft Council Decision 10568/10. 
54 Biondi et al.,(Oxford University Press 2012), p. 190. 
 
49 
 
is not acceptable to permit the ECtHR to rule on the compatibility of an EU act without being 
given the possibility to decide itself whether the act is valid or not. 55  
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Court may loose credibility. 62 Consequently, the presumption will most likely come to an 
end. 
In more concrete terms, this would mean the end of the ECtHR presuming that the EU’s 
protection of human rights is equivalent to that of the ECtHR system. Once the accession is 
completed, the ECtHR will be able to scrutinize the all acts of the EU institutions (therefore 
including the CJEU). This will mean that the CJEU will in fact be subordinated to the ECtHR. 
This formal change in position is a fact, however how exactly this new hierarchy will affect 
their relationship- one cannot say for sure.  
 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
Undoubtedly, the accession of the EU to the ECHR will improve the judicial protection of 
human rights, yet there is still a long way to go until the negotiation process is completed. 
Even though the accession is in the EU’s own interest (as it significantly undermines its 
credibility on the international stage at the moment not to be party to an external control 
mechanism), it made the maintainability of her autonomy a clear prerequisite for the 
accession to the Convention. To guarantee this, the co-respondent mechanism and the prior-
involvement procedure are brought forward as possible solutions. For the future relationship 
the implementation of the mechanism and the procedure will play an important role. But no 
matter how they are going to be implemented, Protocol no. 8 already constitutes a safeguard 
in this respect, as it specifically requires that the future accession agreement shall ensure that 
the specific characteristics of the EU are preserved.63 It is made clear that the EU puts much 
effort in maintaining its legal order (above all the autonomous character of its legal order by 
pursuing to preserve its exclusive jurisdiction). Considering this endeavour in combination 
with the fact that the Bosphorus presumption will most probably cease to exist by the 
introduction of the new formal hierarchy where the ECtHR is able to scrutinize EU acts, it is 
presumable that the friendly relationship between the two Courts will turn grimmer.  
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THE EU CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF 
SUPREMACY 
 
Lea Main-Klingst  
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
The case of Melloni has certainly not been the first time that the possible conflict of interests 
between national Member State law, and that of the Union has been highlighted. The case, 
like many others before it, puts emphasis on the difficulty as regards the principle of 
supremacy.  
On the one hand, EU law is meant to take precedence over Member State law.1 On the other 
hand however, Article 4(2) TEU states that: ‘The Union shall respect the equality of Member 
States before the Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental 
structures, political and constitutional [italics added], inclusive of regional and local self-
government.’ This position of preservation as regards national character and diversity 
between the Member States especially with regard to constitutional identity,2 also referred to 
as constitutional pluralism,3 is also confirmed in Member State law. Article 23(1) read in 
conjunction with Article 79(3) of the German Constitution (Basic Law) for example, 
explicitly states that the Federal Republics’ constitutional identity is inviolable and 
unchangeable as relates to human dignity and human rights (Article 1) as well as in relation to 
its constitutional principles (Article 20). These are characterized as its democratic and federal 
nature and furthermore the principle that public authorities are bound by the rights-guarantees 
as prescribed by the Basic Law.4 The principle of constitutional identity, which fundamental 
rights protection forms an essential part of, can thus be a constraint on European integration.  
Taking these two points into consideration, the question arises what to do when there is a 
conflict between EU supremacy and Member State law, and more specifically, how to resolve 
conflicts of interpretation or application of fundamental rights between the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (CJEU) and Constitutional Courts. What happens if rights granted by 
these two distinct legal orders overlap? Whose judgment should be given priority? These are 
the essential divergences this paper will aim to outline and discuss.  
The paper will start out by offering a definition of the main term concerned, this being 
supremacy. Next some German case law will be studied. This will give an interesting 
perspective for various different reasons. Firstly, because of Germany’s one of a kind 
fundamental and human rights catalogue in its Basic Law, which can be seen as a response to 
the atrocities of the Second World War. Secondly, and more importantly however German 
case law is the most extensive in this field and thus offers the best overview. Thirdly, it has 
been argued that Charter of Fundamental Rights was not only heavily influenced by the 
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German Basic Law,5 but that it could be considered ‘if not a child, at least a godchild of 
Germany.’6 And lastly, because, as can be deduced from Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, a 
case that will be discussed in detail below, German Courts’ insistence that the EU respect 
fundamental rights, or else the supremacy of EU law would be ignored, has been established 
as the original motivation behind the EU’s regime of fundamental rights’ protection.7  The 
case law will then be used as the framework for analysing the German stance on the 
supremacy of Union law. This study will ultimately lead up to an examination of Article 53 of 
the Charter in correlation with the different interpretations offered by the Spanish 
Constitutional Court in its judgment of the Melloni case. A look will also be taken at the 
General Advocate Bot’s opinion relating to the principle of supremacy. The paper will 
conclude with a short summary of the progress from the German case law in the 1970’s to the 
Melloni case of 2012. Finally a personal opinion will be given, relating to the question as to 
whether or not Member States should be able to deviate from EU law in order to provide for a 
higher standard of protection of fundamental rights. 
 
 
2.  The Principle of Supremacy 
 
In order for the objectives underlying this paper to be understood correctly, the term 
‘supremacy’ needs to be defined in order to allow for full understanding of this paper.  
The first decision, which established this principle, was that of Costa v ENEL in 1964. It 
formally integrated the EEC Treaty into the legal systems of the Member States8 thus the 
national courts were bound to apply it.9 Moreover, if Community law would not be supreme 
to national law, it would be almost impossible for the Union to achieve its goals. This position 
was further strengthened in the 1978 Simmenthal case where the Court held that EC law 
would overrule national provisions. This implicated that supremacy of EU law applied no 
matter if the national law had been enacted before or after EU law.10 Moreover this also meant 
that a court would be required to give immediate effect to Union law, without anticipating the 
Constitutional Court’s ruling.11 This however does not mean that national law has to be 
invalidated or annulled. The implications of this judgment are that the national laws are 
simply not to be applied.12 
Thus for reasons of clarification, the principle of supremacy simply means that in a 
hierarchical structure EU law takes precedence over national (Member State) law,13 including 
national constitutional law.14 Such supremacy has generally been acknowledged and respected 
by the Member States, except in the case of supremacy of EU law in relation to state 
constitutions.15  
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3.  Setting the Stage of the Fundamental Rights Conflict 
 
Before fully diving into the case law and analysing the stance of the German Constitutional 
Court, the stage needs to be set. Meaning that the problems and conflicts created as a 
consequence of an overlap between the principle of supremacy, EU fundamental rights 
protection and Member State fundamental rights protection, need to be put under the 
microscope. We first need to understand what the difficulties really are, before we can gather 
information on it and form an informed opinion. 
It has been understood, that the EU generally assumes supremacy in relation to the national 
law of its Member States. However, the EU did not just create itself. It was created by 6 
sovereign nation-states, some might even argue as a reaction to the Second World War,16 
since the war illustrated the destructive nature of complete state sovereignty.17 Thus there was 
a desire for supranational institutions that would create limits to such state power.18 On the 
one hand these limitations are in the shape of the Treaties and institutions that led to the 
creation of the European Union itself. On the other hand such restraint is also given, for 
example, by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR), a legally binding instrument. Additionally, on 1 December 2009, the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union was given legally binding force.19 
Thus, multiple spheres of rights protection coincided: those of the national constitutional 
courts, that of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and finally that of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).20 Hence it can easily be discerned that conflicts 
can arise where rights granted by these three institutions overlap,21 and are not fully 
compatible. However, whereas the ECHR clearly sets out in Article 53 that its Articles are 
merely meant to set a floor, if not to say a minimum standard of protection beneath which 
none of the contracting parties may fall,22 the same does not hold true for the European 
Charter of Fundamental Rights.23 A comprehensive analysis of its limits and scope has never 
been given until recently in Advocate General Bot’s decision in relation to the Melloni case. 
The importance of this will be further considered below. Additionally, the CJEU consistently 
reaffirmed its position that the ECHR can be regarded as one of its main sources when 
interpreting EU fundamental rights.24 It did however not choose to adapt the Convention’s 
position concerning the interplay between constitutional courts and the ECtHR. In this light it 
is also interesting to consider that the CJEU has explained that when protecting fundamental 
rights the constitutional traditions25 of the Member States would serve as a source of 
inspiration.26 Given however the diverse character and constitutional traditions of the Member 
States,27 as well as the different levels of significance fundamental rights protection is 
attributed in the Member States,28 this appears to be an almost impossible task.  When 
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been given until recently in Advocate General Bot’s decision in relation to the Melloni case. 
The importance of this will be further considered below. Additionally, the CJEU consistently 
reaffirmed its position that the ECHR can be regarded as one of its main sources when 
interpreting EU fundamental rights.24 It did however not choose to adapt the Convention’s 
position concerning the interplay between constitutional courts and the ECtHR. In this light it 
is also interesting to consider that the CJEU has explained that when protecting fundamental 
rights the constitutional traditions25 of the Member States would serve as a source of 
inspiration.26 Given however the diverse character and constitutional traditions of the Member 
States,27 as well as the different levels of significance fundamental rights protection is 
attributed in the Member States,28 this appears to be an almost impossible task.  When 
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adhering to the supremacy principle, the EU fundamental rights would not only set a 
minimum standard of protection, but would also claim authority over constitutional rights,29 
thus also setting a ceiling. This position has however not been ascertained in the interpretation 
of text of the Charter and has been disputed by many Constitutional Courts, especially as 
regards the relationship of EU and state constitutional law,30 including that of the Federal 
Republic of Germany. 
 
4.  Germany  
 
The discussion relating to fundamental rights started as early as 1970, with the Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft31 case where the CJEU, for the first time, officially recognized 
fundamental rights as part of the EU legal order32 and the EU legal systems.33 This can be 
regarded as an act to ascertain primacy of (then) Community law,34 as the German Federal 
Constitutional Court had previously ruled that in the case of conflict the fundamental rights 
protected by the German Basic Law would take precedence over the conflicting EU law.35 
Thus the principle of supremacy, in this context, applies always in relation to directly 
effective EU law and irrespective of whether or not national fundamental rights are 
concerned.36 It was then when the ECJ started to build its case law relating to and protecting 
fundamental rights.  
An important milestone in the relationship between national constitutional courts and the ECJ 
in the interpretation and protection of fundamental rights was the judgment of Solange II in 
1986. In this case, the German Federal Constitutional Court held that it would no longer 
exercise its jurisdiction in this field of law, as long as equivalent protection of the 
fundamental rights protected by the constitution would be afforded similar protection by 
ECJ’s case law.37 Meaning that as long as protection provided by the EU regime proved to be 
satisfactory38 and of an essentially equivalent degree39 the Constitutional Court would see no 
reason or requirement to act.40 This judgment did however not establish that the Constitutional 
Court would give up its power to review altogether; it was merely conditioned.41   
The importance of this case and its ruling can be further illustrated in its relation to the 
Maastricht judgment of 1993.42 In this case the Constitutional Court reiterated the position it 
had taken in the Solange II judgment, namely that the Federal Constitutional Court would 
exercise its competence only if there was a gross departure from the level of fundamental 
rights as guaranteed under the German Basic Law.43 The Constitutional Court however 
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emphasized that it did still hold the power of judicial review.44 The court decided that it would 
more actively examine the compliance of acts of the EU with fundamental rights,45 to ensure 
proper protection as required by the German Basic Law. After the judgment had been given, it 
was interpreted by some as the reversal of the Court’s Solange II decision, and that the Court 
had thus decided to return to the principle that the Federal Constitutional Court was the final 
arbitrator in fundamental rights conflicts, as long as the Community did not yet have a 
comprehensive catalogue of fundamental rights (Solange I; BVerfGE 37, 271).46  
In its Banana decision of June 2000,47 the Constitutional Court shed light onto this debate, by 
ascertaining that parallel protection was not necessary.48 Meaning that as long as a similar 
right was protected by the ECJ case law, there would be no reason for the Constitutional 
Court to practice its judicial review.  The Constitutional Court thus established a very high 
hurdle for the admissibility of claims against EU legal acts; the level of fundamental rights 
protection had to have fallen below a sufficient standard.49 Meaning that an applicant would 
have to prove that the EU no longer provided an acceptable level of human and fundamental 
rights protection.50 Thus even though a high hurdle was established, if EU fundamental rights 
proved to not provide adequate protection, the Constitutional Court permitted lower courts to 
temporarily suspend the efficacy of the EC regulation51 in favour of constitutional law. This 
case serves as a further illustration of the complex matter of ‘national fundamental rights 
control over Community law’.52  
Lastly, the Omega Spielhallen case of 2004 will be considered. It exemplifies yet another 
approach to the role of the Constitutional Court and the relationship between fundamental 
rights under the national constitution, the CJEU and the Charter.  
The Federal Constitutional Court referred a question to the ECJ relating to a conflict of rights, 
namely the clash between the protection of human dignity as safeguarded by the German 
Basic Law and the freedom to provide services as ensured under EU law.53 The applicant, a 
company by the name of Omega, had been operating a laserdrome game, which centred on the 
simulation of homicide.54 The facilitation of the game was subsequently forbidden by the 
police authority, on the basis that the purpose of the game was ‘contrary to fundamental 
values prevailing in public opinion’.55 Prior to the application reaching the Constitutional 
Court, Omega had objected to the prohibition before several lower courts. The Constitutional 
Court, before referring the case to the ECJ, however established that it believed that Omega’s 
appeal should be dismissed on the basis of the German constitution. It did nonetheless 
question whether such judgment would be compatible with Community law.56 It never came 
to such conflict, because the CJEU reaffirmed the position of the Federal Constitutional Court 
by recognizing the ‘fundamental importance of the principle of human dignity’,57 not only in 
German law but also in Community law. Moreover, it recognized that the importance given to 
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adhering to the supremacy principle, the EU fundamental rights would not only set a 
minimum standard of protection, but would also claim authority over constitutional rights,29 
thus also setting a ceiling. This position has however not been ascertained in the interpretation 
of text of the Charter and has been disputed by many Constitutional Courts, especially as 
regards the relationship of EU and state constitutional law,30 including that of the Federal 
Republic of Germany. 
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fundamental rights as part of the EU legal order32 and the EU legal systems.33 This can be 
regarded as an act to ascertain primacy of (then) Community law,34 as the German Federal 
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protected by the German Basic Law would take precedence over the conflicting EU law.35 
Thus the principle of supremacy, in this context, applies always in relation to directly 
effective EU law and irrespective of whether or not national fundamental rights are 
concerned.36 It was then when the ECJ started to build its case law relating to and protecting 
fundamental rights.  
An important milestone in the relationship between national constitutional courts and the ECJ 
in the interpretation and protection of fundamental rights was the judgment of Solange II in 
1986. In this case, the German Federal Constitutional Court held that it would no longer 
exercise its jurisdiction in this field of law, as long as equivalent protection of the 
fundamental rights protected by the constitution would be afforded similar protection by 
ECJ’s case law.37 Meaning that as long as protection provided by the EU regime proved to be 
satisfactory38 and of an essentially equivalent degree39 the Constitutional Court would see no 
reason or requirement to act.40 This judgment did however not establish that the Constitutional 
Court would give up its power to review altogether; it was merely conditioned.41   
The importance of this case and its ruling can be further illustrated in its relation to the 
Maastricht judgment of 1993.42 In this case the Constitutional Court reiterated the position it 
had taken in the Solange II judgment, namely that the Federal Constitutional Court would 
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emphasized that it did still hold the power of judicial review.44 The court decided that it would 
more actively examine the compliance of acts of the EU with fundamental rights,45 to ensure 
proper protection as required by the German Basic Law. After the judgment had been given, it 
was interpreted by some as the reversal of the Court’s Solange II decision, and that the Court 
had thus decided to return to the principle that the Federal Constitutional Court was the final 
arbitrator in fundamental rights conflicts, as long as the Community did not yet have a 
comprehensive catalogue of fundamental rights (Solange I; BVerfGE 37, 271).46  
In its Banana decision of June 2000,47 the Constitutional Court shed light onto this debate, by 
ascertaining that parallel protection was not necessary.48 Meaning that as long as a similar 
right was protected by the ECJ case law, there would be no reason for the Constitutional 
Court to practice its judicial review.  The Constitutional Court thus established a very high 
hurdle for the admissibility of claims against EU legal acts; the level of fundamental rights 
protection had to have fallen below a sufficient standard.49 Meaning that an applicant would 
have to prove that the EU no longer provided an acceptable level of human and fundamental 
rights protection.50 Thus even though a high hurdle was established, if EU fundamental rights 
proved to not provide adequate protection, the Constitutional Court permitted lower courts to 
temporarily suspend the efficacy of the EC regulation51 in favour of constitutional law. This 
case serves as a further illustration of the complex matter of ‘national fundamental rights 
control over Community law’.52  
Lastly, the Omega Spielhallen case of 2004 will be considered. It exemplifies yet another 
approach to the role of the Constitutional Court and the relationship between fundamental 
rights under the national constitution, the CJEU and the Charter.  
The Federal Constitutional Court referred a question to the ECJ relating to a conflict of rights, 
namely the clash between the protection of human dignity as safeguarded by the German 
Basic Law and the freedom to provide services as ensured under EU law.53 The applicant, a 
company by the name of Omega, had been operating a laserdrome game, which centred on the 
simulation of homicide.54 The facilitation of the game was subsequently forbidden by the 
police authority, on the basis that the purpose of the game was ‘contrary to fundamental 
values prevailing in public opinion’.55 Prior to the application reaching the Constitutional 
Court, Omega had objected to the prohibition before several lower courts. The Constitutional 
Court, before referring the case to the ECJ, however established that it believed that Omega’s 
appeal should be dismissed on the basis of the German constitution. It did nonetheless 
question whether such judgment would be compatible with Community law.56 It never came 
to such conflict, because the CJEU reaffirmed the position of the Federal Constitutional Court 
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public policy may differ from Member State to Member State and that therefore national 
authorities would be given a margin of discretion.58 In other words, this means that the subject 
matter discussed, as well as its adjudication would be left to the Member States.59 There is no 
concrete explanation for why the ECJ ruled this way. Arguably, the German courts might 
have challenged the decision and thus the supremacy of EU law, if the judgment had been in 
favour of the applicant, as human dignity forms a vital part of the German Basic Law.60  
Summarising and concluding all these cases, it can be established that there is conditional 
acceptance of EU law by the German Court.61 The Federal Constitutional Court conditionally 
reserves its powers of judicial review, but does not exercise them as long as the fundamental 
rights protection regime of the Union is comparable to that guaranteed under German Basic 
Law.62 Whereas numerous judgments of the ECJ have illustrated an apparent disposition to 
consider the Charter as the key or principal source of EU fundamental rights as well as a norm 
coherent to which fundamental right claims are to be adjudicated,63 we have observed that the 
same does not always hold true for the courts of the various Member States. Thus, in order to 
avoid such conflicts in the future it is of fundamental importance that Article 53 of the Charter 
be interpreted.  
 
5.  Article 53 of the European Chart of Fundamental Rights  
The basis for the relationship between the various national constitutions and the Charter can 
be found in Article 53 of the Charter relating to the ‘Level of Protection’.64 The Article states 
as follows:  
 
‘Nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting human rights 
and fundamental freedoms as recognised, in their respective fields of application, by Union 
law and international law and by international agreements to which the Union, the 
Community or all the Member States are party, including the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and by the Member States’ 
constitutions.’ 
The wording of this Article is somewhat ambiguous,65 as no clear definition is given of what 
‘their respective fields of application’ are. The European Court of Justice, the judicial organ 
responsible for the enforcement of the Charter, has not yet given a clear definition of Article 
53,66 thus leaving room for interpretation.  
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For these reasons, the Spanish Constitutional Court referred a case to the Court of Justice of 
the European Union, on 9 of June 2011.67   
Italian national Stefano Melloni had filed a complaint with the Spanish Constitutional Court 
on the basis of Article 24(2) of the Spanish Constitution, claiming that the European Arrest 
Warrant was in breach of the fundamental right to a fair trial as guaranteed by the Spanish 
Constitution.68  
Mr Melloni had been sentenced in absentia by an Italian tribunal. Previously he had been 
convicted and released on bail in response to which he fled to Spain. Subsequently, upon Mr 
Melloni’s sentencing the tribunal issued a European Arrest Warrant,69 which the Spanish 
authorities had complied with and which subsequently had resulted in the arrest of Mr 
Melloni.70 
The Spanish Constitutional Court was thus confronted with the question whether the 
Framework Decision relating to the European Arrest Warrant, prevented Spanish courts from 
granting the applicant all his fundamental rights as protected by the Constitution.71 This 
ultimately boils down to the question if the Framework Decision underlying the European 
Arrest Warrant was incompatible with the Spanish Constitution, and if so, which of the two 
would take precedence.72 
Thus, when referring this question to the Court of Justice of the European Union, the Spanish 
Constitutional Court included three possible interpretations of Article 53 of the Charter, which 
would in the long run help solve the conflicts that resulted from these overlapping rights. The 
three interpretations will be considered below.  
The first interpretation offered by the Spanish Constitutional Court paralleled Article 53 of the 
Charter to Article 53 of the European Convention of Human Rights. According to this 
analysis, the Charter would thus set a minimum standard, if not to say a floor, for the 
protection of fundamental rights.73 Thus Member States would not be allowed to fall beneath 
the required standard, they would however be permitted to set a maximum of protection in 
accordance with their respective constitutions.74 
The second interpretation aimed ‘to define the scope of the Charter’, meaning that where the 
Charter applies it has to be adhered to (this relates to ‘respective fields of application’). 
Conversely, where the Charter is not applicable, the constitutions of the Member States are 
considered to be relevant to ensure the protection of fundamental rights.  
The third interpretation given to Article 53 of the Charter embodies a combination of the first 
two interpretations.75  Which of the two applies would depend on the circumstances of each 
case.76 Consequently, this approach entails that where constitutional protection was higher 
than that of the Charter, and no other rights were at stake, the constitutional protection would 
apply, without however imposing a uniform standard on other Member States. This would be 
analogous to the Omega judgment.77 
As mentioned above, no clear judicial interpretation of Article 53 has been given, nonetheless 
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public policy may differ from Member State to Member State and that therefore national 
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acceptance of EU law by the German Court.61 The Federal Constitutional Court conditionally 
reserves its powers of judicial review, but does not exercise them as long as the fundamental 
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Community or all the Member States are party, including the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and by the Member States’ 
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For these reasons, the Spanish Constitutional Court referred a case to the Court of Justice of 
the European Union, on 9 of June 2011.67   
Italian national Stefano Melloni had filed a complaint with the Spanish Constitutional Court 
on the basis of Article 24(2) of the Spanish Constitution, claiming that the European Arrest 
Warrant was in breach of the fundamental right to a fair trial as guaranteed by the Spanish 
Constitution.68  
Mr Melloni had been sentenced in absentia by an Italian tribunal. Previously he had been 
convicted and released on bail in response to which he fled to Spain. Subsequently, upon Mr 
Melloni’s sentencing the tribunal issued a European Arrest Warrant,69 which the Spanish 
authorities had complied with and which subsequently had resulted in the arrest of Mr 
Melloni.70 
The Spanish Constitutional Court was thus confronted with the question whether the 
Framework Decision relating to the European Arrest Warrant, prevented Spanish courts from 
granting the applicant all his fundamental rights as protected by the Constitution.71 This 
ultimately boils down to the question if the Framework Decision underlying the European 
Arrest Warrant was incompatible with the Spanish Constitution, and if so, which of the two 
would take precedence.72 
Thus, when referring this question to the Court of Justice of the European Union, the Spanish 
Constitutional Court included three possible interpretations of Article 53 of the Charter, which 
would in the long run help solve the conflicts that resulted from these overlapping rights. The 
three interpretations will be considered below.  
The first interpretation offered by the Spanish Constitutional Court paralleled Article 53 of the 
Charter to Article 53 of the European Convention of Human Rights. According to this 
analysis, the Charter would thus set a minimum standard, if not to say a floor, for the 
protection of fundamental rights.73 Thus Member States would not be allowed to fall beneath 
the required standard, they would however be permitted to set a maximum of protection in 
accordance with their respective constitutions.74 
The second interpretation aimed ‘to define the scope of the Charter’, meaning that where the 
Charter applies it has to be adhered to (this relates to ‘respective fields of application’). 
Conversely, where the Charter is not applicable, the constitutions of the Member States are 
considered to be relevant to ensure the protection of fundamental rights.  
The third interpretation given to Article 53 of the Charter embodies a combination of the first 
two interpretations.75  Which of the two applies would depend on the circumstances of each 
case.76 Consequently, this approach entails that where constitutional protection was higher 
than that of the Charter, and no other rights were at stake, the constitutional protection would 
apply, without however imposing a uniform standard on other Member States. This would be 
analogous to the Omega judgment.77 
As mentioned above, no clear judicial interpretation of Article 53 has been given, nonetheless 
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for the purpose of this paper it is interesting to look at the opinion of Advocate General Bot 
for two distinct reasons. Firstly, even though the opinions of the Advocate General do not 
bind the Court in any way,78 and they are merely intended to supply the judges with an 
impartial and independent advice, it has generally been observed that such opinions often 
entail studies of national constitutional law, which then consequently lead to and allow the 
interpretation EU fundamental rights.79 And secondly, because the interpretations offered in 
the General Advocate’s opinion are the first judicial statements relating to the meaning of 
Article 53 of the Charter, which ultimately leads us back to the question of supremacy as 
regards the ECJ and national constitutional courts.  
In his reasoned submission, AG Bot firmly rejects the first interpretation by the Spanish 
Constitutional Court,80 according to which Article 53 had to be seen as merely setting a 
minimum level of fundamental rights required by the Charter. He argues that this version 
would lead to a relinquishment of the principle of supremacy,81 as national constitutions 
would be assigned a higher rung on the hierarchical ladder than the Charter itself. 
He does however not appear adverse to the following two interpretations. The Advocate 
General concludes that the text of the Charter was not intended to replace the respective 
provisions in the national constitutions,82 nor should Member States be required to lower their 
protection regime as to make it coherent with the Charter.83 Bot furthermore concedes that 
where a provision of the Charter seems to affect and more importantly undermine the national 
identity of a Member State, that state should be able to challenge such a provision, using 
Article 4(2) as its foundation.84 He additionally distinguishes between situations85 where a 
definition at European Union level exists, and where it does not.86 
Ultimately, Advocate General Bot comes to the conclusion that Article 53 should be 
interpreted and read in connection with Article 51 and 52 of the Charter. This would 
ultimately amount to the Charter setting a standard of fundamental rights only within the 
European Union’s field of application.87      
As for the case of Melloni, this would mean that the Spanish Constitutional Court would not 
be permitted to grant the applicant (subject to the arrest warrant) a retrial, which would be 
pursuant to the constitution, because such is not permitted by the Framework Decision,88 and 
moreover the Court had not claimed a conflict with its national identity.89   
As previously mentioned, the opinion of the Advocate General is not binding on the Court. 
The Court can thus mend the interpretation of the Charter into any direction it wishes. The 
ECJ could choose to adopt Article 53 as the highest possible standard, or it could choose to 
leave ‘a margin of appreciation’ to the national courts.90 This would mean that national courts 
would be able to adjudicate in cases where constitutional protection is higher than that of the 
charter. This would be in line with Omega.91 
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Either way, it is desirable for the Court to interpret the Article92 in order to elucidate, in this 
situation for the Spanish Constitutional Court, whether the application of national 
fundamental rights is permitted if these are of a higher standard,93 and in general for all 
Member State’s courts to clarify the relationship between the fundamental rights of the 
relevant national constitutions and those enshrined in the Charter. 
 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
Even though, rightfully concluded, the Charter can be considered as including fundamental 
rights and values that are also present in various national constitutions,94 as we have seen 
various national courts, most notably the German courts, pose a threat to the supremacy of the 
CJEU. Not only because diverging interpretations of essentially the same fundamental rights 
exist,95 but also especially when it is believed that the EU protection of fundamental rights is 
not at a high enough level.96 However as we have seen in the case law, the German courts 
have taken a backseat when it comes to the protection of fundamental rights, as long as EU 
law guarantees equivalent protection97(Solange II and Banana Market). The ECJ has in turn 
allowed constitutional traditions to influence its EU fundamental rights  
interpretation98(Omega), without requiring uniform application.   
The difficulties in this are however, that contrary to the principle of EU supremacy, the CJEU 
is part of a system of constitutional pluralism in which its position as final judge is not 
routinely acknowledged.99 There is no concluding arbiter at all. So who gets the final say and 
which provision takes precedence, that of EU law or that of the national constitution, remains 
unclear. That is the element of one of the questions, the Spanish Constitutional Court referred 
to the CJEU in Melloni, and that is also the question this paper tries to give a little more 
substance to.   
When taking another look at the three different interpretations of Article 53 offered by the 
Spanish Constitutional Court, I would suggest that a fourth interpretation should be added. 
Namely, that the fundamental protection regime that is to apply in the situation of an overlap 
is that which guarantees the highest level of protection. I believe that the main concern of this 
debate should not be whether Member States or the EU take precedence when it comes to 
protection and interpretation of fundamental rights, but that the main concern should be 
offering the Union’s citizens (and thus also the citizens of each and every Member State) the 
best possible protection of their rights. This would require interplay between the two parties, 
rather than a feud relating to primacy or precedence.  
All Member States of the Union share a minimum of the same principles100 of ‘liberty, 
democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law’ (Article 
6.1 Treaty Establishing the European Community), thus I would argue that the protection of 
basic fundamental rights is always guaranteed. Furthermore the respect and observance of 
fundamental rights is part of the Copenhagen criteria, which embody conditions required for 
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accession.101 This is why I don’t see any difficulties if only Member State law is applied. This 
standpoint is further supported by the argument that the CJEU only recognised fundamental 
rights to protect its supremacy against the claims of national constitutional courts, and that 
thus fundamental rights were at first not at the core of the (then) Communities’, as it is for 
example in the German Basic Law.102  
Furthermore, I would argue that recognizing and permitting a certain level of diversity does 
not automatically jeopardize the goals of the Union itself.103 I believe that it is important to 
sustain a certain degree of variety, as the differing national characters of its Member States 
contribute to the formation of the Union’s character and uniqueness itself.  
Thus in conclusion, even though it cannot be said that there are gross differences between 
fundamental rights granted by the EU Charter and those, for example, given by the German 
Basic Law, the interpretation of these rights is what causes difficulties. Both protect the right 
to and respect of family, however what is to be understood as family can be disputed. Take for 
example a gay couple.104 Would they constitute a family under both systems? Thus applying 
homogenous interpretations at Union level does not necessarily mean that the citizens are 
given the most satisfactory level of protection.105 Another example that serves as an 
illustration of the Union’s diversity can be seen in the Irish Constitution, which protects the 
rights to life of the unborn. This right however is not explicitly mentioned in other state 
constitutions or the Charter.106 
In brief, I would argue that the highest degree of fundamental rights protection and individual 
freedom is what both regimes should strive for. Therefore, if national constitutional courts 
provide for a higher level of protection than the ECJ, for protection that is not outlined in the 
Charter, or for the protection of a fundamental right momentous to their constitution, they 
should be allowed to deviate.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
101 Kluwer Law International, ‘Editorial Comments: Fundamental Rights and EU Membership: Do as I say, 
not as I do!’, 49 Common Market Law Review (2012), p. 481. 
102 Douglas-Scott, 11:4 Human Rights Law Review (2011), p. 679. 
103 Torres Pérez, Conflicts of Rights in the European Union, p. 57. 
104 Torres Pérez, Conflicts of Rights in the European Union, p. 78. 
105 Ibid, p. 13. 
106 Ibid, p. 12. 
 
61 
 
THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE HUNGARIAN JUDICIARY: AN EU PROBLEM? 
 
Sinead Haywood  
 
 
1. Introduction 
‘Hungary, like all Member States, is obliged by the EU Treaties to guarantee the 
independence of its National Central Bank and its Data Protection Authority and the non-
discrimination of its judges. The Commission is determined to take any legal steps necessary 
to ensure that the compatibility with European Union legislation is maintained." Strong words 
from President José Manuel Barroso. According to the EU Commission,1 the Hungarian 
government’s new constitution, which came into force in January 2012, and the legislation 
which came into force with it, is not compatible with EU law or principles.2 This paper will 
look at what measures have been taken by the Hungarian government, particularly in relation 
to the judiciary, and take a glance at Hungary’s past to see where this constitutional change 
came from. It will examine the justifications presented by the government for these actions 
and will comment on this. Further, an attempt will be made to present the notion that this is an 
EU problem, although not solely, and show why. The case ruled on by the European Court of 
Justice in November 2012 will be presented and finally a conclusion will be provided with 
suggestions of what further action can be taken. 
 
 
2. The Situation in Hungary – What is all the Fuss About? 
In order to grasp where the issues at hand originated, we must briefly delve into the past and 
take at least a cursory look at Hungary’s recent political history of the last few decades, 
particularly the rise of the Fidesz party.  Post World War Two Hungary saw communist 
control being seized in the fraudulent elections of 1947 and soon after a Soviet-style 
constitution was introduced while political parties saw themselves being coerced into merging 
and forming one mega-party, the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (MszMP).3 Though 
there was temporary relief in 1953 from the oppressive measures under the regime, namely 
Imre Nagy’s term as Prime Minister as he freed many political prisoners and attempted to end 
political persecution, the economic deterioration of the time saw the previous Prime Minister, 
Mátyás Rákosi, retake his position within two years.4 However, by 1956 revolution was 
breaking out as a result of student protesters being fired upon by security forces.5 This was 
enough for Nagy to regain support and resume office, disband the security police and abolish 
the one-party system while resolving to hold free elections.6 In light of the withdrawal from 
the Warsaw Pact in November 1956, János Kádár, the Party’s First Secretary, fled only to 
return and form a new government with Soviet support which led to massive reprisals and 
bloodshed while thousands fled in fear for their safety. Nagy was deported and, on his 
                                                 
1 European Commission – Economic and Financial Affairs, available at 
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eventual return, executed.7 Soon the economy was looking healthier and western trade seemed 
viable.8  
It is at this stage that today’s ruling party, Fidesz, came into being. The centre-right party, 
established in 1988, promoted European integration.9 It developed from a party for those 
under thirty-five to later include all others and be re-branded as the Hungarian Civic Alliance 
in 2003.10 The party’s power grew throughout the 1990s and by 1998 it was the largest party 
in the National Assembly with 148 seats (of a possible 386).11 However, under the presidency 
of Viktor Orbán, the party lost its power in 2002 and was replaced by a Socialist 
government.12 Nevertheless, after several scandals, growing economic struggles and the 
second elections since entering the EU in 2004, the Fidesz party returned to power in April 
2010 after joining forces with the Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP).13 This was a 
pivotal moment in Hungarian politics as, by gaining a two-thirds majority, the Fidesz party 
was in a position to bring about constitutional change.14 The party wasted no time in flexing 
its new found muscles and within one year announced a new constitution.15 Many laws were 
swiftly introduced and those which were not already applicable came into effect on January 
1st 2012 when the new ‘constitutional order’ settled in.16 This brings us to the main point of 
discussion, namely the current measures adopted by the new Hungarian coalition government.   
The Fundamental Law of Hungary of 25 April 2011 (Fundamental Law) was preceded by the 
Transitional Provisions of Hungary’s Fundamental Law with further ‘cardinal laws’ of note 
also bringing about significant change; including the Cardinal Act CLXI of 2011 on the 
Organisation and Administration of Courts in Hungary (AOAC), the Cardinal Act CLXII of 
2011 on the Legal Status and Remuneration of Judges (ALSRJ), and the Cardinal Act CLI on 
the Constitutional Court (CCA).17 One would be forgiven for asking: what is so controversial 
about a new government wanting to bring reform to a system which had been blighted by 
turmoil and the heavy handed rule of communism? If knowing that many of these cardinal 
laws were the result of private members’ bills is not enough to raise one’s eyebrows then 
perhaps pointing out that even the Fundamental Law began as a private members’ bill will be 
enough. According to the International Bar Association, this is ‘remarkable.’18 Further, the 
speed by which these bills were passed into law is great cause for concern; for example, a bill 
restricting the number of state recognised religious bodies (in itself questionable) was 
amended at the last minute and distributed amongst deputies only ten minutes prior to them 
having to vote on it.19 This cannot possibly allow any room for true democratic debate. When 
we turn our attention to the Transitional Provisions, worry is further instilled in anyone with a 
sense for democracy when one takes note that these provisions are not transitional in nature 
but indeed ‘appear to substantively change the Constitution.’20 Particular elements of the 
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Transitional Provisions even breach the new Fundamental Law itself when allowing for the 
President of the National Judicial Office (NJO) – discussed later – and the Chief Prosecutor to 
assign cases to particular courts.21 Not only does this violate national law but it appears to be 
in violation of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). What is most 
disturbing is the fact that the Hungarian Constitutional Court, critical of political 
developments, appears to be powerless in the face of the government. When the Court 
annulled a regulation which retroactively imposed a 98% tax on particular categories of 
severance pay, the government passed a bill22 restricting the Constitutional Court’s 
jurisdiction over taxation issues.23 By March 2012, it was found by the Venice Commission24 
that legislation was adopted in a hasty manner and did not allow for adequate consultation.25 
Not only the speed of the adoption caused consternation but the sheer number of laws adopted 
so speedily was worrying; it was estimated that over 359 laws had been passed by the Fidesz 
party since it gained power.26 
The organisation of the courts and independence of the judiciary was called into question by 
the setting up of the aforementioned NJO, which replaced the National Council of Justice’s 
(NCJ)27 collegial decision-making, whose new President was vested with the powers of 
‘operational management of the courts, human resources, budget and allocation of cases.’28 
This individual has a nine year term of office, dismissal requiring a supermajority in 
Parliament, has the power to appoint judges and, together with the (politically appointed) 
chief prosecutor, can decide which judges hear which cases.29 Powers were initially stronger 
than they are now after the government addressed some of the issues of concern with an 
Amendment Act. However, the President still has excessive control30 over judicial 
appointment, raising concerns that, despite having ‘merit-based’ criteria for appointment, 
judges will be selected for political reasons throwing fuel to the fire of controversy 
surrounding the questions of human rights law, in particular Article 6 ECHR.31 Any question 
over the political status of the President will be put to bed once the following fact has been 
digested: the NJO is headed by Tunde Hando – the wife of one of the Fidesz leading 
members.32 
 What has deeply shocked the EU and the wider international community are the measures 
directly affecting the judiciary  which have allegedly jeopardized the  independence of 
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Transitional Provisions even breach the new Fundamental Law itself when allowing for the 
President of the National Judicial Office (NJO) – discussed later – and the Chief Prosecutor to 
assign cases to particular courts.21 Not only does this violate national law but it appears to be 
in violation of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). What is most 
disturbing is the fact that the Hungarian Constitutional Court, critical of political 
developments, appears to be powerless in the face of the government. When the Court 
annulled a regulation which retroactively imposed a 98% tax on particular categories of 
severance pay, the government passed a bill22 restricting the Constitutional Court’s 
jurisdiction over taxation issues.23 By March 2012, it was found by the Venice Commission24 
that legislation was adopted in a hasty manner and did not allow for adequate consultation.25 
Not only the speed of the adoption caused consternation but the sheer number of laws adopted 
so speedily was worrying; it was estimated that over 359 laws had been passed by the Fidesz 
party since it gained power.26 
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Parliament, has the power to appoint judges and, together with the (politically appointed) 
chief prosecutor, can decide which judges hear which cases.29 Powers were initially stronger 
than they are now after the government addressed some of the issues of concern with an 
Amendment Act. However, the President still has excessive control30 over judicial 
appointment, raising concerns that, despite having ‘merit-based’ criteria for appointment, 
judges will be selected for political reasons throwing fuel to the fire of controversy 
surrounding the questions of human rights law, in particular Article 6 ECHR.31 Any question 
over the political status of the President will be put to bed once the following fact has been 
digested: the NJO is headed by Tunde Hando – the wife of one of the Fidesz leading 
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 What has deeply shocked the EU and the wider international community are the measures 
directly affecting the judiciary  which have allegedly jeopardized the  independence of 
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Hungarian judges. Of particular concern was the way in which 27433 judges were prematurely 
and compulsorily retired as a result of the government lowering the retirement age from 70 to 
62 (only for judges) and this being applied retrospectively.34 Article 12 Transitional 
Provisions and the aforementioned Cardinal Act CLXII of 2011 on the Legal Status and 
Remuneration of Judges (ALSRJ) removed the upper age limit of 70 for judges apart from 
‘certain public offices.’35 Many of these judges have already been replaced. This is a blatant 
contravention of EU law in relation to age discrimination as indeed ruled on by the ECJ.36 
This retroactivity and contravention will be a point of discussion later when looking at the 
EU’s infringement case against Hungary. Even the Supreme Court judges were not safe from 
the new legislation,37 as evidenced by the President of the Supreme Court being forced to step 
down for not having the (newly required) five years of Hungarian court experience – 
seventeen years at the European Court of Human Rights was not, apparently, sufficient any 
longer.38 András Baka, who was appointed President of the Supreme Court in June 2009, 
should have, under the then in force Act LXVI of 1997 on the Organisation and 
Administration of the Courts, been able to complete his six-year term of office.39 Under 
Article 73 of the law, the only possibility for termination of a court executive’s mandate was 
by mutual agreement or resignation, or by dismissal – the latter option only available should 
the executive be found incompetent.40 Bill T/4743 was introduced in October 2011, which was 
later passed as the AOAC, defined ‘court executives’ listing all court presidents except the 
President of the Supreme Court (renamed the ‘Kúria’).41 Bill T/5005, introduced on 
November 20 2011, provided an additional option for the termination of the President of the 
Supreme Court’s mandate effective with the entry into force of the Fundamental Law.42 It is 
alarming to note the government’s apparent enactment of ‘a retroactive and ad hominem 
regulation.’43 The impact of this may have a ‘chilling effect’ on the judiciary as individual 
judges may fear their criticism of government bills in their rulings during review may be held 
against them; this has massive repercussions when it comes to the independence of the 
judiciary and the principle of the rule of law.44 
The public is not only affected by the changes to the judiciary, it is also directly affected by 
the abolition of ‘the citizens’ right to take constitutional review on abstract points of law.’45 It 
was argued that the right of actio popularis had put the Constitutional Court under strain as 
claims were so numerous while pointing out that abolishing this right would not, in itself, 
result in a situation any different to other European states which afforded no such right.46 
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It is not only the issues surrounding the judiciary, legislative and executive that present 
worrying developments. According to Human Rights Watch, Hungary’s media law has also 
become ‘problematic.’47 A new body, tasked with regulating the media has been given far 
reaching powers to impose fines for ‘“imbalanced news coverage,” material it considers 
"insulting" to a particular group, or "the majority", or is deemed to violate "public 
morality.”’48 Journalists have lost the legal protection of keeping their sources confidential, a 
move which is seen to curb the media’s freedom and undermine human rights.49 
The measures enacted by the Fidesz controlled government are wide reaching and 
controversial to say the least. They appear to defy European and international legal 
obligations, the notion of democracy and have, unsurprisingly, been the subject of debate 
across the globe and internally while protests within the country have been tense. It is vital 
that one looks into what the justifications may be and if there is another side to the story. 
 
 
3. Are there any Justifications? 
 
One must of course, as in any academic paper, attempt to see more than one side of a problem 
– here, Hungary’s justifications, which were given to the International Bar Association’s 
Human Rights Institute (IBAHRI) on its independent reporting mission, will be presented and 
commented on. Firstly, the government presented the situation with which it was faced as one 
of a country still struggling in the aftermath of communist control and pointed to the fact that 
Hungary had, until January 1 2012, been living with the communist era constitution and that 
the time was nigh for a clean break from the past.50 This may be a valid point and one can 
certainly see why a nation would feel the need, for the sake of national identity and to move 
on from painful wounds of history, to start afresh with a new constitution.  
The next point of defence from the government was that it had indeed consulted the public 
who had approved the changes.51 One must ask how, exactly, is this claim backed up? The 
International Bar Association highlights the fact that Hungary was ‘not obliged to hold a 
referendum on the constitutional changes it introduced’ but chose to consult the public 
through ‘questionnaires distributed to eight million voters, promising to take their views into 
account.52 The delegation from the IBAHRI found that these questionnaires ‘were not fit for 
purpose and that the consultation process had been so minimal as to render it meaningless.’53 
How consultation can be effective when, as outlined above, amendments to bills are made 
minutes before being voted on, leaving no time for examination or debate, and when the 
ordinary parliamentary procedures are not used so as to avoid the normal consultation 
process,54is beyond even the most flexible thinker.  
The government put forward the claim that the judiciary needed an overhaul so as to make it 
more efficient. For over a decade, the judiciary had been almost self-governing but had the 
strain of case excesses and it was said that reform was necessary in order to deal with the 
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overload.55 This does not sound like a preposterous idea in itself. It was further submitted that 
the National Council of Justice (NCJ) did not function well and did not succeed in improving 
the situation of the overloaded courts.56 Again, in itself, not an unreasonable issue to wish to 
solve however, here too one must question the way in which the government pursued its aim. 
A further defence was presented arguing that, by retiring so many judges, the government was 
providing career opportunities for the next generation of judges.57 This does not justify a 
direct infringement of EU Directive 2000/78/EC which prohibits any discrimination on the 
grounds of age.58 As established by case law, it is contrary to EU law to adopt a particular 
retirement age which affects only one group unless an objective and proportionate 
justification is provided – this can be seen in Reinhard Prigge and Others v Deutsche 
Lufthansa AG.59 This move is particularly bewildering when one looks to the average 
retirement age across Europe and sees it is rising, and the Hungarian government had 
provided no objective or proportionate justification for the measure after having informed the 
Commission of its intent to raise the retirement age.60 Thus the move was solely a political, 
rather than legal, one.  
Were their actions proportionate and really necessary? It is doubtful that there will be many, if 
any, valid arguments that would support the government’s total disregard for the guarantee of 
judicial tenure (as required by international law - Article 12 UN Basic Principles on the 
Independence of the Judiciary61) and judicial independence. Individual points that have been 
submitted by the government as defences for measures taken may seem valid when looked at 
in isolation and one cannot fault several of the alleged aims to move forward and away from 
the past and to bring about a new, freer national identity. However, one must ask: has the 
government gone about their aims in the correct way? It would seem that there is no other 
possible answer than to say no, in light of the evidence presented and the way in which the 
government set about bringing in a new constitution, despite its legitimate wish to move away 
from its communist past, this was not done in the correct, or acceptable, way and it is no 
wonder that waves of worry are rippling around the EU and wider international circles. Kim 
Lane Scheppele phrases the problem well in her New York Times blog: “if constitutions are 
supposed to guarantee checks on political power and ensure the rights of citizens, this is an 
unconstitutional constitution.”62  
 
 
4. Is this a Problem for the European Union? 
 
When discussing the case at hand and the EU action against Hungary (which will be discussed 
later), it is useful to bear in mind the principles by which the judges of the European Court of 
Justice will abide. In the Preamble of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), we see the basic 
principles outlined – ‘…universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human 
person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law.’ In order for democracy to flourish, 
there must be a separation of powers stemming from constitutional provisions which ensure a 
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limitation to the powers of the government.63 ‘Respect for basic values and human rights, 
tolerance, peaceful and regulated transfer of power and legitimacy of the state’64 are all 
essential to ensuring democracy. When looking at Hungary’s place in the EU, one may look 
to the Presidency Conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council, 21-22 June 1993, and 
wonder if Hungary would be allowed to accede to the Union under the current situation: 
‘Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of 
minorities.’65 When we compare the moves of the Hungarian government to these principles, 
we see almost immediately that it has ignored these basic common values of European 
Member States. Human rights have been disrespected – how is one to be sure he/she will get 
the fair and impartial trial afforded by Article 6 ECHR when the judiciary is politically linked 
and independence is jeopardized? Where is the true democratic debate over the introduction 
of new legislation when the leading party has the power to introduce or change ‘cardinal 
laws,’ as they have done, with their two-thirds majority? Where is equality when the 
constitution allows for discrimination against LBGTI people?66 Where is equality before the 
law when there are barriers standing in the way of access to the constitutional court?67 Even 
freedom of speech is not guaranteed anymore due to the new media laws which give the 
power to a government agency to still the voices of critical radio stations or newspapers.68 Is 
there really a separation of powers when the legislator exercises so much control over the 
judiciary? These are serious insults in the face of common European values and laws – 
without a shadow of a doubt something must be done – the question is, what can be done?  
 
 
5. What Can the EU Do? 
Since Maastricht in 1991, further European integration has been incorporated into the Treaties 
while a provision to ensure the principle of subsidiarity is respected was also included - 
although Member States do confer certain competences to the EU (Article 5 TEU). These 
competences are outlined in Articles 2-6 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU) and are categorized depending on if they are exclusive, shared, supportive or 
coordinating.69 Article 4 TEU ensures that, where the Treaties do not provide for EU 
competence, the EU will refrain from acting. Article 4(2) TEU pledges to: ‘respect the 
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limitation to the powers of the government.63 ‘Respect for basic values and human rights, 
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equality of Member States before the Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in 
their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-
government…’ Article 5 TEU further contains two leading principles of EU law – that of 
subsidiarity and proportionality. It is accepted and well established that the EU institutions 
only have competence in the areas agreed upon in the Treaties70 however, the articles which 
are broadly formed have left some scope for interpretation by the European Court of Justice. 
There is a somewhat lengthy list of case law on the topic; in Van Gend en Loos ‘a new legal 
order of international law for the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign 
rights’ was acknowledged.71 Costa v. ENEL72 followed reaffirming the supremacy of EU law 
over national law and other cases, including Simmenthal II73 and Marleasing,74 furthered the 
notion. While some accepted this readily, and even enshrined it into their own constitutions, 
this cannot be said for all. Several constitutional courts of Members States have made 
reservations regarding the supremacy of EU law and claim the concept lies within their own 
national constitutions rather than in the ‘new legal order’ itself.75 In particular, the Central and 
Easter European states saw powerful constitutional courts emerge once the grip of 
Communism was slackened enough to let them go.76  
Prior to acceding to the EU, the Hungarian Constitutional Court, confirmed its power by 
holding that Hungary had its own notion of the ‘rule of law’ and that the Commission 
Regulations on transitional measures (aimed at preventing speculative stock accumulation) 
which were to be transposed into national law, in the form of an Act on Measures Concerning 
Agricultural Surplus Stocks, enacted by Parliament on April 5 2004, were retroactive in 
nature.77 The Regulations stipulated that, if stockpiling was to be discovered, fines would be 
imposed. It was argued that it would be in breach of the vacatio legis of 45 days if the 
President was to sign the law in.  Article 2(1) (pre-January 2012) Constitution of the Republic 
of Hungary of 1949 enshrined the rule of law and thus legal certainty according to the Court; 
the Court had viewed the case from the perspective of national law being applied and has 
chosen to take no notice of the European element despite the fact that the rules which were 
struck down were indistinguishable from the transitional measures required by the EU in 
order for Hungary to accede.78 This arguably shows that the Hungarian Court was holding its 
feet firmly on the ground while shouting loudly and clearly that it was up to the national court 
to decide on whether EU law complied with domestic law and, if not, that Hungarian law 
would prevail.79 It is remarkable that, after the Court ruled the EU Regulation would have a 
retroactive effect, the Hungarian government was brought before the ECJ for laws with that 
very effect (as well as contravening an EU directive).  
          Article 17(1) TEU assigns the Commission as the guardian of the Treaties and places 
upon it the responsibility of ensuring Member State compliance.80 Article 258 TFEU affords 
the Commission wide powers and discretion and states that: 
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If the Commission considers that a Member State has failed to fulfil an obligation under 
the Treaties, it shall deliver a reasoned opinion on the matter after giving the State 
concerned the opportunity to submit its observations. If the State concerned does not 
comply with the opinion within the period laid down by the Commission, the latter may 
bring the matter before the Court of Justice of the European Union. 
 
Outlined very briefly, the infringement procedure is divided into four steps; i) the 
Commission gives the Member State the chance to explain its actions (or lack thereof), ii) 
when still unclear, the state will be sent a formal notification by letter outlining the allegations 
it faces – there is a chance for the state to reply, iii) when the matter is unresolved by 
communication between the two, a reasoned opinion is issued, a timeframe by which the state 
must comply is set, and finally iv) the matter is referred to the ECJ when still unresolved. It is 
exactly this procedure the Commission used to bring Hungary before the ECJ on June 7 2012. 
However, the case honed in on one very particular issue, namely the ‘failure of a Member 
State to fulfil obligations’ under Directive 2000/78/EC – Articles 2 and 6(1). The ECJ, in its 
ruling of November 6 2012, found that Hungary provided no ‘evidence to enable it to be 
established that more lenient provisions would not have made it possible to achieve the 
objective at issue’81 and did not justify why it lowered the retirement age with such immediate 
effect.82 The Court further ruled that the ‘contested national provisions give rise to a 
difference in treatment which does not comply with the principle of proportionality and, 
therefore, the Commission’s action must be upheld.’83  Thus the Court: 
 
Declares that by adopting a national scheme requiring compulsory retirement of 
judges, prosecutors and notaries when they reach the age of 62 – which gives rise to a 
difference in treatment on grounds of age which is not proportionate as regards the 
objectives pursued – Hungary has failed to fulfil its obligations under Articles 2 and 
6(1) of Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general 
framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
The ECJ ruling is of course encouraging but there are many issues left unresolved. This said, 
it must be asked: is the independence (or lack thereof) of the Hungarian judiciary an EU 
problem? What about NATO? Human Rights Watch rightly points out that NATO requires 
members to have a “functioning democratic political system” and to respect common values 
of “individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law.”’84 In light of the issues 
discussed in this paper, it would appear that Hungary does not live up to these requirements as 
things stand. What about the flouting of democratic principles and the lack of public 
consultation when bringing about such wide sweeping laws? What about the human rights 
issues under Article 6 ECHR? Media restrictions, lack of the possibility of a fair trial before 
an impartial tribunal, freedom of association,85 laws being enacted with retroactive effect – 
does this not smack of the beginnings of Nazi Germany?  This is a provocative question 
indeed but one which is warranted. The situation in Hungary at the present time is 
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unacceptable in a European Union that purports to uphold democratic values - there is more 
that can be done. ‘Europe's politicians must finally have the courage to openly criticize 
Hungary's government and to increase political pressure on the country with all the means 
they have at their disposal. Nothing less than the protection of European values is at stake.’86 
Finally, the EU should bring further infringement procedures and use every tool at their 
disposal to put an end to ‘democracy being trampled on.’87 
In order for democracy to flourish, there must be a separation of powers stemming from 
constitutional provisions which ensure a limitation to the powers of the government.88 
‘Respect for basic values and human rights, tolerance, peaceful and regulated transfer of 
power and legitimacy of the state’89 are all essential to ensuring democracy. As the situation 
stands, Hungary cannot be seen to be respecting the principle of the trias politica which 
Montesquieu found so vital for democracy. The government shows utter disrespect for the 
views of the Constitutional Court and flouts its independent control, undermining its 
judgements90 evidenced by the introduction of laws which effectively overrules the Court. 
There is little in the way to show that the government takes popular opinion into account. 
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THE PRELIMINARY RULING PROCEDURE: DOES KÖBLER UNDERMINE 
CILFIT? 
 
Caroline Calomme  
 
1. Introduction 
The Court of Justice of the European Union has developed the influential principles of direct 
effects and primacy of European Union law in cases referred to it through the preliminary 
ruling procedure.1 Arguably the most significant procedural rule of the Treaty, it is laid down 
in Article 267 TFEU, previously Article 234 EC or Article 177 EEC.2 This co-operative 
procedure ensures the uniform interpretation and application of EU law in the various 
Member States.3 Therefore, this mechanism secures the rule of law and equal treatment for all 
Union citizens.4 Furthermore, it facilitates the dialogue between the Court of Justice and the 
national courts.5 In 1982, the CILFIT case qualified the obligation for national courts of last 
instance to refer to the Court of Justice by granting discretion to the national courts if ‘the 
correct application of Community law may be so obvious as to leave no scope for any 
reasonable doubt’.6 However, in 2003, the case of Professor Köbler extended state liability to 
breaches committed by judicial bodies, including the failure to make a reference to the Court.7 
This controversial judgment raised many concerns analysed further in this paper.  
The main drawback of the ruling is the foreseeable increase in references in order to avoid 
liability in case of doubt, increasing significantly the already heavy workload of the Court.8 
This paper enquires to which extent the Köbler judgment has indeed rendered CILFIT 
ineffective. For this purpose, the ruling in CILFIT is first examined and evaluated for its 
advantages and inconveniences. Second, the Köbler case is dealt with more extensively 
focusing on the current controversy surrounding it. Third, recent case law is presented in 
order to comprehend further the impact of Köbler. Finally, the paper assesses whether those 
judgments should be reviewed taking into account both the workload of the Court and the role 
of the rule of law.  
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2. The Challenges of the Preliminary Ruling Procedure 
 
According to Art. 267(2) TFEU, the national courts have the discretion to decide whether or 
not to refer a question to the Court of Justice. However, the courts against whose decisions 
there is no judicial remedy, i.e. last instance courts, shall refer such question under Art. 267(3) 
TFEU. When a national court does so, this is communicated to the Member States, the 
Commission and the institutions concerned in order to give them an opportunity to comment 
on the issue. The answer results in a binding judgment but the facts of the case are left to the 
discretion of the referring court.9 Notably, the co-operation of national courts is a necessary 
condition for the functioning of this procedure.10 This is coherent as the courts of the Member 
States are part of the EU judiciary, without there being a formal hierarchy between the 
national and the European level.11 On the one hand, the Court has an incentive to give private 
parties the possibility to challenge national law because it increases the possibilities for 
negative integration instead of having to rely on the governments or on the Commission in 
infringement cases.12 On the other hand, it must face the practical impediments of an 
increased workload.13 Indeed, the preliminary procedure requires resources such as time, 
effort, and materials.14 
From one reference in 1961 to 423 in 2011, it now represents half of the caseload.15 In view of 
easing the Court’s task, the Court of First Instance was established in 1989.16 However, the 
issue remains that the number of judgments given is inferior to the oncoming judgments. This 
results, among others, in an increase of the length of the proceedings.17 The shortest duration 
reached in 2010 still amounted to 16.1 months.18 Therefore, it is in the interest of the Court 
that questions that do not require their time and effort are dealt with at the national level. An 
increase in references may also diminish the impact of the decisions. Moreover, it would 
disturb the distribution of powers between the Member States and the Union. It should also be 
kept in mind that the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties expanded the previous third pillar 
jurisdiction of the Court, enhancing the workload. On top of that, the recent enlargements will 
most likely bring more cases as well.19 To face this issue, Art. 104bis of the Rules of 
Procedure has already been revised as to allow for an accelerated procedure in urgent cases.20 
Next, we will see that the Court had already construed a solution to reduce its workload in 
1982.21 
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3.  CILFIT – an Obvious Ruling? 
In CILFIT v. Ministry of Health, the plaintiffs argued that custom duties imposed by Italian 
law breached the Regulation 827/68.22 Yet the Ministry of Health argued that there was no 
need to refer because the answer was obvious.23 Thus the Italian Supreme Court asked for a 
preliminary ruling on whether the obligation contained in the Treaty was ‘conditional on the 
prior finding of a reasonable interpretative doubt’.24 The theory of acte clair already existed in 
the French legal system and the discussion was whether this also applied to European law.25 In 
its preliminary ruling, the Court held that the obligation for the highest courts to refer is 
waived if: (a) the question is irrelevant for the decision, (b) the question has already been 
interpreted by the Court (acte éclairé), or (c) the correct application is so obvious as to leave 
no scope for any reasonable doubt (acte clair).26  
Concerning the acte éclairé, it added that there might be no obligation to refer ‘even though 
the questions at issue are not strictly identical’.27 Before determining that there is an acte clair, 
the matter must be ‘equally obvious’ to the other Member States.28 Three factors must then be 
considered: (i) a comparison of the different versions of the EU legislation is necessary, as it 
is drafted in several languages that are all equally authentic, (ii) the EU peculiar terminology 
must be taken into account, and (iii) the context of the provision as whole is also relevant, 
particularly its objective and evolution in the light of the Treaty.29 These qualifications given 
in CILFIT provoked different responses. Some authors supported the decision because it was 
coherent with the provision whereas others pointed out the risk it posed to the uniform 
application of the legislation in the Member States.30  
First of all, the CILFIT judgment was not unprecedented. Already in 1963, the da Costa case 
presented similar circumstances to van Gend en Loos.31 The Court ruled that there was no 
more duty to refer if the question was ‘materially identical with a question which has already 
been the subject of a preliminary ruling in a similar case’.32 In other terms, the obligation 
contained in the Treaty was held not to be absolute.33 Furthermore, leaving more discretion to 
the Member States would ease the Court’s workload.34 The legal scholar Rasmussen analysed 
CILFIT as a give-take judgment: it gave discretion to the Member States but only in 
exceptional cases. He proposed that rather than giving more discretion to the national courts, 
it encourages them to carefully scrutinize EU legislation and case law.35 Therefore, the 
decision is a display of trust in the national courts, stressing the cooperative nature of the 
procedure, which still contains safeguards to maintain a uniform application as it has a limited 
impact.  
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The CILFIT criteria have been repeated later on in more recent cases even after the Köbler 
judgment.36 Nonetheless, the Advocate General Capotorti argued against the acte clair theory 
because it would increase the risk of subjectivity and uncertainty.37 The test proposed in 
CILFIT for the acte clair has also been criticized for its difficulty. 38 The scholar Rasmussen 
qualified it as ‘unachievable’.39 Even the Advocate General Jacobs and the Association of the 
Council of State and Supreme Administrative Jurisdictions of the EU noted that the conditions 
are too restrictive and that the language requirement is too much of a burden.40 This 
constitutes an even greater issue for the new Member States, which must learn the acquis in a 
short period of time and might still have doubt as to the content of EU law.41  
However, this did not prevent the national courts from making use of it, proving the risk of 
misapplication due to the lack of control of the Court. For example, the Conseil d’Etat in 
France has invoked the doctrine of acte clair 191 times between 1978 and 2001.42 The Czech 
and Polish Courts made use of the doctrine but merely included one sentence to examine it, 
indicating a lack of thorough analysis contrary to what the CILFIT test suggests.43 Not to 
mention the German Constitutional Court going as far as to ignore the CILFIT criteria and 
apply its own.44 As Arnull commented, this margin of discretion may be used to justify the 
refusal to refer when a Court has already formed an opinion on the interpretation, as it has 
been the case in England. Ironically, the Court decision would therefore serve the national 
courts in supporting a failure to obey EU law.45 
The conclusion drawn as to whether Köbler undermines CILFIT mainly depends on the view 
taken on the latter case. If this ruling indeed granted the Member States more discretion and 
allowed them not to refer as often as they had to in the past, then Köbler most likely 
undermines this. Yet the approach taken in this paper is the following: CILFIT clarified in 
details what had already been affirmed in Da Costa and it only allows discretion for last 
instance courts in some exceptional circumstances. This is also supported by the statistical 
data, which demonstrate that the amount of preliminary references did not necessarily decline 
after 1982.46 Nonetheless, the acte clair criteria developed in CILFIT need improvement. A 
strict and literal application of the CILFIT criteria for the acte clair would have negative 
effects. For example, lawyers could delay proceedings by raising the questions and abuse the 
system. Moreover, this is rendered even more difficult due to the new enlargements and the 
increase of languages to take into account for the comparison.47  
From a realistic perspective, the Courts cannot possibly answer all the questions if the criteria 
were to be strictly followed. This is why, there have been propositions to word the provision 
in a less restrictive manner, e.g. an obligation to refer if it is of sufficient importance and there 
is a reasonable doubt. Unfortunately, the Intergovernmental Conference that took place in 
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Nice in 2000 was unable to find an agreement on this topic and the modification failed.48 
Strikingly, the Member States themselves did not reach a compromise to relax the criteria. 
However, the Member States agreed upon the Reflection Group’s proposal to give the Court 
of First Instance jurisdiction in some circumstances.49 Another alternative proposed by 
Rasmussen is the possibility of a CILFIT II case determining the line between the cases that 
need to be referred and those that do not.50 
 
4.  The Facts and the Ruling in Köbler  
 
The University Professor Mr Köbler was refused an Austrian length-of-service increment 
because the years he had worked in a university in Germany did not count.51 He claimed that 
the decision constituted indirect discrimination.52 Eventually, his appeal reached the Austrian 
Supreme Administrative Court, which referred the question to the Court of Justice.53 The 
Registrar of the Court then informed the judges that a similar issue had already been resolved 
in Schöning-Kougebetopoulou and asked whether they wanted to withdraw the reference.54 It 
supported Köbler’s claim as it held that those years of work of equal value performed in 
another Member State should also be taken into account to calculate the length of service.55 
The Austrian Court withdrew the reference but surprisingly ruled against the professor on the 
grounds that the increment was not a length-of-service bonus but a loyalty bonus.56 
Consequently, Mr Köbler claimed reparation because of the loss suffered as a result of a 
breach of EU law.57  
Since there had never been such a procedure in the past, the Regional Court asked the Court 
of Justice whether a Member State could be held liable for an act of its supreme court, what 
would be the conditions for such liability and whether this applied in the present case.58 The 
Court repeated the Francovich requirements to establish state liability:59 the individual must 
be conferred a right, there must be a sufficiently serious breach and there must be a link 
between the breach and the damage.60 It held that there is a serious breach if ‘the decision [of 
a national court] concerned was made in a manifest breach of the case-law of the Court in the 
matter.’61 It concluded that the Austrian court had breached its preliminary procedure duty as 
to be interpreted based on the CILFIT test and on the provisions for the free movement of 
workers.62 In fact, if the case law did not provide more information about loyalty bonus, they 
should have maintained the preliminary reference. Despite this extension of state liability, it 
also specified that the breach was due to an incorrect reading of the judgment and did not 
amount to a manifest breach.63 Therefore, Mr Köbler did not win his case but the ruling 
established State liability for judicial breaches of EU law regardless of the opposition of 
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between the breach and the damage.60 It held that there is a serious breach if ‘the decision [of 
a national court] concerned was made in a manifest breach of the case-law of the Court in the 
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Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, France, the United Kingdom and the Commission.64  
 
 
5.  The Köbler Controversy  
 
The disapproval of the Court’s view is widespread and scholars raise various controversial 
issues. From a strictly legal point of view, the Court has established a high threshold for 
finding a ‘sufficiently serious breach’. The Court listed a series of factors characterizing the 
breach such as whether the infringement was intentional and whether the error of law was 
excusable but it did not rely on them and limited the issue to whether there had been a 
manifest breach.65 In addition to this debatable reasoning behind the application of the serious 
breach, the Court did not discuss the causality in more details, creating legal uncertainty.66 
Another repeated criticism is the weakness of the comparative argument stating that this 
principle of liability for judicial decisions has been adopted ‘in one form or another’ by most 
Member States. This statement generalizes the facts, relies on an improper analysis and 
comprises a long list of exceptions - only a minority of Member States actually recognizes the 
principle.67 Actually, there is no written provision in the Treaties about state liability.68 In case 
the commonality requirement it not fulfilled, then it does not constitute a source of EU law as 
prescribed in Article 288 TFEU.69  
At the national level, the literature reveals impartiality concerns: in order to avoid the 
obligation to rule on a higher court’s judgment, the national courts will likely refer the 
question to the Court.70 The judgment also threatens the principle of res judicata, disturbing 
legal certainty and the finality of decisions. 71 In response to this, the Court qualifies it as only 
allowing damages and not necessarily reversing the decisions.72 However, this might still 
threaten the legitimacy of the decision that became final.73 In addition, scholars argue that it 
creates a double standard between the Court of Justice and the national courts. 74 In 
Bergaderm, the Court stated that the conditions for liability may not differ between the State 
and the Community unless there are particular circumstances.75 Pavlovic defends that errors in 
judgment of the Court should also impose liability on the Community and that the failure to 
create a mechanism would constitute a manifest infringement.76  
At the European level, this places the Court in a stronger position than before in controlling 
whether the Member States comply with EU law.77 The judgment established a hierarchy 
between the Court of Justice and the national courts as it transformed it into a de facto 
appellate court.78 This will affect the existing relationship between the courts and it might 
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impede on the process of integration of EU law into the national legal orders.79 In other words, 
it undermines the principle of sincere cooperation.80 Indeed, instead of the previously 
envisaged horizontal relationship, the power to overrule the interpretation of the Supreme 
Court and to review the qualification of a question as acte clair transformed it into a 
hierarchical relationship.81 Last but not least, the Court will likely be faced with an overload 
of cases.82 Consequently, an increase of the questions referred will lead to higher costs.83 
Between 2004 and 2011, the number of references has already raised from 249 to 423.84 From 
a procedural perspective, it may lead to references being sent back to the Member States on 
the grounds of obviousness under Art. 104(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court.85 This is 
undesirable because it would offend the national courts as it implies that they do not know the 
case law of the Court sufficiently.86 The disadvantage of Köbler is that despite the 
foreseeability of the issues it would lead to in terms of workload, the CILFIT criteria were not 
revised.87  
 
6.  A Unanimous Opposition?  
Despite the animosity of the literature opposing the Köbler judgment, several arguments 
propose that the ruling should be welcomed. Contrary to what the criticisms might suggest, 
the possibility of such a ruling had existed since the joint case of Brasserie du 
Pecheur/Factortame III. In this case, the court held that a Member State could be liable for a 
breach of EU law by any of its organs and that the state had to be viewed as a single entity 
based on principles of international law.88 In addition, it had been envisaged by the Advocate 
General Léger as well as scholars, e.g. Toner’s article ‘Thinking the Unthinkable? State 
Liability for Judicial Acts after Factortame (III)’.89 Yet Köbler was the first case where those 
predictions became real.90  
More than a mere warning, it equipped the Court with additional enforcement means. Indeed, 
the highest courts present a specific situation, as there is no remedy available to the parties to 
challenge their decision. Before Köbler, there were only two recourses available. The 
Commission could either publish the breach in its annual report on the application of EU law 
or it could start a procedure of infringement against the non-compliant state. However, the 
former did not prove very effective and the latter never occurred until Commission v. Italy in 
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2004.91 Moreover, it allows the Court to verify whether the national courts have implemented 
rulings given in earlier references.92 In fact, even though Professor Köbler did not win the 
case, the decision of the ECJ puts pressure on the Member States to conform to EU law.93  
The judgment installs an informal appellate procedure as questions wrongfully considered 
might be referred to the Court through the intermediary of the liability action.94 Whereas the 
preliminary ruling depends on the willingness of the court to refer and the parties cannot 
request it, the liability action established in Köbler constitutes an indirect way to appeal to 
Court. The lower courts are more likely to refer and will probably even ask for an application 
of the facts in order to avoid to judge a higher court.95 This way, the Court can review the 
substance as well as the decision of the national court to characterize a question as an acte 
clair.96 Therefore, it appears that the stand taken by the Court could also be desirable. 
 
 
7.  Recent case law of the Court of Justice 
 
Interestingly, at the same time, the Commission had started proceedings against Italy because 
of its persistent breach of Community law by its courts.97 Commission v. Italy was the first 
infringement procedure dealing with courts decisions.98 Similarly to Köbler, the Advocate 
General Geelhoed argued that the state is a single entity and emphasized that the decisions of 
the supreme courts cannot be corrected within the national system, which could lead to state 
liability.99 However, the Court did not find an infringement on the basis of a judicial decision 
but on the grounds that the legislator did not amend the law such as to stop incorrect judicial 
practice.100 According to Komárek, the ratio of both holdings was to promote the effectiveness 
of EU law in the light of the 2004 enlargement.101  
Due to the high threshold of the manifest breach test, it would logically follow that a 
procedure with such low chances of success would not encourage individuals to litigate. Yet, 
regardless the lack of a manifest breach, the Court held in Köbler that the decision of the 
Austrian court stemmed from an incorrect interpretation of EU law.102 In addition to the 
political message it sent to Austria, it might also allow the claimant to ask for the increment 
he was refused.103 Indeed, this has become possible based on strict conditions established in 
Kuhne & Heitz in 2004.104 The issue revolved around the classification of exported products as 
chicken legs. In the judgment Voogd Vleesimport, the Court confirmed Kuhne’s position, who 
then requested the reimbursement of the money they were forced to pay due to the wrong 
interpretation.105  
The Court found that normally EU law does not force administrative courts to reopen final 
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decisions.106 However, it is possible in a few exceptional circumstances.107 First, national law 
must allow the court to reopen the decision. Second, the administrative decision must become 
final as the result of a judgment by a court of last instance. Third, it must appear from a 
subsequent decision of the Court that the judgment is based on a misinterpretation of EU law 
adopted without referring to the Court. Fourth, the plaintiff must complain to the 
administrative court immediately after becoming aware of the Court’s decision.108 This way, 
Kuhne & Heitz created other means to ensure the correct application of EU law.109 Within this 
scheme, the damage litigation could provide the necessary Court interpretation to allow the 
reopening of the administrative decision.110 As far as Köbler is concerned, several authors 
support that he would fulfil those four requirements and receive his increment.111 
Finally, the principle developed in Köbler was reaffirmed in Traghetti del Mediterraneo in 
2006.112 This maritime transport undertaking argued that the Italian Supreme Court had 
misinterpreted aid rules and failed to refer to the Court.113 For this reason, the company 
brought a claim for damages against Italy but it failed because the national law limited state 
liability. In its ruling, the Court of Justice extended Köbler and extinguished the limitation to 
intentional fault and serious misconduct.114  
Those three cases confirm Hartley’s prediction of the Court’s behaviour. He proposed that the 
judges first establish a general principle for a new doctrine without giving many precisions. 
Later on, they refine the principle based on the reactions to the newly introduced principle.115 
As explained by Skouris, the President of the Court of Justice since 2003, Köbler safeguards 
the voluntary cooperation scheme of the preliminary procedure, giving a warning to the 
Member States not to exceed the CILFIT test.116 As a matter of fact, the German Federal 
Constitutional Court, the Italian Constitutional Court, the Spanish Constitutional Court, the 
Portuguese Constitutional Court and the French Constitutional Council have never referred to 
the Court of Justice up to 2004.117 Rather than undermining the CILFIT criteria, Köbler rather 
fortifies the exceptional character of the acte clair and consequently reveals once more the 
impracticalities of the criteria determining the obligation to refer.118 
 
8 Conclusion 
It is undeniable that the amount of questions referred to the Court of Justice has significantly 
increased since 2004. Nonetheless, it is a rhetorical mistake to assume that this higher number 
is solely caused by the Köbler judgment. In fact, other factors such as the introduction of 
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recent ambiguous regulations or the recent enlargements, mostly the accession of ten 
additional countries in 2004, could also have had a strong impact. 
After all, if the national courts are indeed dealing with an acte clair and they decide not to 
refer, there is no reason why they will incur liability. Köbler as such does not introduce an 
unfair doctrine, even though its source as a general principle might be questionable. 
Moreover, the state will not incur liability in most cases, as the sufficiently serious breach 
threshold is so high that it is almost impossible to fulfil this requirement. On the contrary, the 
national court will be provided with the correct interpretation of EU law adding to legal 
certainty. Therefore, it appears that it serves more as a political tool for integration and 
application of EU law as a whole than as mechanism to ensure satisfaction for private 
individuals. Actually, Kuhne & Heitz still offers the possibility to ‘do right’ as long as this 
respects national law, both providing a remedy for the individuals and protecting the Member 
States’ sensitivity.  
Due to the vehemence of the articles published, it seems that Köbler brought issues of 
sovereignty back to the surface. In other terms, it revealed the tensions between the Court of 
Justice and the national courts. The Köbler case created more opposition than the CILFIT case 
as the former rather punishes the Member States for misapplication of EU law whereas the 
Member States wished to interpret the latter as a broadening of their discretion. It also showed 
that the Member States are not always best equipped to judge on EU law matters. On the one 
hand, this may be caused by an insufficient education on EU law or deliberate policy choices. 
On the other hand, confusing case law and unclear legislation may contribute to those 
misunderstandings. The blurry line between the cases that should be referred and those that 
should not may also explain the errors made by national courts failing to refer. A CILFIT II or 
an addition to the ‘Information Note on the Preliminary rulings’ could partially solve this 
issue. 
Overall, Köbler does not require revision, particularly not on the grounds that it undermines 
CILFIT. If there is a need for revision, it lies with the CILFIT criteria that should provide the 
Member States with clarifications and a reasonably achievable test. In the future, the Court of 
Justice shall find a balance between a heavy workload to ensure that the EU citizens may 
enjoy their EU rights despite national issues and the risk to affect the uniformity of 
application of EU law by delegating case law to the national courts. In the light of the 
controversy at hand, it is doubtful that case law will suffice to satisfy the Member States. 
Accordingly, a political solution should clarify the CILFIT criteria, hence, defining a clear 
limit of the competences of national courts and the Court of Justice. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The case of Gerhard Köbler v Republik Österreich1 established a new principle in the law of 
the European Union: courts of last instance of the respective EU Member States can, under 
certain conditions, be sued by individuals for damage caused to them as a result of a wrongful 
application of EU law. This judgment extended the general concept of Member State liability 
for breaches of EU law, first annunciated in Francovich v Italy,2 but which up until Köbler did 
not apply to the courts of Member States. In the context of Article 267 TFEU, the judgment 
opens up the significant possibility that a breach of the obligation to refer, in particular in the 
circumstances laid down in Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v Ministry of Health,3 
will result in liability. However, this paper will argue that Köbler, far from bolstering Article 
267 TFEU and CILFIT, may encourage, or at least may serve to perpetuate, the practical 
discretion which national courts have to diverge from CILFIT and Article 267 TFEU. Evinced 
both in theory and to some extent in practice, Köbler seems to have provided an inadequate 
mechanism for punishing divergence from CILFIT, and in doing so does nothing to address 
the problem of fragmentation of EU law, and the contravention of legal certainty.         
 
 
2. Köbler  
 
The very basis of Köbler liability is enumerated at paragraphs 51-52 of the judgment; a 
national court of last instance will be held liable for a breach of Community4 law if: i) The 
rule of law infringed is intended to confer rights on individuals; ii) The breach is sufficiently 
serious – the test being whether the Member State has manifestly and gravely disregarded the 
limits on its discretion; and iii) There is a direct causal link between the breach and the 
damage suffered. 
All of these conditions are relevant to determining a breach of Article 267 TFEU.5 In terms of 
the first condition, this is no great obstacle to establishing liability, as it was ruled in Köbler 
that by its very nature paragraph 3 of Article 234 EC (267 TFEU) was intended to confer 
rights on individuals.6 The third condition is a standard causality test applicable to damage 
claims, and as such provides no special hurdle, even if it might be hard to prove that damage 
has actually been suffered in the context of a breach of Article 267 TFEU.7 The real heart of 
Köbler liability, in the sense of being the most complex and rigorous substantive condition to 
fulfill, is the second requirement. Any breach of Community law, including a breach of 
Article 267 TFEU, must be ‘sufficiently serious’. Being a condition aimed at restricting the 
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scope of claims against national courts of last instance, the Court ruled in Köbler that a breach 
will only be ‘sufficiently serious’ in the ‘exceptional case where the court has manifestly 
infringed the applicable law [emphasis added]’.8 There are a number of factors that must be 
taken into account when determining whether this has been the case, including the degree and 
clarity of the rule infringed, whether the infringement was intentional, whether the error was 
excusable or inexcusable, and various others – these are set out in paragraphs 55-56 of the 
judgment.9 In addition, regard must at all times be had to the specific nature of the judicial 
function, meaning inter alia the need to respect judicial independence, and to the legitimate 
requirements of legal certainty, connoting inter alia that judgments of courts of last instance 
must usually be accorded a degree of finality.10 These two conditions just mentioned seem to 
have been inserted by the ECJ in order to reinforce the point that damages can only be 
claimed when a breach by a court has been exceptionally serious.11  
 
 
3. CILFIT 
 
In Köbler, one of the primary questions was whether the Austrian Verwaltungsgerichtshof had 
committed a ‘manifest’ infringement of what was then Article 48 EC. The ECJ came to the 
conclusion that Article 48 EC had not been ‘manifestly’ breached, one reason being that the 
correct answer to the specific question arising in relation to Article 48 EC, from which the 
Austrian court had deviated, was not to be found in any express provisions of Community 
law, including in the judgments of the ECJ, nor was the answer obvious.12 Of course, given 
that the answer was, in the ECJ’s opinion, neither obvious nor evinced in precedent, a 
separate question arose as to whether the Verwaltungsgerichtshof had therefore breached 
Article 234 EC (267 TFEU), which, as stated in CILFIT, obliges a court of final instance to 
refer a question of interpretation of Community law for a preliminary ruling when the 
particular point of law has not been dealt with by the ECJ, or when the answer is not so 
obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt as to its application.13 Given its position 
on Article 48 EC, the Court ruled that there had indeed been a breach of Article 234 EC.14 
However, what is significant is that the Court ruled that this breach of Article 234 EC was 
‘not of such a nature as to invalidate the conclusion [that the breach of Article 48 EC had not 
been “manifest”]’.15 In other words, the breach of Article 234 EC, as per the breach of Article 
48 EC, did not have the requisite ‘manifest’ character for liability under Community law.16 
The reasoning behind this finding is perhaps the most crucial aspect of the Court’s judgment, 
for it indicates the conditions under which the Court regards infringements of Article 267 
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TFEU as ‘manifest’, and therefore liable to result in a Member State court’s duty to 
compensate. In this case, there was no ‘manifest’ breach because the Austrian court’s decision 
not to refer was based upon an ‘incorrect reading’ of a point of law from a previous case, 
Schöning-Kougebetopoulou.17 Essentially, the Austrian court had seen an answer in the case 
law of the ECJ even though, in the opinion of the ECJ itself, there really was none. 
The problem with the ECJ’s position is that it made no effort to consider the nature of the 
Austrian court’s ‘incorrect reading’. Rather than considering for instance whether the 
Verwaltungsgerichtshof may have intentionally misread Schöning-Kougebetopoulou, or rather 
than determining whether their reading may have been unreasonable, the Court simply stated 
that a misreading had taken place, implying that the breach of Article 234 EC was not 
therefore ‘manifest’ in nature.18      
This judgment of the ECJ is both highly significant and deeply questionable when considered 
in the light of Article 267 TFEU and, in particular, the CILFIT criteria. The most obvious 
point is that the ECJ, when it implicitly ruled that the breach of Article 234 EC was not 
‘manifest’, did not consider the criteria for a ‘manifest’ breach which it had itself set out in 
paragraphs 55-56, and which assumedly should be applied in all cases where a ‘manifest’ 
breach is at issue.19 In theory this sets a dangerous precedent, because national courts 
entrusted to determine the potential liability of courts of last instance for breaching Article 
267 TFEU may also be encouraged to ignore these criteria, or to invent their own. In cases 
where a ‘manifest’ breach would have been found under the criteria at paragraphs 55-56 of 
Köbler, a national court may consequentially apply a looser standard, find that there has been 
no ‘manifest’ breach, and later reject the damages claim on the basis of this. This may in turn 
encourage courts of last instance to interpret precedent in a way inconsistent with CILFIT, 
ruling on novel points of law under the guise of merely disposing of questions already 
resolved by the ECJ, and knowing that under the looser standards they will not be punished 
for it. Furthermore, a loose standard adopted in relation to punishing misinterpretations of 
precedent may well translate into a loose standard when it comes to punishing breaches of the 
acte clair doctrine. Even where an interpretation of Community law is not so obvious as to be 
beyond reasonable doubt, and where a court of last instance nonetheless interprets the 
Community law without referring to the ECJ, its breach may not be deemed sufficiently 
‘manifest’ to imply damages, though this would have been the case under the criteria at 
paragraphs 55-56 of Köbler.  
 
 
4. Theory and Practice: Stephen Cooper v Attorney General 
 
Although the above implications may seem rather theoretical, there is empirical evidence, in 
the form of the English case of Stephen Cooper v Attorney General20 - one of the only cases in 
which a question of Köbler liability has arisen before a national court21  - which suggests that 
the theory may well be playing out in practice.           
Before coming to the Court of Appeal in Stephen Cooper v Attorney General, a potential case 
of Köbler liability had been considered by the High Court in Stephen Cooper v HM Attorney 
General.22 This case centred around, inter alia, potential liability of the Court of Appeal for 
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18 Campbell notes that the Court spent ‘a mere three sentences articulating the application of the serious 
[manifest] breach analysis to the facts of the case’. J.D. Campbell Jr, 38 (1) Syracuse Journal of International 
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of Köbler liability had been considered by the High Court in Stephen Cooper v HM Attorney 
General.22 This case centred around, inter alia, potential liability of the Court of Appeal for 
                                                 
17 Case C-224/01 Gerhard Köbler v Republik österreich, para. 123. 
18 Campbell notes that the Court spent ‘a mere three sentences articulating the application of the serious 
[manifest] breach analysis to the facts of the case’. J.D. Campbell Jr, 38 (1) Syracuse Journal of International 
Law and Commerce (2010), p. 12. 
19 Case C-224/01 Gerhard Köbler v Republik österreich, para. 123. 
20 Stephen Cooper v Attorney General [2010] EWCA Civ 464. 
21 See the comment in Stephen Cooper v Attorney General, para. 64. 
22 Stephen Cooper v HM Attorney General [2008] EWHC 2178. 
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breaching Article 267 TFEU in its decision in R v London Borough of Hammersmith and 
Fulham.23 As the High Court found no liability, and as this decision was appealed, the Court 
of Appeal ended up having to consider potential liability for one of its own previous 
decisions. The significant aspect of the Stephen Cooper decision in terms of Article 267 
TFEU is how the Court of Appeal responded to the ECJ’s ruling in Köbler.  First of all, it 
accepted the ECJ’s finding that the Austrian Verwaltungsgerichtshof had wrongly interpreted 
precedent and had thereby breached Article 234 EC. Secondly, it recalled that the Austrian 
court was nonetheless not held liable (because the ECJ considered that there had been no 
‘manifest’ breach).24 Thirdly, and most importantly, it imbibed how the ECJ, in its finding that 
the Austrian court’s misinterpretation of precedent did not amount to a ‘manifest’ breach of 
CILFIT/Article 234 EC, did not apply any objective criteria in its determination of why this 
was so – one criteria could have been the reasonableness of the Austrian court’s 
(mis)interpretation, but the ECJ did not consider this: ‘the Court of Justice did not ask 
whether its [the Verwaltungsgerichtshof’s] interpretation was reasonable or not.’25   
Evidently because the ECJ simply construed that the breach of CILFIT/Article 234 EC was 
not ‘manifest’, without providing any explanatory notes as to why – including potentially a 
consideration of the reasonableness of the interpretation, or indeed by making reference to the 
factors set out in paragraphs 55-56 of Köbler, the English Court created its own criteria for 
determining when a breach of Article 267 TFEU could be regarded as ‘manifest’: 
 
‘Accordingly, a failure to make a reference where a question is not acte clair does not 
automatically lead to Köbler liability, nor does the [wrongful] interpretation of prior 
case law result in the incurring of such liability, unless there is an obvious answer and 
there are no other mitigating circumstances [emphasis added].’26          
 
Unlike the ECJ, the Court of Appeal therefore seems to have brought an element of 
reasonableness into the ‘manifest’ breach equation; if it considers that the correct 
interpretation was ‘obvious’, but that the court in question nonetheless erred in its 
interpretation of precedent, then the breach of CILFIT will be ‘manifest’. This has real 
practical significance, because if for instance a court of last instance in England had dealt with 
the case of Mr. Köbler in the same manner as the Verwaltungsgerichtshof, the Court of 
Appeal may well have held it liable if it transpired that the court’s misreading of Schöning-
Kougebetopoulou was ‘obvious’. Of course, the meaning of the term ‘obvious’ is not clear, 
and it may be that the Court of Appeal envisaged a higher degree of culpability on the part of 
the erring court before construing liability than, for instance, if this court had made a merely 
“unreasonable” interpretation of a previous case. Thus, an application of CILFIT might appear 
unreasonable or even intentionally wrong, but the English courts could still consider that the 
correct application was not so ‘obvious’ as to hold the court liable for this unreasonable, or 
even intentionally incorrect, (mis)application. One might think, for instance, of a scenario in 
which an English court refuses to hold a court of last instance liable, even though this court 
paid no attention whatsoever to the detailed CILFIT criteria when it decided not to refer a 
question to the ECJ. This court of last instance may for instance have ruled that the matter 
was acte clair, despite not considering whether this would be equally obvious to the courts of 
the other member states, or comparing the different language versions of the Community law 
                                                 
23 R v London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham exp. CPRE (London Branch) [1999] C/OO/5240. 
24 Stephen Cooper v Attorney General, para. 72. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
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in question.27 Because the ECJ in Köbler found no ‘manifest’ breach of CILFIT/Article 234 
EC, despite neglecting to apply the criteria at paragraphs 55-56, it would probably be well 
within the domain of the reviewing English court to consider, in accordance with its own 
criteria, that such a blatant disregard of CILFIT was nonetheless not a ‘manifest’ breach, and 
thus not conducive to liability.     
The scenario just mentioned is in fact exactly what transpired in the Stephen Cooper case. As 
discussed, the Court of Appeal was forced to consider liability for its own previous decision, 
made in the case R v London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham. In this original decision, 
the court wrongly considered the meaning of a term in a Directive to be acte clair – 
specifically, the term ‘development consent’. What is most significant is that it came to this 
conclusion without any apparent consideration of the factors, set out in CILFIT, which must 
be taken into account before reaching any such conclusion. There was no effort to consider 
that this interpretation would ‘be equally obvious to the courts of the other Member States…’, 
to compare the different language versions of the Community legislation, to consider that 
‘Community law uses terminology which is peculiar to it’, to be attentive to the fact that 
‘legal concepts do not necessarily have the same meaning in Community law and in the law 
of the Member States’, nor to ensure that ‘every provision of Community law must 
be…interpreted in the light of the provisions of Community law as a whole.’28 Rather, the 
judge, supported by the others, based his interpretation of ‘development consent’ on his own 
ideas of what could rightfully be seen as substantive “consent”, on ‘reasoning to like effect’ in 
a certain previous decision by the House of Lords, and upon his own conception that the 
wording of the Directive as a whole precluded the opposing interpretation.29  
Amazingly, despite this blatant disregard for CILFIT, the Court of Appeal ruled that the 
breach of this doctrine in the original decision did not constitute a ‘manifest’ breach of 
CILFIT/Article 267 TFEU. If the Court of Appeal had applied the criteria at paragraphs 55-56 
of Köbler, it seems unlikely that they would have come to such a conclusion. However, 
instead of applying these criteria, the Court of Appeal invented its own: the breach could not 
have been ‘manifest’ because, inter alia, other courts and judges in England, including Lord 
Hoffman in the House of Lords, had interpreted ‘development consent’ in the same way that it 
had been interpreted in the original decision.30 Failing to do such things as compare the 
different language versions of the Directive, as mandated by CILFIT, was irrelevant – there 
was no ‘manifest’ breach, and the court was not liable.  
What this case may well demonstrate is the practical reality that Köbler, by ignoring the 
criteria for a ‘manifest’ breach set out in paragraphs 55-56 of the very same judgment, and by 
instead arbitrarily implying that the breach in that particular case of Article 234 EC/CILFIT 
had not been ‘manifest’, created the chance for national courts to invent their own criteria for 
determining when a breach of CILFIT/Article 267 TFEU is ‘manifest’. This may allow them, 
as in this case, to deny that a breach is ‘manifest’, even where this appears plainly untrue. The 
result, again at least in this case, is that liability is not construed, and thus the national court of 
last instance “gets away” with ignoring CILFIT. Overall, then, it might be said that Köbler 
may only serve to encourage, or at least to perpetuate, the discretion which national courts 
have, and which they seem to use on a not irregular basis,31 to diverge from CILFIT.   
                                                 
27 These all being examples of factors that CILFIT has mandated a court of last instance consider before 
deciding that an issue is acte clair. See: Case 238/81 Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v Ministry of 
Health, paras. 16-20. 
28 Case 238/81 Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v Ministry of Health, para. 16-20. 
29 See Stephen Cooper v HM Attorney General, para. 57-63. 
30 See the other reasons at Stephen Cooper v Attorney General, para. 108-112. 
31 There is much evidence to suggest that national courts of last instance have been rather cavalier when it 
comes to abiding by the CILFIT ruling; there are many cases of national courts not referring even where they 
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5. Final Observations 
 
If Köbler has the potential to perpetuate the discretion which national courts of last instance 
have with regards to CILFIT, the question now turns to what sort of implications this might 
have for Community law. Although it is outside the scope of this paper to go into a deep 
analysis of this, the two most obvious points will be considered. First of all, CILFIT has an 
obvious role to play when it comes to maintaining the unity of Community law. If national 
courts of last instance are able to make a ruling on a question of Community law even where 
the answer has not been provided by the ECJ or is not clear beyond reasonable doubt, the 
courts of member states will, when desired, be enforcing their own interpretations of 
Community law.32 The obvious problem with this is that these interpretations may vary from 
member state to member state, and thus Community law will also vary as between the 
member states. Thus, Community law fragments along national lines, and once again there is 
a collection of European nation-states rather than European member-states. The second point 
relates to legal certainty. A discretionary use of CILFIT may make it uncertain as to whether 
CILFIT will apply in a particular case. This in turn increases uncertainty as to whether a novel 
question of Community law will, at the most advanced stage of legal proceedings, be resolved 
by the ECJ or by national courts of last instance – hence bringing into question the status of 
the ECJ as supreme interpreter of EU law, as mandated by the Treaties. It is in these two 
respects that Köbler appears to do nothing to enhance either the interests of Community law 
or the requirements of legal certainty, even if some legal scholars such as Breuer initially 
contended that it would do.33  
The final issue that must be considered is what a “Köbler II” or a “CILFIT II” might do to 
remedy the abovementioned problems. Given what has been said in relation to Köbler, 
perhaps the most obvious solution in relation to that case would be to emphasise the objective 
criteria to be applied in every determination of whether a breach of CILFIT, and thus of 
Article 267 TFEU, is ‘manifest’. Instead of opening up the possibility for national courts to 
develop their own criteria, as for instance the English Court of Appeal did in Stephen Cooper, 
the ECJ should specify the uniform and objective standard to be used; most obviously, the 
criteria set out in Köbler at paragraphs 55-56. All this would go some way to remedying the 
legacy of Köbler whereby national courts seem to have been left to their own devices when it 
comes to determining the criteria for evaluating whether a breach of CILFIT/267 TFEU is 
‘manifest’. In terms of a “CILFIT II”, it is not within the scope of this analysis to consider 
whether the original CILFIT contains certain principles, particularly in regard to the 
determination of whether a certain interpretation of Community law is beyond reasonable 
doubt, that are somehow unreasonable or ill-conceived.34 What is important, if Community 
law is to remain uniform and if legal certainty is to be ensured, is that national courts of last 
instance abide by the general obligations set out in CILFIT  - that is, the obligation to refer 
when an interpretation is not acte clair, or when it has not previously been resolved by the 
ECJ. For this to happen, the appropriate test for ‘manifest’ breach of Article 267 TFEU, 
lacking annunciation in Köbler, must be clarified.    
         
                                                                                                                                                    
should have. See: N. Fenger & M. Broberg, ‘Finding Light in the Darkness: on the actual application of the 
acte clair doctrine’, 30 (1), Yearbook of European Law (2011), pp. 180-212. 
32 Naturally, these courts could still choose to make a preliminary reference under Article 267 TFEU. 
33 See: M. Breuer, ‘State liability for judicial wrongs and Community law: the case of Gerhard Kobler v 
Austria’, 29 (2), European Law Review (2004), pp. 243-254, especially the concluding remarks. 
34 For example, the need to compare different language versions of the Community law in question. 
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LINGUISTIC DIVERSITY IN THE EU – IS A POLICY CHOICE THAT SUPPORTS 
23 OFFICIAL LANGUAGES IN THE EU STILL DEFENDABLE IN A UNION OF 27 
AND MAYBE EVEN MORE? 
 
Ralf Manz  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The European Union has, in the course of its development, encountered many challenges in 
the past. A possible future or maybe even present challenge is ‘linguistic diversity’. There are 
currently 23 official languages in the EU and there is rising a discussion about this topic. 
Sometimes the situation of the Union is compared to Babel like experience, where people 
from different countries with different mother tongues come together and have to 
communicate.35 
This paper aims to give an illustration of the situation in the Union. It will first give an 
illustration about the languages in the EU, and make clear the distinction between official 
languages and working languages. After clarifying the linguistic situation, the positive and 
negative aspects of the linguistic diversity in the Union will be illustrated and finally the need 
of a single language in the Union will be discussed. This will be done under the leading 
question: Is a policy choice that supports 23 official languages in the EU still defendable in a 
Union of 27 and maybe even more? 
 
 
2. Languages in the EU 
 
Before dealing with the different languages in the EU it is important to clarify the term 
‘linguistic diversity’. In fact there are several definitions of the term linguistic diversity that 
all deal with the input of different languages, the kinds of languages, their heritage and so 
forth. For the use of this paper linguistic diversity simply means: the more languages, the 
greater the diversity.36 It refers to the languages spoken in the EU, in particular the official 
languages of the EU.  
When dealing with languages in the EU one has to differentiate between official languages 
and co-official languages of the EU, as well as the languages of the member states. Currently 
the 48 states of Europe have 38 official languages, while in total there are about 240 
indigenous languages spoken in Europe.37 In total 27 of the 48 states are members of the EU. 
Languages in the member states can be official languages, co-official languages or unofficial 
languages, such as dialects spoken in certain areas of a country or other varieties of a specific 
                                                 
35 Mamadouh, ‘Beyond nationalism: Three visions of the European Union and their implications for the 
linguistic regime of its institutions’, 48 Geojournal, p. 135,  
36 Skutnabb-Kagnas, ‘Why should linguistic diversity be maintained and supported in Europe? Some 
arguments, Guide for the Development of Language Education policies in Europe, From linguistic diversity 
to Plurilingual Education’, Reference Study Language Policy Division Directorate of School, Out-of School 
and Higher Education, Council of Europe (2002), 8, available at 
<http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/linguistic/Source/Skutnabb-KangasEN.pdf>  (last visited 05.12.2012); Durk, 
‘Sustainable Development in a Diverse World (SUS.DIV) “Cultural diversity is an asset for human welfare 
and development” Benefits of linguistic diversity and multilingualism, Sustainable Development in a Diverse 
World Position of Research Paper 1.2,  
2, available at <http://www.susdiv.org/uploadfiles/RT1.2_PP_Durk.pdf> (last visited 05.12.2012). 
37  Durk, Sustainable Development in a Diverse World Position of Research Paper 1.2, 4,  
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language.38 In total we find about 63 languages, spoken as first languages, by people in the 
EU, plus some special cases. These first languages are not necessarily languages of European 
heritage.39  
In Article 55 TFEU it is implied that the official languages of the member states are also the 
official languages of the EU. The provision offers a list in which all these languages are 
enumerated. A copy of the Treaty, in the respective language, shall be given to each member 
state. The Article also mentions that all languages are ‘equally authentic’.40 Thus Art. 55 
TFEU forms the basis for the official languages of the EU. This is extended by the first piece 
of legislation that was made by the EEC (European Economic Community), the predecessor 
of the EC (European Community) and later the EU.41 It was passed in 1958 as Regulation No. 
1 and will be further dealt with below.42 
The second paragraph of this Article 55 also indicates that there is a possibility to translate the 
Treaty into other languages. These languages do not enjoy official status in the EU. It only 
has official status in the respective country that demands the translation.43 Thus there is the 
possibility to include co-official languages. 
 
 
3. Official Languages in the EU 
 
As already mentioned Art. 55 TFEU gives an outline of the official languages in the EU. It 
enumerates 23 languages, which all together form the official languages of the EU.44 They 
represent the languages spoken in each Member State. As some states have the same official 
language, e.g. Germany and Austria (both have German as an official language), there are not 
27 official languages of the EU.45 However the 23 official languages represent the official 
language of the Member States, i.e. each Member State is fairly represented by the 23 official 
languages. 
Article 55 TFEU should also be looked at in the context of Regulation No. 1. This regulation 
sets out the ‘languages to be used by the European Economic Community’. Every Act of 
Accession amended the Regulation after each specific accession of a Country to the 
Community/Union.46 Art. 1 of the regulation stipulates that the 23 languages are the official 
and the working languages of the institutions. One can refer to the institutions in any of these 
languages mentioned under Art. 1.47 Regulations and other documents of general application 
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shall be drafted in all official languages.48 The same applies to the Official Journal of the 
European Union.49 
 
 
4. Co-official Languages 
 
It is also important to mention the co-official languages of the EU, in order to obtain a 
complete picture of the languages used in the EU. This has also to do with several 
developments in the past. 
Co-official languages occur when a state has more than one official language. Each country 
specifies which language it wants to have as an official language in the EU.50 Thus when a 
country has more than one official language the other language will become a co-official 
language. An example is provided by Spain where next to Castellano, el vasco, el catalán and 
Galician are co-official languages of the country. In 2005 the co-official languages of Spain 
were used as working language in the EU institutions, e.g. Council discussions.51 In 2006 it 
also became possible to refer to the Ombudsman in the co-official languages of Spain.52 Thus 
it is possible for co-official languages to find their way into the EU. Nevertheless the 
languages will not be awarded the status of official languages. They will keep the co-official 
status, but play an important role in the processes of the EU. Another example that is similar 
to the Spanish inclusion of co-official languages is the granting of co-official status to Welsh 
in 2008, which led to the use of Welsh in EU institutions.53  
These examples illustrate that next to the 23 official languages of the EU co-official 
languages also play a crucial role in the every-day-business of the EU institutions. Recent 
developments also show that there is pressure to upgrade some of the co-official languages to 
official languages of the EU.54 Thus the role of co-official languages is also important when 
considering the linguistic diversity of the European Union.  
 
 
5. Use of Languages in the EU Institutions 
 
Regulation No. 1 stipulates that the institutions themselves can determine in their own rules of 
procedure which languages are used in specific proceedings.55 This means that not in every 
situation all official languages have to be used. But at the same time it opens the door for co-
official languages to become part of the proceedings within the institutions.  
One has to differentiate between the official languages of the Union and the working 
languages, which are the languages used in the every-day business of the institutions. The 
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official languages are used for communication of the EU institutions and the outside world, 
while the working languages are used for the work within the institutions themselves. 
56According to Art. 342 TFEU the Council shall, without prejudice to the Statute of the 
European Court of Justice, determine rules governing the languages of the institutions. In the 
light of Regulation No. 1 and Art. 342 TFEU, this means that different rules concerning the 
use of languages apply in the different institutions.  
Each institution has the 23 official languages as its own respective official languages; 
however in some situations the working languages in the institutions have been altered and 
adopted to the specific needs in the institutions themselves. 
The European Parliament’s 23 official languages are at the same time the working languages 
of the Parliament. The same applies to the Council, ECOSOC and the committee of regions.57 
However in the Council there is a rising use of English and French, especially in oral 
communications.58 
In the Commission there is a significant difference between the oral and the written 
proceedings. While the written proceedings are mostly multilingual, the oral proceedings are 
dominated by the use of English, followed by French and German as working languages.59 
However in some situations the Commission is forced to apply all 23 official languages, for 
instance when it comes to the issuing of Regulations or other Acts of general application.60 
The ECJ, like the Commission, has restricted its working languages. The working language is 
solely French and one further language that is selected at the start of proceedings.61 The Court 
of Auditors however has English, French and German as a working language. Only English as 
a working language is used in the European Central Bank (ECB).62 
In the Council of Europe the whole situation is turned around. As the institution is assigned to 
be only bilingual, in practice many more languages are used.63  
A trend towards the mere use of only English and French can also be ascertained when 
considering the European Patents Office, which can only be applied to in English and French. 
English and French are the most used languages in the EU, but at the same time Germany 
wants to established a firmer ground for the use of more German64 
What is however of crucial importance to mention when considering the working languages 
of the institutions, is the fact that there are no rules stating specifically which exact language 
is used as the working language in the EU. There are in fact no official working languages in 
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the institutions. In fact every language can be a working language and most official languages 
are also used in the different institutions. The working languages just illustrate which 
language is preferred.65 This is however changed when a special language is mentioned in the 
Rules of Procedure of one institution. 
 
 
6. Brightside of Linguistic Diversity – What Supports Linguistic Diversity in the 
European Union? 
 
Linguistic diversity is one of the most important cultural features of the EU.66 It reflects the 
international flair the project has gained over the years and stands for diversity in general. 
Linguistic diversity makes it easy for every person to refer to the EU and its institutions67, as 
there are no linguistic hurdles posed. One can say that communication profits from linguistic 
diversity because people are more likely to communicate and communication itself is 
facilitated.68 This results in a better link between the EU and the European citizens.  
What is definitely at stake here is a notion of fairness.69 Fairness is something very important 
for the people; this is emphasized by Human Rights, for instance Article 22 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the EU, which constitutes that the Union should be anxious to support 
cultural diversity, including diversity. As at the moment, each state puts forward one official 
language of the EU no discussion is triggered about privileges of bigger or more important 
states because they are all fairly and equally represented. 
The idea of fairness brings us to another positive factor of linguistic diversity, which has 
already been touched upon a little bit: the promotion of equality between the Member State of 
the Union. When talking about linguistic diversity in the EU one can say that there are three 
areas of special importance. First there is democratic participation of the members. When 
there is a restriction put upon the languages to use, this could result in an unfair amount of 
representation and by that lead to a reduction of political weight. Linguistic diversity thus 
supports democracy in the Union. Secondly there is the equality between the Member States 
themselves, which is somehow related to the third issue of Prestige. Linguistic diversity is 
something that promotes both because as soon as there is a restriction of languages, this 
infringes the equality of the Member States and damages their Prestige, as some states and 
their respective languages seem others. 70  
Another aspect to be considered is the fact of facilitation for member states to get acquainted 
with the EU in general, when access of information is provided in their native language71  
Summing up a general phrase that is very often used in this context refers to European 
Culture. The fact that every state contributes to the language of the EU leads to the 
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preservation so some kind of  ‘cultural DNA’ of the Union, which might be lost when 
reducing linguistic diversity. 72 
 
 
7. Downside of Linguistic Diversity 
 
Unfortunately linguistic diversity does not only have positive but also negative aspects.  It 
begins with the huge workload that the institutions have to deal with. As indicated above all 
Regulations or Acts of general application have to be published in all the official languages of 
the EU.73 The same holds true for the Journal of the EU.74 The translation of texts in 23 
different languages is very sophisticated and requires a lot of resources.  
First a lot of time is needed to translate such texts and the more extensive the text the more 
time-consuming the process is.75 This may be very burdensome depending on the type of Act 
that is at stake. Secondly a working-staff is required to conduct the translation of the texts. As 
these are of a high importance and political matter, dealing with crucial topics in the Union 
the staff employed to carry out such tasks must be highly educated and reliable, as inaccurate 
translation may lead to a lot of problems. Finding such personal is one matter, but employing 
and paying them is the other. This brings us to a third problem, the financial and procedural 
costs that come up. The factors leading to these costs are various. These may be costs of 
employment, costs of providing material for the translation, costs of maintenance and several 
other factors. 76 
Another problem arising in relation to translation is the vagueness of translation, which may 
in some cases be imprecise.77 This may depend on the restricted vocabulary given in one 
language, the broadness of terms that may lead to different interpretations of the texts or 
mistakes made during the translation, as translation always includes an individual 
interpretation or comprehension of the text. Thus a text will be translated as the translator may 
interpret certain words, meanings and so on.  
Efficiency suffers from the burden that is imposed by the equality of the languages of the 
Member States. The process of work is slowed down, especially in cases of translation.78 One 
could provide information much faster without all the hurdles to take in order to provide 
information in all necessary languages.  
Diversity can generally also be separated into two different topics – first there is education 
and second there is service and industry. Education and being in the position to speak several 
languages fluently is a very desirable one, referring to the present and to the future. This is 
supported by initiatives of the EU to trigger progress in this area, for instance by different 
programmes as LINGUA, SOCRATES and others.79 In fact there is no downside in this area, 
as education and knowledge is always desirable. However the forced use of all these 
languages for some processes may be problematic.  
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On the other had the customisation of languages in the sector of services and industry is 
essential for firms to deal with their content, but also for other industries to deal with the huge 
volume of digital information. The customisation of information, supports partnerships and 
facilitates transactions between businesses. 80 This can also be seen in the context of 
competitiveness of the EU against other major economic powers, which is an aim set out in 
the Competitiveness Council and recognisable in may other projects.81 It can also be seen in 
the context of a better internal market, which is one of the main aims of the European Union.82 
However linguistic diversity decelerates the process and efficiency, which may lead to 
disadvantages for the EU as too many hurdles may be imposed by the rules on linguistic 
diversity to for instance make quick decisions. 
Summarizing the negative sides of linguistic diversity the reasoning is rather a pragmatic one. 
83 When considering the reduction of official languages of the EU this leads to a clash 
between equality or culture and efficiency or competitiveness. This relationship will be 
addressed in the next part of this paper.  
 
 
8. English as a Lingua Franca 
 
A lingua franca entails the idea that a language is used by non-native speakers for 
international communication between members of an international community.84 The term 
usually depicts a common language (‘Pidgin-language’) that was used for commerce in the 
western Mediterranean until the 19th century. It was based on a mix of the most popular 
languages at that time. 85 An example of a lingua franca in modern times is English. Whether 
English would be an appropriate lingua franca for the EU as well depends on several factors, 
like the actual use of English in the Union and its institutions, the number of people being 
able to speak and understand English, in regard to the staff and the Union citizens, as well as 
other factors.  
In the past Georges Lüdi established that English is used by the Swiss to communicate when 
they speak different languages. The same holds true for Norway, where relations between the 
government and companies, even Norwegian companies, were completely dealt with in 
English. This implies that the use of English is expanding and driven by engines in several 
sectors and places all over the world.86 Consequentially the question is raised how long can 
this development be excluded from the EU or at least reduced? 
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Taking into consideration the amount of English used in the Union, one can see a growing use 
of English in relation to other languages. As indicated above many institutions reduced their 
working language to English only, or they included French and German. However it is 
obvious that for communication purposes English is the most important and mostly used 
language.87 This has to do with the fact that there is a general growing use of English, 
including high proficiency fields. Furthermore there is a growing use of English as second 
language.88 The ability to understand and speak English has advanced in the past, and will 
even grow in the future.89 English is the most widely spread language in the whole world and 
used for communication all over the planet. It is the main language of science and technology 
and plays a crucial role in the process of globalization.90 This has led to the approach of 
English as a lingua franca (ELF), next to the English as a native language (ENL).91 
To understand the situation a short inside is needed of how the states today see the situation. 
The Danes for example when negotiating as accession to the EU advocated a language regime 
in which the focus was on English and French, similar to the work of the Council.92 Larger 
states on the other hand tend to demand a representation of their language on an European 
level, as both an official and a working language.93 
 
 
9. Does the Union Need a Lingua Franca? 
 
The discussion about the actual need of a lingua franca can be nicely introduced by a quote of 
Heinz Kloss in a proposal on European diversity: 
 
In the unification of Europe, which is the wish of us all, we have to perform two 
completely different tasks: we have to improve the possibilities of oral and written 
comprehension between the language communities of Europe, and we have to 
prevent medium-sized and small language communities from being consciously or 
unconsciously discriminated and damaged in that unification.94 
 
In order to be fully able to discuss this topic a few things need to be repeated. First we need to 
consider the arguments put forward for and against linguistic diversity. Secondly we need to 
figure out the difference between the real-life situation, with different official and working 
languages. Finally the concept of a lingua franca should be kept in mind. We considered the 
costs of the linguistic diversity as a negative side. However in order to be able to judge the 
costs one needs to see the costs in relation to something else, thus a cost-benefit analysis 
should me made.95 The costs of linguistic diversity in the EU have steadily been rising from 
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1999-2007. In 2007 the costs for linguistic diversity made up 1% of the total budget of the 
EU. 
However costs cannot be only measured in relation to money but other factors play a crucial 
role too. People tend to communicate in their native language than in their second or third 
language.96 This means that a reduction of languages may also lead to a decrease in 
communication. Another factor to be considered, especially in modern times, are the 
environmental costs.97 Linguistic diversity includes a greater load of paperwork, production 
costs and so on. There may even be political costs caused by the reduction of languages, for 
instance for the European Parliament (EP). The EP is directly elected.98  
Two problems may arise in this context. The first problem is an ex post scenario in which a 
person is elected that does not speak the required working language or his language skills are 
not sufficient. The second problem concerns the situation before the election (ex ante). People 
may be prejudiced when making their preferences because of the language skills of the 
candidates, i.e. not the most suitable candidate will win, but the one showing fluency in the 
required language.99 A last factor to be included is Human Rights. According to Art. 22 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU: ‘the Union shall respect cultural, religious and 
linguistic diversity’, which goes hand in hand with the notion of fairness. It is not fair to ask 
citizens to acquire knowledge in one specific language, just to be able to have access to 
information or communicate on a European level. Equality of people is infringed when the 
access to information is only given in one specific language, as only privileged people 
understanding the language will have access to the information provided. It should not be 
necessary for people to speak a certain language in order to acquire information they need.100 
What also needs to be considered is a possible shift of costs, which means that a reduction of 
linguistic diversity in the Union may reduce the costs for translation, salaries etc., but at the 
same time this can result in other costs like the need to educate people and support them in 
acquiring new or better language skills.101 
The ‘factors mentioned above have to be considered when drawing a conclusion to the essay 
question. Is the policy choice of 23 official languages of the EU still defendable at the 
moment and in the future? When considering the costs and the benefits of linguistic diversity 
mentioned above the result somehow shows that no side actually outbalances the other and 
there is no argument standing out on one side. Therefore one can conclude that the costs are 
quite reasonable in the light of the aims that are to be achieved. 
So should there be any changes? From a democratic point of view the answer is no because no 
state in the EU should be more or less privileged than another state. This goes hand in hand 
with the Charter of Fundamental Rights. However, there should be a difference made between 
the symbolic official languages of the EU and the working languages of the EU. The EU 
needs to be competitive and efficient. Rules on specific language requirements should be 
loosened, especially when considering the negative sides of linguistic diversity and the 
variation of costs. The question is in how far should these been loosened. It is already 
recognisable in the current structures of the Union that there is a reduction of languages used.  
It is however crucial to keep the publications in the official languages when it comes to acts of 
general application and so on. The important aspect is, the more people are influenced, 
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directly or indirectly the easier it should be for the people to get information about it, without 
prejudicing citizens with a lower degree of language skills. The work of institutions should 
due to efficiency reasons however be reduced and the use of 23 languages should not be of 
mandatory use. When the institutions deem it necessary to reduce the number of languages 
they should be able to do so, but at the same time they can also add languages to use in 
specific situations. The reduction of languages should however not be criticised for lack of 
democracy. The reasons for such decisions are not made with the intent to infringe with 
democracy, equality or the Prestige of the Members. The reasons are practical ones that aim to 
keep the Union competitive and functional. This is what is actually done in the Union. But 
there is still an influence of the big states recognisable. The limitation to one language only, in 
the respect English as a lingua franca should be supported to make even more progress.  
So one can say, relating to the essay question, that the work of the Union is not as much 
impaired as one might think in the first place. There have been practical adjustments in the 
Union by limiting their working languages, which makes it still bearable for the Union to 
have 23 official languages. However the influence of the big states and their languages should 
be reduced and one should turn to a development that supports English as the only working 
language, which may be amended by other languages in special cases. The research in the 
area of English as Lingua Franca (ELF) may be helpful here and lead to a reduction of costs 
and other hurdles, without impairing essential elements. Due to the differentiation the Union 
can still keep the 23 official languages and should also stick to Article 4 and 5 of Regulation 
No.1 in order not to prejudice anyone, i.e. still keep special rules for the publication of acts in 
all official languages, as public interest here clearly outweighs the costs. A development in 
such a direction will make it possible to defend a policy with such a high number of official 
languages in the EU in the long term.   
In order to conclude this paper one can quote Leonard Orban, a former Commissioner for 
multilingualism in the EU102:  
[…], multilingualism has its own limits inside the European institutions and in 
publications. No matter how much we would like to, we cannot translate everything in 
all the 23 official languages. We are faced with constraints, depending on the human 
resources available and the budget allocated to translation. Legislation is translated 
into 23 official languages, but other documents […] are translated only into the 
languages needed. At the same time, documents or sub-websites that are consulted 
only by a limited number of people do not need to be in all the official languages. The 
transience of information is another limit. Translation takes time, so we concentrate 
our resources on getting urgent information online in real time, in the languages 
understood by the largest number of European citizens, rather than on late publication 
in all languages.103  
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LINGUISTIC DIVERSITY AT WHAT COST: ARTICLE 55 TEU [TREATY OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION] IN NEED OF REVISION? 
 
Loyce Mrewa  
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
This paper will focus mainly on the legal-institutional aspects of maintaining linguistic 
diversity within the Union. The need and goals of multilingualism and linguistic diversity will 
also be assessed. Sociolinguistic aspects of this multilingualism within the Union will also be 
looked into where language diversity and its relation to society within most of the EU 
Member States are observed. The later part of the paper will focus on the policy analysis of 
the cost, effectiveness and justification of using all 23 official languages, the political issues 
associated with such diversity and the possible solutions to any problems resultant of 
maintaining diversity. The conclusion will focus on my own personal opinion of the best way 
forward, which would be either maintaining such multilingualism or to take action to amend 
treaties and other legal instruments enforcing such measures. My research question is What 
are the effects of linguistic diversity on EU citizens and the legal-institutional aspects 
associated with them? 
 
 
2. The Need for Multilingualism within the EU 
 
The principle of multilingualism is used as a tool to ensure the realization of goals such as 
equal accessibility and transparency of the EU institutions. This is evident in for instance 
Article 24 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), where EU citizens can 
directly question the legality of acts of the EU institutions. As in the European Parliament 
(EP) using any of the official languages within Article 55 TEU and receive an answer in the 
same language.104 This also allows for participative democracy within the Union where every 
EU citizen can challenge the Unions' actions as also within a Citizens initiative according to 
Article 24(1) TFEU. Equality of all Union languages also ensures political significance and 
prestige is maintained amongst the Member States which can be used to avoid the 
deadlocking of EU projects such as within the unitary patent protection system caused by 
Italy and Spain who eventually opted out..105 Equality is also achieved via the promotion and 
safeguarding of each Member States’ cultural and linguistic diversity protected within Article 
22 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. The right to non-discrimination of 
language is also protected within Article 21 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights; 
this Charter is binding within the EU according to Article 6 Treaty on the European Union 
(TEU). The respect and autonomy of linguistic diversity seems to be an essential value in EU 
policy within the EU and is also echoed in projects such as the European Year of languages 
(EYL).106 The Commission in 2005 asserted this through its communication within A New 
Framework Strategy for Multilingualism whose main aims were to improve communication 
between EU citizens and EU institutions and explore ways of increasing multilingualism 
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directly or indirectly the easier it should be for the people to get information about it, without 
prejudicing citizens with a lower degree of language skills. The work of institutions should 
due to efficiency reasons however be reduced and the use of 23 languages should not be of 
mandatory use. When the institutions deem it necessary to reduce the number of languages 
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and other hurdles, without impairing essential elements. Due to the differentiation the Union 
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No.1 in order not to prejudice anyone, i.e. still keep special rules for the publication of acts in 
all official languages, as public interest here clearly outweighs the costs. A development in 
such a direction will make it possible to defend a policy with such a high number of official 
languages in the EU in the long term.   
In order to conclude this paper one can quote Leonard Orban, a former Commissioner for 
multilingualism in the EU102:  
[…], multilingualism has its own limits inside the European institutions and in 
publications. No matter how much we would like to, we cannot translate everything in 
all the 23 official languages. We are faced with constraints, depending on the human 
resources available and the budget allocated to translation. Legislation is translated 
into 23 official languages, but other documents […] are translated only into the 
languages needed. At the same time, documents or sub-websites that are consulted 
only by a limited number of people do not need to be in all the official languages. The 
transience of information is another limit. Translation takes time, so we concentrate 
our resources on getting urgent information online in real time, in the languages 
understood by the largest number of European citizens, rather than on late publication 
in all languages.103  
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within the EU.107 Language within the framework was regarded as a ‘direct expression of 
culture’ and cultural integrity which are also protected in Article 22 of the European Charter 
of Fundamental Rights. The governments of the Member States also agreed to increase the 
individual multilingualism within their own respective countries by use of the Promoting 
Language Learning and Linguistic Diversity: An Action Plan 2004 – 2006 project,108 where 
EU citizens were expected to learn two other languages besides their mother tongue from an 
early age.109 All these initiatives preserve the diversity within the Union whether cultural and 
or linguistic. The linguistic diversity also makes the free movement rights of EU citizens 
within Title IV TFEU possible, as communication barriers will be greatly reduced as a result 
of language learning implemented by measures such as A New Framework Strategy for 
Multilingualism 2005, Promoting Language Learning and Linguistic Diversity: An Action 
Plan 2004 – 2006 and the EYL 2001. 
3. The Legal-Institutional Aspects 
 
The equality of languages of the Member States within the EU is in principle correct but 
might not be so in reality even though linguistic equality is protected in European regulations, 
treaties and decisions of the EU institutions. The status and importance of languages in 
principle can be divided into mere treaty languages and official and working languages.110 
The institutions and all Member states of the Union are stipulated in Article 55 TEU to treat 
the translated texts of the treaty with ‘equal authentication’. The languages within Article 55 
TEU and Article 24 TFEU can be regarded as treaty languages as they are the languages used 
in the translation of the treaties and for bringing a claim to the EU institutions, respectively, in 
a language mentioned in Article 55(1) TEU. The official and working languages of the EU are 
within Article 1 of Council Regulation No.1which accords equal status to all the 23 languages 
of Member States within the Union as official and working languages.111 In Article 342 TFEU 
these official and working languages of the EU institutions are determined by the Council 
acting unanimously by means of regulations, such as Regulation No.1, and without prejudice 
to the Statute of the Court of Justice.  
Council Regulation No. 1 Article 6 states that: ‘The institutions of the Community may 
stipulate in their rules of procedure which of the languages are to be used in specific cases’. 
This alludes to the differential treatment between languages that are accorded status just as 
official languages and those that are used as working languages within the institutions. This 
violates the principle of equality of all languages within Article 55 TEU and Article 1 
Regulation No.1. This differentiation can however, be justified since equality seems to be 
accorded only in principle for practical reasons because strict adherence towards linguistic 
requirements would result in inefficiency, increased workload, increased translation costs and 
                                                 
107 COM(2005) 596 final See I.1 MULTILINGUALISM AND EUROPEAN VALUES. 
108 Presidency Conclusions: Barcelona European Council 2002 See para. 44 or p.19. 
109 Presidency Conclusions: Barcelona European Council 2002 See para. 44 or p.19. 
110 Urrutia & Lasagabaster, ‘Language Rights as a General Principle of Community Law’, 08 German law 
Journal 05 (2007), pp.480-481, available at 
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdfs/Vol08No05/PDF_Vol_08_No_05_479-
500_Articles_Urruitia.pdf.pdf (last visited 13.04.2013) 
111 Regulation No.1 (OJ L 17, 6.10.1958, p. 385), Article 1:  
‘The official languages and the working languages of the institutions of the Union shall be Bulgarian, Czech, 
Danish, Dutch, English, Estonian, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Hungarian, Irish, Italian, Latvian, 
Lithuanian, Maltese, Polish, Portuguese and Swedish’. 
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time.112 The concept of equality being in principle and not in reality is also echoed within the 
Council Regulation on the Community trade mark (EC) No 40/94 within Article 115113. The 
five languages English, French, German, Italian and Spanish within Art.115 are still used 
even today, under the legal base of the Council Regulation (EC) No.207/2009, for appeals 
where applications are lodged in any of the official languages within the same Article. These 
five languages are the procedural languages of the Office for Harmonization in the Internal 
Market (OHMI) where the appeals to the Community trade mark, an EU agent, are lodged114.  
Institutional bodies such as the European Parliament (EP) have the competence to create their 
own Rules of Procedure, acting by a majority of its members according to Article 232 TFEU. 
The EP seems to give high prestige to multilingualism within the Rules of Procedure of the 
European Parliament [7th parliamentary term - October 2012] as Rule 146(1) states: ‘All 
documents of Parliament shall be drawn up in the official languages’ and Rule 146(2) states 
that: ‘speeches shall be interpreted into other official languages or which the bureau 
considers necessary’.115 The rationale behind the high prestige accorded to multilingualism is 
that the EP creates binding legislation on all Member States and EU citizens. Therefore it 
would be necessary to ensure there is transparency and accessibility of these legislative 
documents in order to safeguard participative democracy within the EU. Transparency is 
necessary to enable citizens of the Union or Member States to bring actions, within Article 
263(4) TFEU or within Art. 263(2) TFEU, to the Court of Justice. It is essential that 
legislative acts are published in official languages of the Union to ensure that every citizen of 
a Member State or the Member States themselves can read and understand all legislative acts, 
transparency, which is the first step to enabling participative democracy thereafter where 
accountability measures might be initiated if a legislative act is unlawful. This same concept 
of respecting and ensuring multilingualism to enable transparency and accessibility is also 
echoed in the Council of the European Union where the procedural working language used in 
this institute is also all the 23 official languages of the EU.116 
According to Article 24(4) TFEU all the other institutions such as the Council, The European 
Council, the Commission, the Court of Justice of the European Union, the European Central 
bank, The Court of Auditors and the Ombudsman shall hear and reply applications 
(accessibility) in the official languages mentioned in Article 55 TEU. This requirement is 
echoed by the Court of Justice of the European Union, in Article 29(1) of its Rules of 
Procedure (2010/c 177/01), when dealing with cases brought by citizens of the Member 
States. However, the procedural or working languages of the European Court of Justice are 
mostly French.117 In the Commission documents of correspondence are principally in all 
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116 Gazzola, ‘Managing Multilingualism in the European Union: Language Policy evaluation for the 
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Parliament (2006), p.b397. available at 
98 
 
within the EU.107 Language within the framework was regarded as a ‘direct expression of 
culture’ and cultural integrity which are also protected in Article 22 of the European Charter 
of Fundamental Rights. The governments of the Member States also agreed to increase the 
individual multilingualism within their own respective countries by use of the Promoting 
Language Learning and Linguistic Diversity: An Action Plan 2004 – 2006 project,108 where 
EU citizens were expected to learn two other languages besides their mother tongue from an 
early age.109 All these initiatives preserve the diversity within the Union whether cultural and 
or linguistic. The linguistic diversity also makes the free movement rights of EU citizens 
within Title IV TFEU possible, as communication barriers will be greatly reduced as a result 
of language learning implemented by measures such as A New Framework Strategy for 
Multilingualism 2005, Promoting Language Learning and Linguistic Diversity: An Action 
Plan 2004 – 2006 and the EYL 2001. 
3. The Legal-Institutional Aspects 
 
The equality of languages of the Member States within the EU is in principle correct but 
might not be so in reality even though linguistic equality is protected in European regulations, 
treaties and decisions of the EU institutions. The status and importance of languages in 
principle can be divided into mere treaty languages and official and working languages.110 
The institutions and all Member states of the Union are stipulated in Article 55 TEU to treat 
the translated texts of the treaty with ‘equal authentication’. The languages within Article 55 
TEU and Article 24 TFEU can be regarded as treaty languages as they are the languages used 
in the translation of the treaties and for bringing a claim to the EU institutions, respectively, in 
a language mentioned in Article 55(1) TEU. The official and working languages of the EU are 
within Article 1 of Council Regulation No.1which accords equal status to all the 23 languages 
of Member States within the Union as official and working languages.111 In Article 342 TFEU 
these official and working languages of the EU institutions are determined by the Council 
acting unanimously by means of regulations, such as Regulation No.1, and without prejudice 
to the Statute of the Court of Justice.  
Council Regulation No. 1 Article 6 states that: ‘The institutions of the Community may 
stipulate in their rules of procedure which of the languages are to be used in specific cases’. 
This alludes to the differential treatment between languages that are accorded status just as 
official languages and those that are used as working languages within the institutions. This 
violates the principle of equality of all languages within Article 55 TEU and Article 1 
Regulation No.1. This differentiation can however, be justified since equality seems to be 
accorded only in principle for practical reasons because strict adherence towards linguistic 
requirements would result in inefficiency, increased workload, increased translation costs and 
                                                 
107 COM(2005) 596 final See I.1 MULTILINGUALISM AND EUROPEAN VALUES. 
108 Presidency Conclusions: Barcelona European Council 2002 See para. 44 or p.19. 
109 Presidency Conclusions: Barcelona European Council 2002 See para. 44 or p.19. 
110 Urrutia & Lasagabaster, ‘Language Rights as a General Principle of Community Law’, 08 German law 
Journal 05 (2007), pp.480-481, available at 
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdfs/Vol08No05/PDF_Vol_08_No_05_479-
500_Articles_Urruitia.pdf.pdf (last visited 13.04.2013) 
111 Regulation No.1 (OJ L 17, 6.10.1958, p. 385), Article 1:  
‘The official languages and the working languages of the institutions of the Union shall be Bulgarian, Czech, 
Danish, Dutch, English, Estonian, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Hungarian, Irish, Italian, Latvian, 
Lithuanian, Maltese, Polish, Portuguese and Swedish’. 
 
99 
 
time.112 The concept of equality being in principle and not in reality is also echoed within the 
Council Regulation on the Community trade mark (EC) No 40/94 within Article 115113. The 
five languages English, French, German, Italian and Spanish within Art.115 are still used 
even today, under the legal base of the Council Regulation (EC) No.207/2009, for appeals 
where applications are lodged in any of the official languages within the same Article. These 
five languages are the procedural languages of the Office for Harmonization in the Internal 
Market (OHMI) where the appeals to the Community trade mark, an EU agent, are lodged114.  
Institutional bodies such as the European Parliament (EP) have the competence to create their 
own Rules of Procedure, acting by a majority of its members according to Article 232 TFEU. 
The EP seems to give high prestige to multilingualism within the Rules of Procedure of the 
European Parliament [7th parliamentary term - October 2012] as Rule 146(1) states: ‘All 
documents of Parliament shall be drawn up in the official languages’ and Rule 146(2) states 
that: ‘speeches shall be interpreted into other official languages or which the bureau 
considers necessary’.115 The rationale behind the high prestige accorded to multilingualism is 
that the EP creates binding legislation on all Member States and EU citizens. Therefore it 
would be necessary to ensure there is transparency and accessibility of these legislative 
documents in order to safeguard participative democracy within the EU. Transparency is 
necessary to enable citizens of the Union or Member States to bring actions, within Article 
263(4) TFEU or within Art. 263(2) TFEU, to the Court of Justice. It is essential that 
legislative acts are published in official languages of the Union to ensure that every citizen of 
a Member State or the Member States themselves can read and understand all legislative acts, 
transparency, which is the first step to enabling participative democracy thereafter where 
accountability measures might be initiated if a legislative act is unlawful. This same concept 
of respecting and ensuring multilingualism to enable transparency and accessibility is also 
echoed in the Council of the European Union where the procedural working language used in 
this institute is also all the 23 official languages of the EU.116 
According to Article 24(4) TFEU all the other institutions such as the Council, The European 
Council, the Commission, the Court of Justice of the European Union, the European Central 
bank, The Court of Auditors and the Ombudsman shall hear and reply applications 
(accessibility) in the official languages mentioned in Article 55 TEU. This requirement is 
echoed by the Court of Justice of the European Union, in Article 29(1) of its Rules of 
Procedure (2010/c 177/01), when dealing with cases brought by citizens of the Member 
States. However, the procedural or working languages of the European Court of Justice are 
mostly French.117 In the Commission documents of correspondence are principally in all 
                                                 
112 Els, ‘Multilingualism in the European Union’, International Journal of Applied Linguistics Vol.15 (3) 
(2005), pp. 263-281.  See pp. 269- 271. 
113 Council Regulation  (EC) No 40/94 Article 115 :  
‘1. The application for a Community trade mark shall be filed in one of the official languages of the 
European Community. 
2. The languages of the Office shall be English, French, German, Italian and Spanish. 
3. The applicant must indicate a second language which shall be a language of the Office the use of which he 
accepts as a possible language of proceedings for opposition, revocation or invalidity proceedings.’ 
114 Europa (Community trade mark).See Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (OHMI), available 
at <http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/other/l26022a_en.htm> (last visited 13.04.2013).  
115 EuroParl: Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament. 
116 Gazzola, ‘Managing Multilingualism in the European Union: Language Policy evaluation for the 
European Parliament’, 5 Language Policy for European Parliament (2006), p.397, available at 
<http://www.euc.illinois.edu/_includes/docs/managing_multilingualism_in_the_eu.pdf> (last visited 
13.04.2013).  
117 Curia See Court of Justice: Language arrangements and Gazzola, 5 Language Policy for European 
Parliament (2006), p.b397. available at 
100 
 
official 23 languages but in reality responses to citizens or to Member States will usually only 
be translated into the same language used at application by the individual.118 The official and 
working language requirements of Council Regulation No.1 are also only applied in principle 
due to the fact that only legislation and policy documents of main public importance are 
translated into all official 23 languages within the Commission.119 These translations of the 
major important documents only account for a third of the Commissions’ work in reality.120 In 
the Council, although the staff and the officials have knowledge of at least two languages, 
multilingualism is also limited due to budgetary concerns, time constraints and other practical 
reasons. Because of this only the most widely known languages are used as working 
languages.121 In the European Central Bank in Frankfurt, English is used as procedural 
language both internally and externally.122 The derogating from the Treaty articles and 
Regulations, enforcing the linguistic diversity, by EU institutes and Agencies is unlawful in 
principle. Nonetheless the EU institutes act via force majeure due to the resultant limitations 
and inefficiency of implementing such measures. The lawful derogation from use of all 
official languages can be justified within Council Regulation No. 1 Article 6 but it is used for 
exceptional or ‘specific’ cases only and not for general application. 
 
 
4. Sociolinguistic Aspects 
 
One of the ways of achieving equality in the EU is through linguistic diversity which places 
paramount significance on every Member States’ language. It is an important feature of the 
EU and is protected both in Article 55 TEU and the Article 22 of the European Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. The official documents of the EU are translated into the different 
languages used within the EU thus reflecting on the cultural diversity of the high authority 
accorded to every Member’s own language. The European Year of Languages [EYL], 
founded by the EU in 2001, project also aimed at achieving the goals within Article 22 of the 
European Charter of Fundamental Rights European Year.123 Its activities had a budget of 
10.792 million Euros given at the European Union level and also another 10 million Euros 
from the participating Member States.124 The project was effective in raising awareness at 
national level of the need to value and recognize the importance of other languages within the 
Union. The EYL results also highlighted how other countries were aware and competent in 
using another language, which was English, but was seen as an insufficient step towards 
creating a multilingual European society.125 Other projects such as Promoting Language 
Learning and Linguistic Diversity: An Action Plan 2004 – 2006126 and A New Framework 
Strategy for Multilingualism 2005 were implemented to increase language competences and 
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enhance multilingualism at national level. However, in the reports on the progress of the 
Action plan; the Comenius projects improved language skills but mainly for English.127 This 
alludes to the disinterest of the EU citizens in becoming multilingual and having knowledge 
of other languages besides their mother tongue, with an exception in the case of English 
which is a globally known and used language within the business arena, media et cetera. 
 
 
5. Policy Analysis: Effectiveness and Cost 
 
Linguistic diversity helps to preserve the cultural integrity within the Union, equality, 
transparency and accessibility within the Union and is also a tool to ensure political prestige 
and importance of each Member State. The translations and the interpretations are carried out 
by the most competent professionals to ensure high accuracy of the translated documents 
within institutions such as the EP and the DG Interpretation within the Commission.128 
However, the scope of application of this linguistic diversity is limited as the translation into 
23 official languages of all legislative acts, decisions, treaties according to Council regulation 
No.1 and Article 55 TEU is financially burdensome and leads to inefficiency of the EU 
institutions due to increased workloads. These workloads are evidenced by the need of the 
Commission internal DG interpretation to employ 300-400 freelance interpreters per day129. 
The Commission only translates acts of grave importance to the public which account for only 
a third of their total work.130 There is however, a decrease in the number of potential 
interpretations to be used in the future as figures currently show that when most of the 
interpreters reach retirement age it will be unlikely or difficult to find replacements especially 
if a large number take early retirement packages.131 This will reduce efficiency and increase 
delays due to staffing shortages or increase the budgetary costs for interpreters since there will 
be need of an increase in freelance interpreters. 
In Article 314 TFEU the EP and Council acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative 
procedure shall draw up the Union’s budget in accordance with the other elements within 
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multilingualism expenditure represents over one third of the total expenditure of Parliament.133 
In the Commission translation costs increased by only 20% since the Member States increased 
from 11 to 23 between the years 2004-2007.134 The financial costs of these translations and 
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official 23 languages but in reality responses to citizens or to Member States will usually only 
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4. Sociolinguistic Aspects 
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enhance multilingualism at national level. However, in the reports on the progress of the 
Action plan; the Comenius projects improved language skills but mainly for English.127 This 
alludes to the disinterest of the EU citizens in becoming multilingual and having knowledge 
of other languages besides their mother tongue, with an exception in the case of English 
which is a globally known and used language within the business arena, media et cetera. 
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budget of the EU.135 The greatest cost within the EU institutes has to be the inefficiency 
caused by the time and resources consumed by language barriers due to an ever increasing 
workload which needs to be addressed by translators and interpreters especially in debates or 
oral proceedings and workload which necessitates 600 staff interpreters and 300-400 freelance 
interpreters per day.136 
The EYL project had a budget of over 20 million Euros from all Member States and the EU 
even though it was effective in raising awareness on the national level of the importance of 
multilingualism within the Union;137 can such costs be justified only for the merits attained of 
national recognition of other languages and an increase of language teaching and learning 
which only resulted in the increase of communicative competences in the English 
language138.In the years 2000-2002, the Socrates and Leonardo programs invested more in 
programmes which promoted specific language learning by 66%. This increased their budget 
from 30 million to approximately 50 million Euros in the 2004-2006 period.139 This led to an 
increase in for instance language projects by 84% and in adult education learning partnerships 
by 689%.140 However, the results of these EU-funded language programs did not meet 
‘specific goals’ of promoting linguistic diversity and multilingualism as in the Comenius in-
service training of teachers which was mostly training in English and within the Comenius 
projects and grants mostly English was undertaken as a second language.141 The goals of 
promoting multilingualism, linguistic diversity and cultural diversity were not “really” 
achieved as progress cannot be established as a result of the promotion of one language, 
namely English. This brings to question whether the increased costs were justified by the 
outputs. 
 
 
6. Political Aspects 
 
One of the goals of maintaining linguistic diversity is to accord political prestige and 
significance to all the Member States. An example of politicized aspects of the linguistic 
diversity is within the patent rights in Europe. The Commission in 2000 proposed a unitary 
Community patent with English, French, and German as the procedural working languages.142 
They had been used for the past thirty years and all the languages were both official languages 
of the EU and of the European Patent Organization (EPO).143 The use of only the official 
languages of the EPO would not only be cost-effective, because of the reduction of translation 
costs of the patents from €14,000 to just €680 per patent, but would also lead to the reduction 
of patenting expenses incurred especially by small and medium sized enterprises which could 
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be reinvested to aid growth.144 This would also enable the EPO to carry out further research 
within the patenting area for the EU. This approach would be efficient since it was an already 
tried and tested approach. The Commission allowed other countries the possibility to apply 
for a patent in their own native language and receive the patent translated by the EPO in an 
official language.145 Spain and Italy opposed the initiative as they wanted the same prestige 
awarded to German and the other official languages which are used by the majority of the 
other Member States.146 Italy and Spain rejected the trilingual approach due to the need of 
political importance and prestige especially for Italy as Italian was one of the founding 
languages used in the EU amongst other founding Member States147. This raises the question 
whether political importance and prestige should be awarded more status than efficiency. The 
proposal needed unanimity so therefore it was not adopted due to the veto of Spain and 
Italy.148  
The Commission, on 13 April 2011, adopted proposals for implementing regulations on the 
creation of unitary patent protection and a second one on the applicable translation 
arrangements.149 This unitary patent protection system would also reduce the costs of 
patenting with working languages being defined within Article 14(3) of the Convention on the 
Grant of European Patents (EPC) and would also enable a compensation scheme within Art.5 
of the Council Regulation on implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation 
of unitary patent protection with regard to the applicable translation arrangements.150 Italy and 
Spain were still threatening the use of their veto towards the trilingualism of the working 
languages as they considered the trilingualism contra to equality of Member States guaranteed 
in Article 22 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights which is binding according to 
Article 6 TEU. However, the Council on 10 March 2011 decided to use enhanced cooperation 
within Article 118 TFEU in the creation of the unitary patent system in order to overcome the 
deadlock.151 The use of the legal base in Article 118TFEU might however, be unlawful and 
therefore be in need of some amendments.152 This reflects on the inflexibility created by 
politics regarding the language regime of equality protected in Article 55 TEU and Council 
Regulation No.1. The unitary patent protection system would not only protect the small and 
medium-sized enterprises but would allow for an increase in research activities and 
innovation in order to expand the industry; these attributes are all positive and greatly 
outweigh the demerits. However, the initiative has been stalled for nearly 12 years due to 
political aspects of using a trilingualism approach and the need of political importance 153 and 
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prestige for Italy and Spain who have since opted out154. This illustrates how linguistic 
diversity can greatly undermine efficiency and raises the question whether linguistic 
democracy can truly be justified in such a context or, should a more realist approach be 
adopted but without also offsetting the already topsy-turvy political environment. 
 
 
7. Possible Solutions 
 
The use of all 23 official and working languages of the EU enshrined in Council Regulation 
No.1 is not always possible within the EU institutes due to a variety of limitations. In most of 
the institutions the procedural languages are reduced to either the most common languages, 
for example in the Council or English within the European Central Bank, to enable efficiency. 
Different approaches have been suggested by Michele Gazzola, specifically for the EP 
procedural language which can be used in this context, such as reduced multilingualism [only 
six official languages used].155 However, this too could cause political conflict, as a result of 
which languages would be selected. Asymmetric systems are were all official 23 languages 
would be used except in oral communications, or where the languages would be limited to 
two or three and finally controlled multilingualism are where the different institutions could 
choose which languages would be a procedural language in both written and oral proceedings. 
This approach is likely to undermine transparency and equal accessibility of the EU 
institutions depending on which language is chosen. However, others have suggested the use 
of English as a lingua franca in the EU.156 
English is a universally known language and with the phenomenon of globalization the 
English language would seem the most viable and practical language to reduce language 
barriers within the Union. Various measures have been undertaken within the EU to promote 
language knowledge and learning. The use of projects such as the EYL 2001 highlighted how 
English was used as an effective communication tool in other countries thereby supporting the 
views of English being a lingua franca within Europe157.Another EU project was Promoting 
Language Learning and Linguistic Diversity: An Action Plan 2004 – 2006 whose reports of 
the Comenius projects improved language skills, but mainly for English.158 This further 
highlights the authoritativeness and the general competence of EU citizens to communicate in 
the English language. In both the language projects English was the most commonly selected 
and desired second language in most of the Member States. English is also commonly known 
and used in large groups of society and not only by elites due to other global influences such 
as music, films, the media159 and even in formal settings such as in business and academia160 
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.These global influences are present even within Europe due to the increasing globalization of 
the world. One of the potential drawbacks of using English as a lingua franca is dependent on 
the quality of English since it is a second language in most of the Member States where the 
language can be influenced by local customs and might form a type of “pidgin English” 
influenced by an endo-normative concept161. This could cause problems within the institutions 
with regard to communication and mutual understanding between employees from different 
countries but the role played by accents seems minor to development of mutual 
understanding. 
It is to be expected that the role of English as a lingua franca of the EU would raise a lot of 
political conflicts especially in States with majorly used mother tongues such as German 
(16%), Italian and English (13% each), French (12%), then Spanish and Polish (8% each).162 
Member State languages spoken in a somewhat international sphere such as German and 
French could lead to scepticism about promoting English due to expected resultant decrease 
of their own language spheres of influence.163 English is still the most spoken foreign 
language since results from the Eurobarometer 2005164 and the recent Special Eurobarometer 
(386)165 where English ranked 38% in comparison to French (12%), German (11%), Spanish 
(7%) and Russian (5%). English is also the most widely spoken language at national level in 
19 out of 25 Member states (excluding UK and Ireland) which proves that is it the true lingua 
franca of the EU and its use would be the most efficient within the EU. 166 
8. Conclusion 
 
The maintenance of linguistic diversity within Article 55 TEU and even Regulation No.1 is 
not reasonable and leads to problems of inefficiency within the Union if all 23 official 
languages are also the working procedural languages within the EU institutions and the EU. 
The EU institutions, such as the European Central bank and the Commission, do not use all 23 
languages due to various efficiency issues. The issues can be solved by use of a lingua franca 
which currently seems to be English as evidenced by the results of language implementation 
projects such as the EYL 2001 and Promoting Language Learning and Linguistic Diversity: 
An Action Plan 2004 – 2006. The current globalisation also supports the use of English since 
it is a globally known language due to its use within the media, business, films and even 
academia. The linguistic diversity and also cultural integrity protected within the Union could 
be diminished but each Member State can preserve its own cultural and linguistic diversity at 
national level. The system used presently is unsustainable especially with the prospected 
enlargement of the Union soon to 28 Member States; even future enlargement would just 
result in larger problems therefore the Union needs to take action before things get worse out 
of hand since the likelihood of attaining successive interpreters to replace retirements within 
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prestige for Italy and Spain who have since opted out154. This illustrates how linguistic 
diversity can greatly undermine efficiency and raises the question whether linguistic 
democracy can truly be justified in such a context or, should a more realist approach be 
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the Union is unlikely. The change of the system towards linguistic diversity is not sustainable 
as evidenced by the institutions which have changed their procedural languages and ignored 
the general rule of 23 working and official languages in order to maintain efficiency even 
though this is in principle unlawful as it breaches Regulation No.1. Although derogation from 
the linguistic requirement is permissible under Regulation No.1 Article 6 it is only for 
exceptional or ‘specific’ cases.167 The EU institutions are now undertaking unlawful actions 
and only adhering to the use of all 23 ‘official’ languages as working languages in principle 
which highlights how necessary the revision of Article 55 TEU and other legislation 
stipulating the need for multilingualism has become in order to ensure not only efficiency but 
also as a way to limit the unlawfulness carried out by the institutions as a force majeure. The 
EU needs to take some action whether it is having a lingua franca for the EU or finding a 
compromise between EU institutions duties, towards promoting cultural and linguistic 
diversity, and efficiency since the complete withdrawal from the multilingualism within the 
Union seems unlikely. This is evidenced by all the investment within this area such as 
language implementation projects and the inclusion of a portfolio of Commissioner for 
Multilingualism, Leonard Orban, within the Union168. However, it seems necessary for 
Member States to let go of their nationalistic ego underlying the demand of maintaining their 
own languages within the Union and work together towards reducing costs and finding the 
most effective means of creating a functional and well-oiled EU machine which is both 
sustainable and transparent. 
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INTRODUCING DISSENTING AND CONCURRING OPINIONS AT THE COURT 
OF JUSTICE: IMPROVING THE READABILITY OF JUDGMENTS OR CREATING 
MAYHEM? 
 
Egelyn Braun 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
The Court of Justice delivers collegiate rulings that excludes the possibility of concurring and 
dissenting opinions as derived from Art. 27 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice. 
A dissenting opinion is expressed by a judge who does not agree with the majority decision, 
while a concurring opinion is one where the judge agrees with the main judgment but might 
provide a different line of reasoning.1 In light of recent criticism concerning the democratic 
deficit in the Union’s decision-making, it would appear to be a progressive step to start 
considering the possibility of adopting measures that are not only used in numerous Member 
States and international organizations such as the European Court of Human Rights, but that 
could also improve the readability and accessibility of judgments, and contribute to a more 
multifaceted development of European law as a whole.  
In order to assess the reasoning behind the Court’s present approach and the possibility of 
future reforms on the matter, we will briefly consider the historical, political and procedural 
elements of individual opinions in the Court of Justice. By dissecting the main arguments 
supporting collegiate rulings, it will become more apparent whether the individual opinions 
could reach more desirable results for the Court. The theoretical aspect of individual opinions 
will be assessed by presenting the advantages and disadvantages in relation to readability - in 
particular, the effects on the style of judgments, translations and transparency. The practical 
aspect will be considered by drawing a comparison between the position of the Advocates-
General to that of a dissenting or concurring judge. By thoroughly assessing the numerous 
implications of individual opinions in the Court of Justice, we will arrive at the conclusion 
that the benefits outweigh the disadvantages of introducing the practice. 
 
 
2. Historical Elements: Individual Opinions – a New Concept for the Union? 
 
The founding members of the European Union - France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Luxembourg - are all civil law countries that were relatively unfamiliar with 
the concept of dissenting and concurring opinions, especially during the time of the 
establishment of the Court of Justice in 1952.2 Much has changed since then, including the 
introduction of common law elements such as de facto case law based on precedents in the 
Court, and the introduction of dissent in higher courts in several Member States. Countries 
such as the United Kingdom, Germany, Estonia, Greece, Italy and several Scandinavian 
states, recognize dissenting opinions in some form on the level of the highest courts or 
constitutional courts.3  
The lack of individual opinion also relates strongly to the secrecy of deliberations, which is 
also the core principle of the judges’ oath, as stipulated in Art. 2 of the Statute of the Court of 
                                                 
1 B. Garner, Black's Law Dictionary, 8th edition, West Group (2004). 
2 J. Laffranque, Dissenting Opinion in the European Court of Justice – Estonia’s Possible Contribution to the 
Democratisation of the European Union Judicial System, IX Juridica International (2004), p. 16. 
3 J. Laffranque, Dissenting Opinion and Judicial Independence, VIII Juridica International (2003), p. 165. 
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Justice of the European Union. Judges are bound to “perform their duties impartially and 
conscientiously and to preserve the secrecy of the deliberations of the Court”. By allowing 
dissenting and concurring opinions, the veil of secrecy may be lifted by allowing various 
arguments that were used to arrive at the final judgment to be assessed in opinions.  
From a historical perspective, the Roman legal tradition initially included public deliberations 
and declarations of the judgment. It was not until much later, with influence from the canonist 
procedures, that secrecy became prominent.4 In France, the earliest degree for secrecy was 
published in 1344 and over the course of the next four centuries, this rule developed into a 
protection mechanism for the judges. After the French Revolution, the principle of secrecy 
was abandoned largely due to the general distrust for the courts. However, soon thereafter, 
deliberations were once again made secret, although the process has not always been without 
protest, especially in criminal cases.5 With influence from the Napoleonic codes, the 
Netherlands, Belgium and Italy also adopted the principle of secrecy.  
These juriscultural developments shed light on the current situation in most of these states 
(with the exception of Italy that has since changed its perspective), and explain the Union’s 
current approach in relation to the strong influence of the French legal tradition, especially 
with the Court’s structural model, the Conseil d’Etat.6 However, with the vast expansion of 
the Union and the development of dissenting opinions in most Member States, the concept of 
introducing dissenting and concurring opinions no longer seems like an unconventional 
proposal.  
 
 
3.  Political Elements: Maintaining Authority for the New Legal Order? 
 
One of the principal reasons for delivering collegiate rulings is to maintain judicial authority 
and produce an uniform interpretation and application of EU law as stipulated in Art. 19 TEU. 
By introducing individual opinions, especially those of dissenting nature, the authority of the 
Court and legal certainty may very well be undermined. Moreover, it may be more difficult to 
establish the main principles of the ruling with well-researched and well-reasoned dissenting 
opinions by its side.7 However, a healthy amount of debate between opposing views could 
provide the Court with a valuable aspect of self-criticism, thus allowing EU law to develop 
and produce more desirable outcomes for all parties involved.8 The benefits of allowing 
dissent could extend far beyond addressing the arguments of the main judgment – individual 
opinions could help place the judicial questions in a wider legal context, introduce elements of 
comparative European law from various Member States and make the legal reasoning more 
accessible for a wider range of audience.9 As a result, the Court would reach a state of 
compromise that would both maintain the authority of the main judgment, but also satisfy the 
holders of opposing views by assessing the legal arguments in question in a more multifaceted 
range and form. After all, the Court does not have problems with asserting authority like some 
of the other international courts do - their decisions are ultimately binding in all of the 
Member States. 
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6 J. Laffranque, IX Juridica International (2004), p. 17. 
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4.  Procedural Elements: Protecting the Independence of Judges? 
 
One of the main arguments supporting the single ruling practice includes the preservation of 
judicial independence. Once the appearance of unanimity breaks down, the position of the 
judges changes radically. The question of independence relates closely to the appointment and 
re-appointment procedure stipulated in Art. 253 TFEU, Art. 255 TFEU and the Statute of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union. Judges will be appointed by the common accord of 
the governments of the Member States for a six-year term, which is renewable for an 
unlimited amount of times.  
The problematic aspect of possible re-appointments relates to the judges’ dependence on the 
Member States that are appointing them. With the introduction of dissenting and concurring 
opinions, the Court could end up on a slippery slope, which allows the judges to show 
partiality through the individual opinions in order to support the views of the Member States 
and thus ensure their re-appointment.10 On the flip side, the judges could also jeopardize their 
position by not supporting the views of the Member States through their individual opinions. 
Political pressure can lead both sides to retaliation, but for esteemed judges that have been 
elected by the Member States because of their outstanding careers, national governments are 
simply not the only audience they consider.11 Although the endangerment of the independence 
of the judges is clearly a possibility, it cannot be seen as a solid argument to negate their 
chance of presenting an individual opinion altogether. By introducing individual opinions, the 
preservation of judicial independence would depend more on the reasoned choices of a 
particular judge and the actions of the Member States, not the safeguards of the Court’s 
procedural elements.12 By relying on the premise that it is in the best interests of both the 
Member States and the Court to provide an impartial and democratic judicial process, the 
introduction of individual opinions could lead to a more desirable outcome for judicial 
independence, not create mayhem in that regard. Moreover, in relation to the oath as 
stipulated in Art. 2 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, judges are 
obliged to ‘perform their duties impartially and conscientiously and to preserve the secrecy of 
the deliberations of the Court’. The importance of the secrecy of deliberations was previously 
noted, but the first two elements must equally be considered in relation to judicial 
independence. In order to act impartially and conscientiously, a judge that holds a minority 
view would act in contradiction if he were to be denied the opportunity to express a dissenting 
opinion.13 Individual opinion would ensure mental independence and that the views of every 
judge are respected, which could be seen as reinforcing collegiality instead of undermining 
it.14 
 
 
 
 
5.  Individual Opinion in Theory: Advantages and Disadvantages for Readability 
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13 J. Laffranque, VIII Juridica International (2003), p. 164. 
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One of the main arguments supporting the single ruling practice includes the preservation of 
judicial independence. Once the appearance of unanimity breaks down, the position of the 
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5.  Individual Opinion in Theory: Advantages and Disadvantages for Readability 
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In order to provide a theoretical comparison of the advantages and disadvantages of 
introducing dissenting and concurring opinions, we will consider its multifaceted effects on 
the style of judgments, translations and transparency. 
 
 
5.1  Style: Shift from Generality to Specificity 
 
It could be said that the style of reasoning in the Court’s judgments is more focused on the 
outcome than the process.15 The level of generality that is used when describing a principle, 
precedent case or interpretation of a statutory provision, is highly influential for the outcome 
of the case – it can limit the scope of the decision and give the judges a better chance to match 
the facts of the case with the principle at hand.16 Consequently, the Court’s justificatory style 
has often been criticized as being vague and overly abstract.17 With the introduction of 
dissenting and concurring opinions, there could be a shift from generality to specificity in 
relation to assessing the legal principles used in its reasoning. This could be seen as an 
advantage for legal scholars and national courts, who would be able to benefit from the 
increased accessibility and readability of the judgments. For the Court, this could be seen as a 
disadvantage if the generality of their statements is dissected by the specificity of the dissent. 
Moreover, if the main judgment contains inconsistent or poor legal reasoning with little 
precedent, then dissenting opinions could only make it more difficult to establish the main 
principle of the judgment. It is a clear possibility that a well-reasoned dissent could 
overshadow or undermine the main judgment in controversial cases, but simultaneously, it 
could also be seen as a good incentive to improve the quality of judgments in order prevent 
this situation from occurring.18 When taking into account that the Court’s general approach 
aims to fulfill goals of uniformity and effectiveness, then the increased scope of legal 
interpretation through individual opinion could be fundamentally at odds with the prevailing 
practice. 
 
5.2  Translation: Increasing Costs, Time Consumption and Workload 
 
While the availability of judgments in the official languages of the Union can certainly be 
seen as a advantage for readability and accessibility, it also serves as a large disadvantage in 
terms of the Court’s workload and efficiency. Firstly, all of the Courts documents are 
translated into its internal working language of French.19 Secondly, the judgments are 
translated into the respective official languages, as stipulated in Art. 29-31 of the Rules of 
Procedure of the Court of Justice. The obligation to translate dissenting and concurring 
opinions would certainly increase the workload of the Court, the costs of translation and time 
consumption.20 However, the accessibility of case law for all of the Member States is a factor 
of utmost importance for the Court’s legitimacy, and adjustments to handle the increasing 
workload would have to be made. 
 
5.3  Transparency: Opening the Line of Legal Reasoning 
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By unveiling the secrecy of deliberations through individual opinion, the Court’s line of legal 
reasoning would be explained in more depth. Providing a new perspective on the reasoning 
that led to the majority decision via concurring opinions could help fill the gaps in law and 
give a better understanding of the principles established.21 A dissenting opinion would lead to 
a more challenging perspective that ensures a healthy debate and a wider context for the 
principles assessed. As a disadvantage, the Court’s authority and legal certainty may be 
undermined, and it may be more difficult to establish the main principles of the ruling with 
well-researched and well-reasoned individual opinions by its side.22 However, in relation to 
readability, the arguments for individual opinion tend to outweigh the counterarguments by 
virtue of transparency. It might often be the case that the reasons for a certain judgment could 
be better understood in light of a contrary view.23 Moreover, especially in controversial cases, 
the lack of transparency could prove to be counterproductive because it has the potential to 
lead to the generation of suspicion among the public.24 The current style of judgments does 
not always provide sufficient information to build counterarguments for dissenting opinions, 
which consequently puts more pressure on the holders of opposing views to thoroughly 
describe the line of reasoning.25 As a result, the Court would be left with a larger body of 
well-reasoned legal arguments that could help develop the Union’s legal policy as a whole 
and even serve as a basis for future drafts and papers on the subject matter. 
 
 
6.  Individual Opinion in Practice: the Position of the Advocates-General 
 
When discussing the introduction of dissenting and concurring opinions, we should note that 
several elements of the practice are already represented in the unique body of the Advocate-
General. Art. 252 TFEU stipulates that the Court will be assisted by eight Advocates-General, 
whose duty is to ‘act with complete impartiality and independence to make, in open court, 
reasoned submissions on cases which, in accordance with the Statute of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union, require his involvement’. The appointment procedure and requirements 
for Advocates-General are identical to the procedure for judges, as stipulated in Art. 253 
TFEU and the Statute of the Court of Justice. Judges and Advocates-General rank equally in 
precedence according to their seniority in office, as stipulated in Art. 6 of the Rules of 
Procedure of the Court of Justice. From the outset, it appears that the Advocate-General can 
be seen as a member of the Court that offers a unique perspective much like the dissenting 
and concurring opinions of a judge would. In order to determine whether this body could 
serve as an alternative to the individual opinion of judges and whether it would still be needed 
after the introduction of the practice, we will draw a comparison of the position of the 
Advocate-General to that of a dissenting or concurring judge. 
 
 
6.1  Effect on the Judgment: Essential or Supplementary? 
 
The dissenting or concurring opinion of a judge will be published after the main judgment has 
been made. It is especially important for dissenting opinions that the arguments of the 
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22 J. Laffranque, IX Juridica International (2004), p. 17. 
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majority decision are established so that counterarguments could be crafted in response. 
Individual opinions do not directly affect the judgment but merely serve as a form of 
supplement. However, the practical effects of a powerful dissenting opinion could extend 
beyond its initial position – after all, the dissent of today could be the majority of tomorrow. 
In several civil law Member States, the scope of application is often limited to important cases 
in the highest court or constitutional court. In comparison, the opinion of the Advocate-
General is presented during a much earlier phase, as its principal purpose is to assist before 
the deliberation process. As proof of their influence, the opinions of Advocates-General are 
also often cited in the final judgments.26 The submissions of the Advocate-General will be 
heard during the oral procedure, although the Court may decide, after hearing the Advocate-
General, that the case shall be determined without the submission, as stipulated in Art. 20 (5) 
of the Statute of the Court of Justice. To conclude, both opinions are subject to limitations, but 
the actual effect on the judgment varies greatly – individual opinions have no effect, whereas 
the opinion of the Advocates-General can be directly applicable. 
 
6.2  Nature of the Opinion: a Duty or a Right? 
 
One of the fundamental differences of the individual opinion of a judge and the opinion of 
Advocates-General resides in the nature of their prerogative. The ability to present a 
dissenting or concurring opinion can be seen as a right, whereas the submission of an opinion 
of Advocates-General is an obligation derived directly from their duty as a legal body.27 It is 
important to note this difference when considering whether the Advocates-General opinion 
could be seen as an alternative to individual opinion. If we rely on the premise that the ability 
to present a dissenting opinion is a fundamental right relating to the independence of the 
judge, then the duty to provide an advisory submission undoubtedly falls short of that 
concept. 
 
6.3  Substance of the Opinion: Similar Scope but Different Angle 
 
The opinion of Advocates-General is usually crafted in a manner similar to that of the final 
judgment – it contains the facts of the case, the state of law, the issues at hand, the 
submissions of the parties involved and the reasoned opinion on the outcome of the case.28 It 
usually offers a more in-depth approach than the final judgment itself and lays out the issues 
that the Court should or should not address in their deliberations.29 Likewise, the dissenting or 
concurring opinion of a judge could provide a more in-depth analysis of the case and the 
principles at hand. The main difference between the two is derived from the fact that the 
Advocates-General does not see the judgment at the time of his submission, whereas the 
individual opinions rely directly on the final judgment. It is a crucial difference that 
determines not only the substance of the opinion but the entire approach that is taken. 
 
6.4  Duality of Opinions: Co-exist or Overlap? 
 
Based on the differences and similarities considered above, we must decide whether the two 
functions overlap in their purpose or whether they each provide equally important 
perspectives that can coexist in the Court’s practice. Although the Advocates-General and 
judges enjoy a similar position along with similar appointment procedures, they cannot be 
                                                 
26 F. Jacobs, Kluwer Law International (2000), p. 21. 
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viewed as identical. In addition, the nature of their opinions is fundamentally different, for a 
right is not the same as a duty. Moreover, the opinions are presented in a different phase of 
the proceedings and possess a different function in terms of the effect on the judgment, as 
well as the reliance or non-reliance on the final judgment. We can therefore conclude that 
although the Advocates-General provide a unique perspective that can differ from the 
judgment much like individual opinions, they do not overlap with the concept in any 
fundamental form due to procedural and substantive differences.30 In my view, coexistence of 
both opinions is therefore not only possible, but also complimentary for the development of 
EU law. 
 
 
7.  Conclusion 
 
To conclude, the practice of dissenting and concurring opinions is used in numerous Member 
States on the highest court level, as well as in several international organizations such as the 
European Court of Human Rights. We considered the historical, political and procedural 
elements to explain why the Court of Justice is reluctant to introduce the practice in light of its 
increasing popularity. The leading arguments against individual opinion relate to the 
protection of the independence of the judges, the maintenance of authority and uniformity, 
and the historical allegiance to hard-core civil law countries such as France. By analyzing the 
theoretical aspect of individual opinion, we concluded that the style of judgments could 
greatly benefit from the increased readability, and the level of transparency for the line of 
reasoning would help contribute to a more multifaceted development of European law as a 
whole. The downside of introducing individual opinion would naturally relate to the increase 
in workload, time consumption and costs, especially due to the obligation of translation. 
However, the accessibility of case law for all of the Member States is a factor of utmost 
importance for the Court’s legitimacy, and adjustments to handle the increasing workload 
would have to be made.  
By analyzing the practical aspect of individual opinion, we concluded that the position of the 
Advocate-General is ultimately not able to replace the individual opinion of a judge. The 
differences in the nature and substance of the opinion, as well as in the effect on the judgment 
render the two practices separate. However, in my view, both opinions could coexist since 
they do not fundamentally overlap in substantive or procedural form. By thoroughly assessing 
the numerous implications of individual opinions in the Court of Justice, we have arrived at 
the conclusion that the benefits outweigh the disadvantages of introducing the practice. The 
ability to justify ones line of reasoning will add to the recognition of legal responsibility and 
serve as a great tool to maximize the efforts of the Court. In order to balance the 
disadvantages, individual opinion could be limited to certain cases or areas, and the loss in 
authority could be compensated by the gain in legitimacy. The very basis of democracy relies 
on debate that allows opposing views to be presented, and needless to say, it is especially 
important to preserve these values in the highest court of the European Union. With the 
current realities of political dialogue suggesting that we need more measures to further the 
democratization of the Union’s institutions, it would seem appropriate to start considering the 
introduction of dissenting and concurring opinions in the European Court of Justice. 
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